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PREFACE
What prompted the topic of this thesis was a brief visit to the
Big Hole battlefield during a hunting trip in November, 1963. Because
the area was officially closed to visitors, no Park Service personnel
were there to explain what had transpired 86 years before. I found a
pamphlet entitled "Trail Guide," left in a box on one of the small
buildings, and it explained something about the furious fighting that
had taken place.

It indicated where soldiers and citizen volunteers

had dug rifle pits, still discernible in the "siege area" where these
men had retreated after attacking the Nez Perce camp a half mile dis
tant. The booklet noted that seven soldiers had received the Congres
sional Medal of Honor for their service there. The largest of several
monuments in their honor had been transported from New Hampshire in
1883.
Then I noticed a small monument, unpolished and fashioned from
rough stone. Apparently it had been placed there by an unknown donor
and was never removed. If memoiy serves, the inscription on the bronze
plaque read, "In memory of the Nez Perce women and children who were
killed here by U. S. soldiers."
After completing By self-guided tour and returning home, that
plaque had me curious about the true, full story of the Nez Perce war.
The answer was not an easy one to find. Hence, a thesis was born.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORIC HT OF THE NEZ PERCE NATION
To give perspective and a basis for understanding the events of
1877, when the Nez Perce nation was brought to full subjugation by the
U. S. government, it is necessary to establish objectively something
of the character of these Indians.
With all due respect to voluminous and enlightening studies
undertaken in the fields of histoiy and anthropology concerning the Nez
Perce as a people, it is generally agreed by scholars that little is
known about the origin and ancient traditions of these somewhat nomadic,
amorphous tribes. Tribal documentation—save for pictographs—is not
extant.^
Nevertheless, the usual oral tradition involving folklore and
nyths has been preserved to some degree through ejctensive personal interviews.

2

At the same time these efforts rendered limited documentation

and analysis of the original tongue, a Shahaptian dialect closely related
to the Umatilla, Wallawalla and Yakima tribes of Oregon and Washington.^
The character of the Nez Perce tongue obviously links the nation

^Herbert J. Spinden, The Nez Perce Indians, American Anthropo
logical Association, Vol. II, Part 3 (Lancaster, Pa.; The New Era
Printing Company, 1908), p. 231.
^Archie Phinney, Nez Perce Texts (New York: Columbia University
Press, 193h).
%errill D. Beal, I Will Fight No More Forever (Seattle: Univer
sity of Washington Press,'"l963), pT ii.
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with Pacific Northwest tribes, as opposed to Indians located to the east
in Montana. But it should be noted at the outset that Nez Perce envir
ons were, for the most part, isolated geographically from neighboring
nations.
Generally speaking, the area inhabited by the 70 or more tribes
in the Nez Perce system stretched, in what has been described as a 200square-mile belt, across Idaho to the eastern portions of Oregon and
Washington.^ This belt was bounded to the east by the Bitterroot Mount
ains, to the west by the Blue Mountains and, for lack of better defini
tion, lay between latitudes

and U7 degrees north.^

Regarding the matter of isolation, there appears to have been a
wide margin of neutral territoiy separating the Nez Perce from their
traditional enemies, the Shoshoni to the south and the Spokan and Coeur
d'Alenes to the north. On the other hand, a close association existed
with friendly Indians, the Umatilla and Paloos, along the western flank
of the belt.^
Nez Perce villages were situated along major waterways in this
sprawling, majestic countiy.
The drainages occupied by the so-called non-treaty tribes (that
half of the Nez Perce which rebelled in 1877)—a compilation of five
bands, each led by a chief, which split from the Nez Perce nation and
went on the warpath in 1877—were as follows: White Bird, along the

^Ibid.. p. 7.
^Spinden, og. cit., p. 172.
6lbid., p. 173.

3
7
Salmon Riverj Toohoolhoolzote, between the Salmon and Snake rivers|
Hush-hush-cute, southwest of the Snake; and Looking Glass, along the
Middle Fork of the Clearwater. The band led by Chief Joseph, leader
of these non-treaty tribes, inhabited the Wallowa and Imnaha valleys

8

of Oregon.

Because of an abundance of a variety of fish and the fact that
large game, plentiful on Montana plains to the east, was sparse in Nez
Perce environs, much of the econony was concentrated on fairly sophis
ticated methods of fishing.

Tribesmen were adept in utilizing tackle,

9
spears, nets, seines and traps.
Gathering of wild fruits, berries and roots—especially camas,
a nutritious bulb roasted in pits—was a chore delegated to women and
children. Agriculture in any form was unknown before the arrival of
the whites.
The men hunted surrounding mountains for deer, elk, mountain
goat, big horn sheep and small game animals. But an understanding of
later events requires recognition of the fact that the procurement of
food was for the Nez Perce a difficult and time-consuming task, as
compared with plains Indians located 200 or 300 miles to the east.
Each spring a large portion of the Nez Perce nation ventured
over the traditional route—a well-cut but precipitous horse trail

7

The spelling of Indian names is phonetic and, therefore, author
ities differ markedly. Cyrus Brady, for instance, rendered this name,
"Too-hul-hul-suit."
®Beal, loc. cit.
^Spinden, o£. cit., pp. 208-211.
^°Ibid., pp. 201-205.
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often called a "road," via Lolo and Lost Trail passes—to hunt buffalo
in central Montana. This route was the one followed by the Lewis and
Clark expedition when, in September, l805, the first meeting with the
Nez Perce was made by white men. This route also was the one followed
during the fateful summer of 1877 when the non-treaty tribes escaped
into Montana Territoiy.
The problem of food for the Nez Perce which, it may be supposed,
established the traditional route across the Bitterroot Mountains, was
clearly documented by Capt. William Clark, October 10, l805, in his
journal:
Their amusements appear but fiew as their Situation requires
the utmost exertion to pr(o)cure food they are generally emplcyed
in that pursute, all the Summer & fall fishing for the Salmon,
the winter hunting the deer on Snow Shoes in the plains & in the
Spring cross the mountains to the Missouri to get Buffalow robes
and meet &c. at which time thqy frequent(ly) meet with their
enemies & lose their horses & maney of their people.ITThe mention of horses and warfare by Clark merits comment.
It is believed that the Nez Perce were unique among Indians in
12
that horse breeding was practiced without instiruction from white men.

One strain which was developed before the arrival of Lewis and Clark
was the renowned Appaloosa, a remarkable animal characterized usually
13
by a spotted rump.

Once white settlers introduced cattle, the Nez

Perce were equally successful in establishing large herds by animal
husbandry.

^^Bernard DeVoto (ed.), The Journals of Lewis and Clark (Boston;
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953)> p. 2i;b.
^^Beal, 0£. cit., p. 10.
^%ernard DeVoto, The Course of Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 19?2), p. ^07.
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More than is commonly realized, the horse, spread throughout the
West from Mexico in the early 17th century, played a major role in Nez
Perce culture.

One man is said to have owned 1,500»^^

These animals

afforded great mobility for a primitive society and, as soldiers later
learned, the Nez Perce were accomplished equestrians.

Not only were

saddles used, but for combat a war horse was decorated with paint and
feathers. Such pageantry was regarded as an exceptional honor bestowed
1^
only on warriors.
An interesting sidelight about horses in the Nez Perce society
is that race tracks were established throughout the tribal land. Appar
ently these Indians attached so much importance to adventurous quests
such as racing and hunting that it created a problem at tribal councils
for those interested in developing a more unified, domestic life.^^
As it turned out, the Nez Perce became increasingly nomadic.
This has been attributed both to their need to hunt the plains areas
and the economic affluence gained in selling horses to ranchers and
the military. By

I87O

most of the Nez Perce carried modern firearms

The nomadic life brought a host of problems for the Nez Perce,
as given in a personal account in 1926 hy Wottolen (Hair Combed Over
Ejyes), an aging and blind warrior who earned the distinction of becom
ing tribal historians

^^eal, loc. cit.
^^Spinden, og. cit., pp. 229-230.
^%eal, o£. cit., p. 11.
Harvey Chalmers II, The Last Stand of the Nez Perce (New York:
Twayne Publishers, 1962), p. 19.
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The buffalo was hunted on the head of the Salmon [during
early times]. The people would go there for meat and hides
during the summer moons. Next few snows they go a little
farther east. Following snows they go still farther east,
and to the north. After a time they reach the Yellowstone
River. There they hunt, for the buffaloes are many. Finally
they come to (now) Helena, Montana. There th^ find people.
This tribe proves an enemy to the Nez Perces. Crows, the
Cheyennes, the Sioux. All these tribes living in that
country became enemies of the Nez Perces.
While the Nez Perce were tranquil in domestic life save for funloving adventures, as warriors they were greatly respected by other
Indians in the Pacific Northwest, and their reputation in combat was
surpassed only by that of the Comanches, a southwestern offshoot of the
Shoshoni.

One Nez Perce has been considered the equal of three Black-

foot Indians, a tribe of marauders which clashed frequently with the
19
Nez Perce.
The correct name of the Blackfoot of Montana was, according to
a more precise interpretation of sign language. Blacklegs. The Nez
Perce referred to them as "Iskoikenic," meaning "Schemers." Apparently
Blackleg war parties harassed tribes as distant as ^fyoming and South
Dakota. Arch enemies of the Nez Perce, save for one small band called
Small Blankets, the Blacklegs were among the first western Indians to
20
obtain firearms from French migrants.

Nevertheless, it is believed that sorties into Idaho by Invading
trtbes were repulsed successfully by the Nez Perce. About l805 or l806,
approximately the time that the Lewis and Clark expedition passed

7. McWhorter, Hear Me, Hy Chiefs I (Caldwell, Idaho; The
Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1952), p. 3.
^^Ibld., p. 2.
on
Ibid., pp. 7-8.

7
through Nez Perce country, the Nez Perce massacred an Invading party of
Snake Indians in what has been described as a running battle. The car
nage was counted at 266 Snakes, comprising half the complement, at the
site of an Idaho cave. How many Snakes were killed before the band was
forced to take cover is unknown. Unable to extract the Snakes from the
cave without sustaining a large nuntoer of casualties, the Nez Perce
built at the entrance a fire which caused mass suffocation of the in-

21
vaders.
Such astute tactics made the Nez Perce dictators over the lands
they claimed and it is in this light that the treaties imposed on them
starting in 1855 should be viewed.
It should be emphasized, however, that no private ownership of
22
land existed.

The concept of a homeland did, as the nationalistic

concept existed for the whites. To Indians throughout the United States,
even after some 200 years of white influence, the notion of land as an
economic commodity to be bought and sold was alien to their thinking.
The warrior chief, Tecumseh, expressed the Indian philosophy of nearly
all nations in answering the demands of white buyers:

"Sell the coun

try? . . . Why not sell the air, the clouds, the great sea?" Not a few
23
tribes resisted to the death demands to sell their land.
The Nez Perce ancient right to sovereignty over the home terri
tory had been spelled indelibly with blood for centuries and it is to

^^Ibid., pp. 13-15.
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., p. 2li5.
^^Stewart L. Udall, The Quiet Crisis (New York, Chicago, San
Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 8.
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the everlasting credit of Gov. Isaac I. Stevens of Washington Territory
in negotiating the first treaty that the right was fully respected.
Shortly after the war in 1877, Gen. 0. O. Howard, who had pur
sued the Nez Perce from the first battle to the last, wrote that the
main tribe,
the Upper Nez Perces, occupied the Lapwai, from which we have
seen that Old Joseph was driven in l8ii.7. With these the gov
ernment has had most to do in times past. With these Governor
Stevens made his celebrated treaty of 1855, to which Old Joseph
gave his assentj and well he might assent to this the first
treaty, for it embraced in its established boundaries all his
lands, and allowed him and his people to live in the same place,
and in the same manner, as the Lower Nez Perces had lived for
generations. Therefore, we are not surprised to find his name
appended to an instrument which in itself was not inequitable,
but which was preliminary to the usual course of dispossessing
the Indians of the property and rights which th^ claimed.
Within Nez Perce community life, property such as weapons and
horses was personally owned and traded.
Nez Perce relations with early settlers often were complicated
by their love for stealing horses. But Many Wounds, a Nez Perce inter
preter, explained that for a youthful warrior to gain prominence for
consideration as a chieftain, he had to have led a minimum of ten suc
cessful horse-capturing raids.
The Nez Perce retained prisoners of war as slaves, although
treatment toward them was kind. Slaves could gain acceptance into the
tribe and it was not uncommon for female captives to marry their cap
tors. Children born to prisoners in bondage were regarded as free.^^

^^0. 0. Howard, Nez Perce Joseph (Boston: Lee and Shepard Pub
lishers, l88l), p. 7.
^^cWhorter, 0£. cit., p. 11.
^^Spinden, loc. cit.

9
The political structure of the tribal unit was founded on admir
ation for individual prowess and accomplishment. Usually each tribe
elected two chiefs or, more precisely, two chiefs who filled offices
of greatest responsibility.

The so-called peace chief held his position

within the village for as long as the majority wished him to govern. A
war chief, regarded with highest esteem, represented the tribe in the
27
council, a national body.

While sons often replaced their fathers

as chieftains, as happened with Chief Joseph in 1872 when Old Joseph
died, the position was by no means hereditary.

28

The council met as circumstances warranted, sometimes in part
to consider a minor matter between two or three tribes and sometimes in
whole to debate intertribal concerns. There were, however, intertribal
councils and village councils which dealt effectively with the majority
of local issues.
Unquestionably the national theme was harmonious for the Nez
Perce. The prime concern of the individual was within the tribal vil
lage and family ties were cohesive despite the general practice of
29
polygyny.
Tribesmen exercised a wide latitude of personal freedom in action
and speech.

Oratory before a council marked the merit of a potential

chief as much as his accomplishments in battle. That Chief Joseph was
so revered by his compatriots—and later by his greatest enemies, the

^"^Ibid., pp. 2ii2-2it3.
pQ
Cyrus Townsend Brady, Northwestern Fights and Fighters (New
York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1907), p. U.
^%eal, op. cit., p. 8.
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whites—can be ascribed in large measure to his articulate wisdom, ex
pressed in almost biblical phraseology.

With an introduction by Rt.

Rev. W. H. Hare, D.D., Bishop of South Dakota, who said that Joseph's
appeal reminded him of the Hebrew prophets, the story as related by
this great chief began with the following wordss
Ify friends, I have been asked to show you nçr heart. I am
glad to have a chance to do so. I want the white people to
understand nçy people. Some of you think an Indian is like a
wild animal. This is a great mistake, I will tell you all
about our people, and then you can judge whether an Indian
is a man or not. I believe much trouble and blood would be
saved if we opened our hearts more. I will tell you in ny
way how the Indian sees things. The white man has more words
to tell you how th^ look at him, but it does not require
many words to speak the truth. What I have to say will come
from Bçr heart, and I will speak with a straight tongue. Ahcum-kin-i-ma-me-hut (the Great Spirit) is looking at me, and
will hear me.30
The impassioned, yet penetrating simplicity of many documented
speeches by this warrior chief stand as empirical evidence of an expres
sive wisdom that was embodied with the generations of his-people.

He

spoke for many, not just for himself.
Jurispmdence within the Nez Perce nation amounted to an unwrit
ten discipline enforced under the authority of each village chief.
Murder, theft and adultery were regarded as major offenses, punishable
according to the established code.

A rapist, according to circumstances,

was punished either by enforced marriage or death. Lying was a breach
of tribal ethic and punishable

public scorn and derision.

The way of Nez Perce life made a lasting impression on the mem
bers of the Lewis and Clark expedition. Captain Clark made the following

^%rady, o£. cit., p. L8.
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., p. 2hk»
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entry in his diaiy, October 17, l805;
Those people appears to live in a State of comparitive
happiness: they take greatOer) share (in the) labor of the
woman, than is common among Savage trices, and I am informed
(are)content with one wife.32 Those people respect the aged
with Veneration. I observed an old woman in one of the
Lodges which I entered, She was entirely blind as I was in
formed by signs, had liyed more than 100 winters. She occu
pied the best position in the house, and when She spoke
great attention was paid to what she Said.^^
This sensitivity and respect for the views of the aged, this
basic trait of character which might best be termed humility, made an
overwhelming impression on many whites who had to deal directly with
these Indians. The Nez Perce as a people—too often referred to as
brutal savages and barbarians by indignant and uninformed writers
undertaking historical reviews of the conflict shortly after its ter
mination—received unconditional praise from persons of whom it would
be least expected.
Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commander of the troops that finally de
feated Chief Joseph near the Bear Paw Mountains of Montana Territory,
wrote that they "were a very bright and energetic body of Indians j
indeed, the most intelligent that I had ever seen. Exceedingly self
reliant, each man seemed to be able to do his own thinking, and to be
purely democratic and independent in his ideas and purposes.

^^Apparently a large number of Nez Perce males, dominant in the
paternalistic society common to Indian culture, were content with one
wife. But some, including Chief Joseph, wed two. For this reason,
the task undertaken by early missionaries to erase the practice of
polygyny was by no means easy.
33
DeVoto, Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^3.
^^Nelson A. Miles, Personal Recollections and Observations of
General Nelson A. Miles (New York: the Werner Co., 1897), p. 279.
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Similarly, Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior, wrote:

"This

bloody conflict might have been avoided by a more careful regard for
the rights of an Indian tribe whose former conduct had been uniformly
peaceable and friendly.
Had it not been for the qualities of the Nez Perce, the Lewis and
Clark expedition might never have survived the difficult traverse of the
Bitterroots into the vast domain now encompassed by the Selway-Bitterroot
Wilderness area. The expeditioners found it nearly impossible to dele
gate time for hunting while following the tortuous trail, a long stretch
of which ascended heavily forested peaks and ridges. A Sergeant Gass
proclaimed these "the most terrible mountains I ever beheld," although
the crossing required only nine days.

It should be remembered that

71 years later Nez Perce men, women and children cariying all their
personal belongings were to outmarch Gen. 0. 0. Howard's command over
the same route on the initial leg of the frantic retreat.
During the nine-day crossing by the Lewis and Clark expedition,
iron rations in the form of a concentrate soup, a military experiment,
were issued to the famished travelers. This sustained them until six
advance hunters killed a stray Nez Perce horse for food. It was this
hunting party which, on September 20, l805, made the first contact by
whites with the Nez Perce people.

Hospitality was warm and cordial

despite the language barrier which reduced communication to hand gest37
ures.^'

3%eal, 0£. cit., p. xi.
3^eVoto, The Course of Empire, p. ^0^.
37ibid.
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The sudden change in diet, starting with iron rations and then
shifting to dried salmon, dried berries and camas cakes offered by the
Nez Perce, resulted in serious cfysentery for nearly every member of the
white party.
gentle horse.

Like most. Captain Lewis found it difficult to ride a
Morale fell to the lowest point during the transcontin

ental trek and not a few members wished to turn back.
Some medicines administered, such as "rush pills," "pukes salts,"
and other remedies, helped little.

With a tone of embarrassment Cap

tain Clark noted: "Cap(t.)Lewis and gy selfe eate a supper of roots
boiled, which filled us so full of wind that we were scercely able to
Breathe all night." The famed woman guide, Sacajawea, lessened their
misery with a special salad of herbs.
Yet the turning point in this crisis was the generous hospitality
•59
extended by the Nez Perce.

It is curious, therefore, and perhaps

prophetic of white thinking in later relations with the Nez Perce, that
Captain Clark made the following entry, October 10, 180^;

"They are

verry Selfish and Stingey of what they have to eate or ware, and they
expect in return Something for everything give(n) as presents or the
survices whic they doe let it be however Small, and fail to make those
returns on their part."^*^
DeVoto notes that this unjust stricture in view of the benefac
tions of Indian friendship offered openly was later reversed and both
of the expedition commanders came to regard the Nez Perce as the most

^^Ibid., p. 506,
39DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^1.
^°Ibid., p. 2U8.

generous and likeable tribe th^ had encountered.

On the return of the

expedition from Fort Clatsop on the Pacific Coast in the spring of

I806,

the Nez Perce gave back not only horses and saddles that had been left
behind, but also a hidden cache of food and supplies that had been
buried and washed up by flood waters
Snow halted several attempts to recross the Bitterroots until
June U, when the expedition bade a final farewell to their Indian friends.
The explorers learned to speak a few words of the language, and it was
tribal legend that a number of Nez Perce girls were left pregnant
In stature and bearing the Nez Perce were a handsome people, as
evidenced by numerous descriptions and photographs»

Their physiognon^

radiated an inner calm beneath the sharply furrowed, weathered features
reflecting the grim aspects of wilderness existence.
Captain Clark noted, however, that these Indians
. . . as also those of the flat heads which we had passed on
the Koskoske and Lewis's rivers are subject to sore eyes, and
many are continually fishing during the Spring Summer & fall,
& the snows dureing the winter Seasons, in this open countiy
where the ^e has no rest.^3
While a medical analysis of this and other Nez Perce physical
debilities would require a separate study, which has been done on certain
diseases, the major concern for missionaries was the outbreak of smallpox
and similar infectious maladies which devastated numerous Indian nations
during the 19th century. Much of this was spread by war parties from
the upper Missouri to Indians who had not been exposed to the diseases

^^DeVoto, The Course of Bnpire, p. ^l5.
^^Ibid., p. 5lli.
^^DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2^3»
^^DeVoto, The Course of Empire, p. 306.
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Smallpox, measles and scarlet fever were common in the wagon
trains which shuttled westward. The inability of the Indian to acquire
immunity made him easy prey to full-scale epidemics, as happened in
more recent times among the Eskimos. The Indian's disregard of camp
sanitation only worsened the situation.
Ravages of smallpox and tuberculosis, unquestionably originated
with white civilization, hit the Nez Perce nation in the i860's in the
same manner other tribes were struck.

Although census estimates vary

widely, a drastic decline in population followed the epidemics.
Early settlers who undoubtedly were unfamiliar with the entirety
of Nez Perce environs gave conflicting census tabulations. This may
have influenced Isaac I. Stevens, who became governor of Washington
Territory in 18^3, who set the number at 1,680 in iB^l. Father Cataldo,
a missionary who lived with the Nez Perce a half century or longer,
estimated the population peak to be approximately 5,000 in i860. There
after, the trend was sharply downward and the first official census in
1893 indicated there were 1,895 Nez Perce people.
Long before white influence, the Nez Perce developed a technology
of note. Tribal lodges were huge, extending to some l50 feet. A 12month calendar was devised, not only to keep track of time, but to
record historic events such as battles. Warriors wore armor—as did
maqy of other tribes—which included a helmet, shield, and tunic fash
ioned from elk leather.

The most remarkable development was the making

^^Francis Haines, The Nez Perces (Norman; University of Oklahoma
Press, 1955), p. 9h'
^^Spinden, o£. cit., pp. 239-liO.

^^Ibid.
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of bows which were masterpieces of design and craftsmanship. The best
of these, fashioned from the horns of mountain sheep, required a care
ful splitting lengthwise, steaming for recurved shape, and then glueing
and wrapping of deer sinew in a lamination process not dissimilar to
the finest modem methods.
It has been stated frequently that the French name given these
Indians ty trappers is a misnomer.

But as early as 1805, Captain Clark

referred to them as "Cho-pun-nish" or "Pierced Nose" I n d i a n s . A t
least part of the Shahaptin stock of the Pacific Northwest did pierce
the septum of the nose to insert a dentalium shell for ornamentation
and, if this were widely practiced by the Nez Perce, it happened during
earlier times.These Indians referred to themselves as Numipu.
But for all their accomplishment as wari^iors, stock breeders
and craftsmen, the Nez Perce seemed deeply aware that white civiliza
tion eventually would become dominant.
The incursion of settlers within Nez Perce boundaries did not
occur, however, until February 20, i860, after Elias D. Pierce discov
ered gold in the Clearwater district flanking the eastern portion of
tribal land protected by the treaty of 18^5.

It should be noted that

the date of incursion corresponds closely with the smallpox epidemics
of that decade. This formulated the tragic turning point of what pre
viously had been considered a golden age of relations with the whites.

^^Ibid., pp. 211-212.
^^DeVoto, The Journals of Lewis and Clark, p. 2ij^6.
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., pp. 171-172.
^^eal, o£. cit., pp. 18-20.
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Owing to the treaty signed five years earlier, citizens in Walla
Walla recognized the enormous danger and favored negotiating a new
treaty. Meanwhile, Chief Eagle-from-the-Light and Chief Lawyer fumed
and made open threats on the town of Lewiston, then being built.
An agreement to let miners dig the Clearwater country was reached
the following year, but it was inevitable that further demands would
follow.

A second agreement was signed December 31,

I86I, to

open the

Salmon River district to the south.
It is somewhat amusing that the enterprising Nez Perce adjusted
to their fate in numerous ways, including the construction of toll
bridges and the running of ferries.
But as the Indians had sadly anticipated, the thousands of miners
that swarmed in became settlers. To the credit of the Nez Perce, hos
tilities were avoided despite several provocations. The whites cut
timber, cultivated fields and built fences, and pigs overran and des
troyed the camas crop so dear to the Indians. Meanwhile, it has been
estimated that the miners eoctracted some $50 million in gold from Nez
Perce territory.
That friendship with the whites deteriorated was criminal in
view of the exhaustive efforts made in earlier years by both sides to
foster friendly relations. It is apparent that Lewis and Clark seeded
the theme of national sovereignty which, as far as is known, the Nez
Perce never challenged.Traditionally their interest centered on

^^Ibid.

^3ibid.

^^eclmically the Nez Perce were Spanish Indians, and they might
well have become British during the border dispute later. The American
"manifest destiny" was by no means a certainty.
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the land, the tribal society and a deeply rooted religion.
While their religion was somewhat mystical, based in part on
dreams and visions, the tenets were not so divergent from Christian
principles that argr impossible barriers existed for missionaries.

A

most astounding event, in view of the respect paid to tribal mores,
occurred during the summer of I83I when four tribesmen traveled from
Eamiah village on the Clearwater with the specific intention of
journeying some 2,000 miles to St. Louis in the hope of recruiting a
Christian missionary and learning something about the great book of
the white religion.
On crossing Lolo Pass, one Nez Perce turned back to avoid hin
dering his partners, but shortly thereafter, three tribesmen from the
friendly Flathead nation joined the venture.
Unfortunately, the remainder of the endeavor was one of tragedy.
Before the delegation reached its destination, October 1, I83I, two
Indians had died of disease. The people of St. Louis accorded the
visitors a warm welcome, but it was found nearly impossible to commun
icate effectively.

Captain Clark, then a resident of St. Louis, was

overjoyed to gather again with the people who had welcomed him 2$ years
earlier, but he had forgotten what little he had learned of the Nez
Perce and Flathead languages. The desire of these tribes to enlist a
missionary was not understood fully.

Meanwhile, three more Indians of

the delegation succumbed to diseases and only one, a Flathead named
Rabbit-Skin-Leggings, returned to his people to tell of failure.

^^Haines, o£. cit., p. 57.
^^Ibid.

^"^Ibid.
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Seen in the larger sense, however, the remarkable quest bore
fruit that was to nourish the Nez Perce culture on the one hand and,
strangely, to help destroy it on the other.
In

1836, two

missionaries, Marcus Whitman and Henry Spalding,^®

and their wives introduced agriculture, technology, education and
religion in a manner that endeared them to the Nez Perce and neighboring
tribes to the west. Indeed, the Nez Perce appeared eager to receive
instruction in Christianity and margr accepted conversion.The impress
of this influence was understood well by General Howard who penned the
following account of the tragic end of the work done by the Whitmans:
When Mr. Spalding, a remarkable Protestant missionary,
whose name to-day is a household word with the Christians of
the tribe, came, in I836, to the Nez Perces, Old Joseph and
his band were induced to cross over to the mouth of the Snake
and settle for a time near Lapwai, to cultivate a farm there,
and send their children to Mr. Spalding's school. The sudden
massacre of Dr. Whitman and his family, by the Cayuses, in
l8i;7, caused the Spaldings to leave the country in haste.
Whitman, representing the Presbyterian, Congregational and Dutch
Reformed churches, and his beautiful wife, Narcissa, had gained the
deepest admiration of the Indians until circumstances changed their

^®Paul C. Phillips (ed.), "The Oregon Missions as Shown in the
Wàlker Letters, 1839-1851," Frontier Omnibus (Missoula: Montana State
University Press, 1962), p. 101. Phillips spelled this name Spaulding,
making it obvious there is some confusion. Other authorities drop the
"u". Which is right is difficult to ascertain, for it is entirely
possible that Phillips is correct. A monument erected on the Contin
ental Divide near the Green River reads: "Narcissa Prentiss Whitman.
Eliza Hart Spalding. First White Women to Cross This Pass July
1836." In personal letters which Phillips edited, such as correspond
ence by Dr. Whitman, the "u" is dropped also. Undoubtedly Phillips
was aware of the problem, having rendered the name two ways in the same
article. The town in Idaho is spelled Spalding.
^^Spinden, 0£. cit., pp. 158-261.
^'^Howard, o£. cit., p. 6.
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relationship.
First, the Caynse tribe was poor in comparison with the Nez Perce
and disease, which the missionary was helpless in controlling, swept
through the band. Second, Mr. Spalding had blundered diplomatically
with the Nez Perce, as shall be described shortly. Finally, and most
important, a vagabond deserted by a passing wagon train for causing
trouble managed to ignite Cayuse feelings against the Whitmans. This
individual, Joe Lewis, a half breed from Maine, convinced the tribe that
Dr. Whitman was poisoning the sick—those dying of measles—to procure
their land.^^
It should be noted also that the Whitmans were less than success
ful in their ceaseless efforts to instill Christian principles with the
/g

Ceruse.
Although Dr. Whitman realized danger was imminent, he had little
expectation, apparently, that two prominent chiefs would enter the
mission on the pretense of obtaining medicine and then cariy out the
plot that left the Whitmans massacred and mutilated before the eyes of
their children.
Although Spalding faced no such danger with the Nez Perce, he,
too, had made mistakes which had divided the nation.

At the outset,

Spalding had distributed food, clothing and tools indiscriminately with
out regard for tribal custom or asking for repayment.

He did expect

^^Erwin N. Thompson, "Narcissa Whitman," Montana Western Histoiy,
Vol. XIII, No. L (Autumn, 1963), 15-28.
^^Haines, o£- cit., p. 101.
^^Thompson, o£. cit., p. 2lt.
^^Ibid., pp. 26-27.

21
protection, support and acceptance of his doctrine, of course, which
the Nez Perce would not give in return for an assortment of gifts.
This shortsightedness hurt Spalding's prestige and, when the
Whitman massacre occurred, he and his family decided to leave.
The two missions at Waiilatpu and Lapwai were closed for lli years
as a result. Many of the Christian Nez Perce retained the faith, how
ever, and continued the agricultural pursuits taught them. In 1862,
Spalding and his second wife reopened Lapwai and, consequently, hundreds
of Nez Perce were baptized. Many accepted Christian names, as in the
case of Tu-ela-kas who became Joseph^^ and whose son, the renowned chief,
was to bear the same name.
Other missionaries of other faiths arrived in the l860's, but
their efforts to combat disease, the confusion caused by various inter
pretations of Christianity, and the impact of the mining invasion doomed
the diplomatic era of golden relations.

^^Haines, 0£. cit., p. 79.
^^eal, o£. cit., p. 17. According to the personal recounting
of the war by Chief Joseph, his name was In-mut-too-yah-lat-lat, mean
ing Thunder-traveling-over-the-mountains. Joseph claimed that his
Christian name was first given to his father by Spalding. But many
Nez Perce had two or more Indian names, which had led to much confu
sion.
^^Ibid.

CHAPTER II

PRE-WAR TREATIES AND COUNCILS

As early as 18^3» seven years before the mining invasion of
Idaho, there were sufficient settlers in the Northwest to create a new
territory. Congress approved the splitting of the "Old Oregon Country"
to form Washington Territory that year. Major Isaac I. Stevens, 3h, of
the U. S. Army, was appointed governor, a position which included serv
ing as Secretary of Indian Affairs in that domain.^
American policy, even before the Revolutionary War, has been to
negotiate formal treaties with each Indian nation to avoid or resolve
land disputes.

In l8% many such documents were contracted with tribes

from coast to coast, including the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Yakima, Flatheads
and Blackfeet in the Northwest.^ That the federal government should
negotiate similarly with the Nez Perce nation for the first time in l85^
was by no means unusual. Unlike subsequent treaties with that nation in

1863

and

1868, the

initial agreement arose from no great controversy.

Yet the basic issue—to establish a reservation exclusive of white
settlement—remained foremost in all Nez Perce treaties.
When approximately half of the Nez Perce nation revolted in 1877,

^Helen A. Howard and Dan L. McGrath, War Chief Joseph (Caldwell,
Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltc., 1958), p. hS^Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian Affairs Laws and Treaties,
U. 5. Senate Reports, Vol. II (Washington; Government Printing Office,
190li), pp. 665-7ii2.
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newspapermen and government officials, including congressmen and advis
ers to the President, studied Nez Perce treaties and related events to
determine the cause of the difficulty.

As will become evident in later

chapters, the government was finally to accept the blame for its failure
to uphold the obligations which, in the case of the Treaty of

I863, were

forced upon the Indians.

Treaty of 1855
On Msçr 23, l855. Governor Stevens and an entourage comprising
approximately 100 aides and military personnel gathered along a tribu
tary of the Walla Walla River. There a camp was established to greet
delegations from the several Indian tribes asked to attend.
The first to arrive the next day were approximately 2,500 Nez
Perce.

Each of the several tribes was represented by a chief, which

included Looking Glass (father of the warrior of 1877), Spotted Eagle,
q
Old Joseph, James, Red Wolf, Timothy, Eagle-from-the-Light and Latter.
Then came Cayuse, Yakima, Umatilla and Walla Walla tribesmen,
for a total of more than 5,000 Indians.^

During the protracted negotia

tions that followed, the council ground was filled with gaiety from
outward appearances. Indians danced, courted, gambled on races and spun
yarns.^ But as the treaty negotiations became heated over details of
apportioning lands, a plot was inspired by the Cayuse, murderers of the
Whitmans, to overwhelm the small white delegation by force. When word
of this reached Nez Perce chiefs—presumably to gain approval—the

%eal, o£. cit., p. 25.
^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. ii9.

^Ibid.
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lodges of that nation were quickly moved into the midst of Stevens'
camp. This action not only thwarted the Cajruse scheme, but demonstrated
Nez Perce good will toward the whites which assured tranquillity during
the remainder of the talks.^
Negotiations between the white men and the Nez Perce went reason
ably well until an outburst by Chief Looking Glass halted the talks with
Governor Stevens for a short time. This chief, arriving on the scene
late because of a buffalo hunt, accused his people of selling out tribal
land for government annuities.

Although the position by Looking Glass

was correct in many ways, the Nez Perce rejected it in separate council
and negotiations were resumed with the whites.
Article 1, establishing general boundaries for a ^,000-squaremile reservation, began with the following declaration which, although
common to Indian treaties, was to cause serious misunderstandings later:
"The said Nez Perce tribe of Indians hereby cede, relinquish and conv^
to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to the
countiy occupied or claimed by them, bounded and described as follows,
7
to wit: ..."
While the intent of such a declaration is clear, a definition of
such words as "right," "title," and "interest" becomes academic when
soldiers demand tribes to move homes and belongings, first, from land
protected by Nez Perce warriors for uncounted centuries and, later, from
land protected by this treaty. In effect, the government extracted from
the Nez Perce their title to lands owned, if that word is applicable,

^eal, loc. cit.
Tseal, o£. cit., pp. 27-29.
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on the quid pro quo that this transfer of ownership would entail govern
mental management, improvement, supervision and protection as stated in
succeeding articles.
Article 2, which further delineates boundaries, specifies that no
white settlement would be allowed on the reservation, except for person
nel emplc^ed by the Indian Department.
It stipulates further that any substantial improvement made by
an Indian—be it cultivation, fencing or construction—would be valued
accordingly, and equal compensation would be paid to the Indian involved.
While this and other inclusions designed to aid the financial lot
of the Indian deserve praise, for the transition to white ways is rarely
easy, the Nez Perce were alreatfy a relatively rich nation and became
more so through prosperous trading with miners, settlers and the military.
Because the treaty was not ratified by Congress until 18^9—a delay later
deplored by government officials as inexcusable—annuities totaling some
$200,000, plus promises to spend $60,000 for improvements, did not begin
to materialize for the Nez Perce until late in i860, five years after

8

the treaty was signed.

This delay abrogated Article 1; wherein the annuities were prof
fered as follows:
For the first five years after the ratification of this
treaty, ten thousand dollars each year, commencing September
1, 1856J for the next five years, eight thousand dollars each
year; for the next five years, six thousand each year, and
for the next five years, four thousand each year./
Technically, then, the treaty became inoperative on September 1,

^Chalmers, og. cit., pp. 2^-25.
%appler, og. cit., p. 70lt.
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1856, because the financial commitment of the government was not ful
filled as agreed.
The remaining articles of the treaty made provisions for schools,
a hospital and access for public highways through Nez Perce environs.
This is not to suggest, however, that white settlers would be tolerated
without permission of the Indians. Article 10 allows one white, William
Craig, to retain his land holdings on the reservation in accordance with
the laws binding the Indians because the latter had expressed the desire
that he do so.^^
As noted in the previous chapter, this treaty incorporated fairly
the tribal dominion of the Nez Perce in establishing a reservation.

A

general good will between the contracting parties prevailed, with one
important exception, and when the Stevens delegation departed eastward
to make similar agreements with Plains Indians, he discharged his mili
tary escort and was accompanied by a Nez Perce guard.

Heading this

escort were Looking Glass, who temporarily had disrupted the council
talks, and White Bird, who was to become a persuasive voice in Nez Perce

12
affairs during the war 22 years later.
The one exception to good will was Old Joseph's refusal to join
the 56 other Nez Perce chiefs and chieftains who signed the Treaty of
185#. Although he was overwhelmingly outvoted, the position he took in
refusal, recounted by his son, the great warrior in later years, was to
have far greater impact on Nez Perce affairs than did the treaty:

^^The Nation, August 2, 1877 (see Appendix).
^^appler, o£. cit., p. 705.
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 27.
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Mr. Spaulding took hold of nçr father's arm and said, "Come
and sign the treaty."
father pushed him away and said;
"Why do you ask me to sign away nçr country? It is your busi
ness to talk to us about spirit matters ..." Governor
Stevens urged ny father to sign his treaty, but he refused.
"I will not sign your paper," he said, "you go where you
please, so do I; you are not a child, I am no child; I can
think for nyself. No man can think for me. I have no other
home than this. I will not give it up to any man. Ify people
would have no home. Take away your paper. I will not touch
it with Day hand."
father left the council. Some of the chiefs of the
other bands of the Nez Perces signed the treaty, and then
Governor Stevens gave them présents of blankets. % father
cautioned his people to take no presents, for "after awhile,"
he said, "they will claim that you accepted ps^ for your
country." Since that time four bands of the Nez Perces have
received annuities from the United States. îfy father was
invited to many councils, and they tried hard to make him
sign away his home. HLs refusal caused a difference among
the Nez Perces.
This "difference" which young Joseph mentioned about his father
and other chiefs became the first major split in Nez Perce unity that
was to divide the nation into parts, one peaceful and the other at war,
in 1877.
Treaty of I863
Mith the illegal mining invasion of i860, the settlement which
resulted and the failure of the government to uphold either the finan
cial or territorial obligations of the Treaty of 18^5, tensions mounted
swiftly.

Mills and buildings promised were not constructed; payments

were not met; whites who had taken Indian wives abandoned them and their
children; Southern sympathizers agitated that the federal government was
about to collapse; and the sale of several thousands of dollars of Nez
Perce horses for use in the Yakima War, 18^6-58, was not paid by the

^%rady, o£. cit., pp. 52-^3.
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government.
1/fi.lliam Purvine wrote for the Oregon Statesman;
If open hostilities have not commenced with the Nez Perces,
it is not because they have not been outraged to that degree
when "forebearance ceases to be a virtue." In return for the
continued friendship in time of want, and generous acts of
hospitality always so readily extended towards the whites by
the Indians, they now reap an abundant harvest of every species
of villainy and insult.^5
On June 21, l862, the Washington Statesman carried an account of
the murders of three Nez Perce tribesmen by drunken m i n e r s . P l e a s
for justice were ignored by the whites and pressure was put on Indian
agents to negotiate with the government. These attempts failed com
pletely in l86l and 1862 because Nez Perce leaders were no longer in
accord about signing papers with the United States. For lack of better
tenaiinology, the tribes to the south headed ty Old Joseph in the Wallowa
area are refeired to as "Lower Nez Perce"j those to the north headed by
Chief Lawyer are called "Upper Nez Perce." The split in unity in 185#
became a chasm during the long-awaited negotiations of 1863.^^
Because the Civil War prevented the government from paying
annuities in

I863,

a commission, headed by Calvin H. Hale, then Super

intendent of Indian Affairs in Washington Territory, was appointed to
negotiate a new treaty with the Nez Perce. The major dispute, however,
was not over money, especially among Joseph's tribes which refused to
"become wards of the government" by accepting annuities.

The real issue

^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 70.
^^fealem] Oregon Statesman, April 28, 1862.
Italia Walla] Washington Statesman, June 21, 1862.
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 30.
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was land.
The meeting at Lapwai, May 1^, 1863, was totally unlike the one
eight years previously when amiable relations and a gay setting tended
to lessen the heat of debate.

The talks were conducted at Fort Lapwai,

built the previous year, where four companies of the First Oregon
Cavalry were garrisoned.^®
The preamble characterizes the Treaty of

I863

as "being supple

mentary and amendatory" to the Treaty of l8?5, indicating that the
19
latter remained in effect.

Article 1 provided for cession of lands to the government as
stated in the earlier treaty with the exception that new boundaries
would be located. Article 2 spelled out the changes, lopping off some
million acres of the southern portion of the reservation where
20

Joseph's tribes were located.

Moreover, this article allowed individual tribesmen at personal
discretion to sell allotments of land, determined by survey, to whites.
This provision trampled tribal ethic of long standing, because land was
considered community property, as noted in the previous chapter. It
also guaranteed settlement of reservation lands in violation of Article
2 of the Treaty of 1855, which stateds
All which tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary,
surveyed and marked out for the exclusive use and benefit of said
tribe as an Indian reservation; nor shall any white man, except
ing those in the employment of the Indian Department, be permitted
to reside upon the said reservation without permission of the
tribe and the superintendent and agent. . . .21

^®Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 70-71,
l^Kappléif, o£. cit., p« 81i3«
2%eal, loc. cit.
ZÏKappler, Og* cit., p. 703*
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Article I4. of the Treaty of I863 noted that because the government
had failed to comply "as yet" with the first treaty, a new schedule of
payments would go into effect.

The remainder of the treaty expanded

somewhat the annuities promised originally, despite the Civil War debt.
Regardless, the Lower Nez Perce still refused any federal "gifts"
and what money did reach the reservation by way of improvements was, in
large measure, embezzled by unscrupulous whites.

A report by Superin

tendent Kendall for the government after an inspection tour in 1862
stated, in part:
Not far from sixty thousand dollars have been expended by
the agent heretofore in charge of this tribe. I regret to say
the visible results of this liberal expenditure are meagre
indeed.
The buildings erected by Mr. Cain for the agency were mere
shells hardly fit for human habitation. The want of comfort
displayed can only be accounted for on the ground that the
agent did not make the reservation his headquarters and conse
quently felt little if ar%r interest in the matter.
I sought in vain to find the first foot of land fenced or
broken (to plough) by him or his employees. The only product
that I could discover consisted of three tons of oats in the
straw piled up within a rude uncovered enclosure of rails to
raise which must have cost the government more than seven
thousand dollars. Even this property was barely saved from
the hands of departing employees who claimed it as the result
of their private labor.
As I witnessed the withdrawal from this meagre pile of the
rations for ny horse, I could hardly fail to sigh from the
thought that every chomp of his jaws devoured at least a
dollar's worth of government bounty.22
While this evidence is not conclusive as to the conduct of white
employees on the reservation, similar evidence was brought to light in
newspaper articles late in the war when a specific explanation of the
causes of ill feeling were scrutinized.
In view of the numerous breaches of faith by the government, it

22chalmers, og. cit., p. 2U.
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is no less than amazing that ^2 Upper Nez Perce signed the Treaty of

1863.

Only one Lower Nez Perce, Wap-tas-ta-mana, signed.Old Joseph

had refused to attend the parley and, after learning the terms set
forth, roundly denounced Chief La^er for selling out the Wallowa
country to the south without authorization from Lower Nez Perce tribes.
Actually, Laisser had fought to preserve as much of the reservation as
possible and forced white negotiators to compromise their original
demand to reduce the total area from 5,000 to approximately ^00 square
miles.

Nevertheless, such compromise as finally documented did not

appease the lower tribes which bore the brunt of this "thief treaty."
It is generally agreed and should be obvious that the commissioners
were wrong in concluding a treaty for the Nez Perce nation with only
half the tribes.

Old Joseph's reaction was vehement. He not only tore

his copy of the treaty to shreds, but he destroyed his long-treasured
New Testament. Consequently, his bands turned to a Dreamer cult for
religious solace, based on the teachings of Smohalla. This individual
was subject to catalepsy, and his thinking—sometimes likened to Freud
—centered on the meaning of dreams. Although he was a persuasive
orator who rose to prominence at a time of great confusion for the
Nez Perce, General Howard who met him said:

"He is a large-headed,

hump-shouldered, odd little wizard of an Indian, and exhibits a strange
mixture of timidity and daring, of superstition and intelligence."

7. McWhorter, Yellow Wolf: His Own Stoiy (Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 19U0), p. 3^
2%rac^, op.cit., p. 53^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 30-31.
26
Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., pp. 81-82.
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Others have described Smohalla as an "Indian Moses," a somewhat ques
tionable comparison, because of his promise that "an Indian would rise
up to drive out every white person and would raise to life all the
dead Indians.Belief in an after life was prevalent among the
Indians and, while the Dreamer cult did not expand beyond the North
west, it gained numerous converts throughout the region.

Apparently
PR

this religion is still extant and is practiced by many Indians.
The Upper Nez Perce continued as Christian.
Treaty of 1868

Generally regarded by scholars as unimportant, this treaty—
actually an amendment of the Treaty of

I863—was

a prelude to the con

fusion which was to ensue during the l870's.
Article 1 reiterates the policy of moving the Lower Nez Perce
to the new reserve, "provided, however, that in case there should not
be a sufficient quantity of suitable land . . ., then those residing
outside, or as many thereof as allotments cannot be provided for, may
29
remain upon the lands now occupied and improved by them. . . ,"
This stipulation suggests two things. First, the government
had not yet enforced the provision of Article 2 of the Treaty of

I863

which required the Lower Nez Perce to abandon the Wallowa country and
move northward to the new reserve, usually referred to as the "Lapwai
Reservation," within one year.

Second, and of greater significance,

the government recognized the fact that a mass relocation to the Lapwai

^7Ibid.

^^Ibid.

^^Kappler, 0£. cit., p. 102b.
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Reservation would be impractical, because there would not be sufficient
land for every male over 21 years of age to be allotted 20 acres.
The intent of land distribution to individual tribesmen was to domes
ticate these Indians, to end their nomadic habits of hunting, to make
them farmers and ranchers.
of 1855 and

I863 where

Evidence of this is apparent in the treaties

monetary reward was promised to individuals who

built fences, cultivated fields, erected buildings or, in any similar
manner, improved the land apportioned them.
Despite this altruism, the treaty policy as documented in the
U. S. Senate Reports is a contradictory one, as already shown, and
matters were only made worse in the l870's when two conflicting execu
tive orders were issued by President Grant in an obvious attempt to
rectify the matter. The first, issued June

I6, 1873,

was inspired by

a report made the previous month by the Commission on Indian Affairs
which concluded: "If any respect is to be paid to the laws and customs
of the Indians, then the treaty of

I863

is not binding upon this band.

If so, then Wallowa Valley is still part of the Nez Perce reservation.
If this is the case, the Government is in equity bound to pay white
settlers for their improvements and for the trouble, inconvenience and
expense of removing from there.
The presidential order of 1873 intended to put this recommenda
tion into force, requiring that white settlers, who had violated
federal treaty obligations by their presence on Nez Perce lands, move
off at government expense. This might have been a great victory for

30lbid.
3^Avant Courier (Bozeman, MontanaJ, August 23, 1877.
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the Lower Nez Perce in particular, the Nez Perce nation in general, had
the executive order been carried out.

It might have resolved the basic

issue which led to the uprising of 1877•

Unfortunately, Congress re

fused the pleas of the Secretary of the Interior to allocate an estimated

$67,860

necessary to pay the settlers.While this msgr seem an exorbi

tant sum to settle a matter for a distant nation of Indians—especially
when viewed in terms of the value of the dollar in those times—it
would have been a small cost when compared to the federal expenditure
of $931,329 for the military campaign of 1877.^^ This latter figure
does not include expenses incurred by the various state militias or
take into account damage to property.
Because the measure failed in Congress, an executive order was
issued June 10, 1875, rescinding it; thus, the one hope of the Lower
Nez Perce—to annul the land provisions of the Treaty of

I863—died.^^

Meanwhile, the government was having difficulty changing the
nomadic habits of the Nez Perce. Toung Joseph, who had become chief
of the lower tribes upon his father's death in

I87I,

expressed his

sentiments to Agent John B. Monteith who, on April 28, l87b, wrote to
Edward P. Smith, commissioner of Indian Affairss "For a year past I
f'
have tried to prevail upon Joseph to cease his homadic habits and settle
down in the Wallowa Valley, . . . His answers invariably have been, 'Ify
father made the tracks for me to go in, and I intend to walk them.'"^^

3^The Nation, August 2, 1877 (see Appendix).
^%eal, o£. cit., p. 2^7.

^^The Nation, loc. cit.

^^Eugene B. Chaffee (ed.), "Nez Perce War Letters to Governor
Mason Brayman," State Historical Society of Idaho Reports, 1929-1936
(Boise, 1930), p. 38.
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This explains that the Nez Perce were not cooperative with the govern
ment during the period of amnesty of the presidential order of

1873

when it was thought that the land provisions of the Treaty of 1855 were
reinstated.

Had Joseph moved all his people into the Wallowa district

which he claimed as tribal domain, it may be speculated that the second
executive order which ended the period of amnesty might not have been
issued.

As evidence, a considerable controversy arose over what

Joseph's attitude was toward all treaties, including that of 1855.
Gov. L. F. Grover of Oregon, who strongly opposed the initial presi
dential order which revoked the land stipulations of the Treaty of

1863,

made an issue of Joseph's failure of cooperation to move all his

bands to Wallowa. Despite a rebuttal by Henry C. Wood, assistant
adjutant general to the commander of the Department of the Pacific, to
this assertion on the grounds that all the treaties negotiated with
the Nez Perce were unfair, pressures increased against the Indians of
Joseph's tribes who were then commonly called "non-treaty Nez

Perce."^6

Joseph appealed to Agent Monteith to present his case to the
•37

President, but this was denied.

The problem for the government from

1875-77 was moving the non-treaty Nez Perce to the Lapwai Reservation
against their will without bloodshed. Major Wood, named a commissioner,
continued to plead the cause of the Nez Perce without avail and, in
January,

I877, the

Department of the Interior issued orders to Agent

Monteith to effect this move, by force if necessary.^®

3%oward and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 90-92.
^^Beal, og. cit., p. 35.
^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 105.
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of these orders fell on Gen. 0. 0„ Howard, a famed Civil War commander,
who had met in council with the Nez Perce more as a diplomat than a
soldier during two years of talks.

Pressure was put on him by news

papers to take decisive action immediately. An editorial in the Walla
Walla Statesman proclaimed:

We have a right to demand that no half way

measure be adopted by the officer in command. Send out a large force
at first, and not in small details, and let the question be settled
forever.Similarly, an editorial in the Portland (Oregon) Daily
Qregonian expressed the opinions
The case of Joseph is in many respects similar to that of
Captain Jack, out of which the Modoc massacre arose. . . . The
government should act with promptness and energy. . » .
Temporizing will only make matters worse. Having determined
upon a policy to be pursued toward this defiant band, the way
to prevent its number from increasing [un]till it becomes
formidable is to break its power at once.
On January 13, 1877, Gen. William Sherman ordered Howard's com
mand to occupy the Wallowa country, and a series of talks was conducted
between the various commissioners and the chiefs of the Lower Nez Perce
tribes.What has been described as "the final council" was begun on
May 3 of that year. One of the best accounts of that session, related
by Yellow Wolf who was 21 at the time, but discredited by Chief Lawyer
of the Upper Nez Perce who blamed Joseph for the war, was as follows:
At Lapwai Howard asked Joseph if he had anything to say.
Joseph answered: "I will hear what you have to tell the chiefs,

^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 251i-255. Howard served in six major
battles during the Civil War and achieved the rank of major general.
^'^Walla Walla Statesman j^Walla Walla, Washington^, March 2k, 1877.
^^Daily Qregonian [Portland, OregonJ, February 28, 1877.
^%eal, op. cit., pp. 39-UO.
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Ity brother [oilokotj and I came to listen. Tou must not hurry.
White Bird and Toohoolhoolzote will be here tomorrow." But
General Howard would not wait. He talked short. Said the
Indians would have to do as ordered. Agent Monteith read a
paper and said we had to go on a small reservation.
Ollokot made a short talk. He wanted to wait for the Salmon
River chiefs before anything was done.
General Howard now said, "If you do not come on the reserva
tion, Bçr soldiers will put you there."
This hurt the Indians.^3
Shortly thereafter. General Howard and Toohoolhoolzote broke into
an argument which, more than arching else, was a show of diplomatic
force on both sides. Yellow Wolf recalled this by quoting General
Howard's impassioned rejoinders

"I am the man to tell you what you

mast do! Tou will come on the reservation within time I tell you (^0
. If not, soldiers will put you there or shoot you down."^^
The general then commanded his men forcibly to escort Toohool
hoolzote to the guardhouse.
In a newspaper interview after the war at Bismarck, N. D., Chief
Joseph said simply;
mast move.

"Howard, in our councils, talked harsh; said we

His language pierced uy heart as a knife.

The result of the ultimatum by Howard was successful in that the
Nez Perce chiefs agreed to move as ordered.

The elderly chief, Toohool

hoolzote, was released from the guardhouse. Howard justified this action
later by saying:

"I^y conduct was summary, it is true, but I knew that

it was hopeless to get the Indians to agree to anything so long as th^
could keep this old Dreamer on the land and defy the agents of the

^%cWhorter, og. cit., pp. 37-38^Ibid.
^^Avant Courier ^ozeman, MontansJ, December 13, 1877. The inter
view in Bismarck, N.D., was conducted on November 22, 1877, and reprinted
in the Avant Courier.
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government. ..
Thus, the Nez Perce gave in to the threat of force, a strong
testimonial that they did not desire hostilities with the whites. The
relocation of Joseph's people was begun as agreed, but circumstances
arose that prevented its completion.

Chief Joseph pleaded with the

general for more than 30 days to make the move because his stock was
scattered and the waters of the Snake River, which would have to be
forded, were at flood stage.

General Howard refused, saying; "If you

let the time run over one day, the soldiers will be there to drive you
on to the reservation, and all your cattle and horses outside of the
reservation at that time will fall into the hands of the white men."^^
In addition to abandoning much of their stock, the Nez Perce lost
considerable possessions during the difficult river crossing, in order
to comply with the ultimatum. A rendezvous was planned at the camp
ground called Tepahlewam at the head of Rocky Garyon so the tribes
could rest and organize for the trek to Lapwai. But this stopover
duidng the journey was often described as a "fatal pause" because it
provided an opportunity for tribesmen, angered deeply, to vent their
feelings collectively.

Six leading chiefs—Joseph, Ollokot, White Bird,

Toohoolhoolzote, Looking Glass and Hahtalekin—agreed, however, that a
war with the United States would be senseless, and no evidence suggests
that special preparations for fighting were made, as was charged later
by newspapers.^®

Joseph's wife was expecting a child that month, which

^%eal, 0£. cit., p. h 2 .
^^Brady, o£. cit., p. 60.
^^Ghalmers, og. cit., p. $2.
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only added to his concerns,

Joseph and his brother, Ollokot, left the

camp, recrossed the Salmon River nearby, and butchered cattle in prepar
ation for the journey.
While the two chiefs were away, a horse ridden by two young
braves stepped on camas bulbs that a woman had been gathering.
husband, Hs^oon Moxmcoc, insulted them, saying;

Her

"See what you do!

Playing brave, you ride over HQr woman's hard-worked food!

If you so

brave, why you not go kill the white man who killed your father. Eagle
Robe?»'
This inflamed young Wahlitits.

He enlisted the help of two

cousins and, at dagrbreak of June 13, 1877, headed for white settlements
along the Salmon River. The raiding party returned to the camp the
following day with the news of having killed four whites. Reaction
was varied. White Bird and the elders advised against such demonstra
tions on the grounds that war had to be averted. Wahlitits retort was:
"Why do you sit here like women?

The war has begun a l r e a d y . W h e n

Joseph learned about what happened, he was shocked and rode to camp
immediately. But he was too late to stop l6 braves and Yellow Bull,
a chieftain, who joined the renegades for a second foray of slaughter.
Although the exact count is uncertain, more than a dozen settlers were
murdered by these Indians who obtained whiskey at a store owned by
Samuel Benedict.
The first newspaper account of the murder by a Nez Perce Indian

^%cWhorter, Hear Me, ^ Chiefsi, p. 190.
Brady, og. cit., p. 62.
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. ii7.
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appeared three weeks later, as followss
The Nez Perces give the following version of the cause of
the Idaho outbreak; One of the head men of the Nez Perces
had long held back the turbulent spirits who were clamorous
for war. He was at a trading post for the purpose of buying
a gun, which the trader refused to sell him, saying that he
was a bad Indian. The Indian said, pointing to the sun,
"Before the sun goes down I will make you sell me a gun."
The trader replied, "Before the sun goes down I will put you
out of this store;" and he advanced toward him as if to put
his threat into execution. As he was advancing the Indian
shot him in the head, and his partner, hearing the disturb
ance and coming up, was also shot dead. The Indians then
went to the rear of the store and clubbed the trader's wife
to death* On the way to their camp th^ killed four other
persons."
How and from whom this account was obtained was not explained,
but the inaccuracies in it are numerous and it conflicts with the
eccplanations given by the Nez Perce chiefs after the war, as already
cited. Apparently the source tried to justi:^ the various murders by
explaining that the entire affair began over an argument at Benedict's
store. Much to his credit, Joseph, who was not involved in the affair
in any way, said in 1879:
I would have given
own life if I could have undone the
killing of white men by my people. . . . When ny young men
began the killing ay heart was hurt. Although I did not
justify them, I remembered all the insults I had endured, and
ny blood was on fire. Still I would have taken ny people to
the buffalo countly without fighting, if possible. I could
see no other way to avoid war. We moved over to White Bird
Creek, sixteen miles away, and there encamped, intending to
collect our stock before leaving; but the soldiers attacked
us and the first battle was fought.^3
The shameful murders by the Nez Perce were the result of broken
Treaties, white invasion, murder, conflicting executive policy, and a

^^Avant Courier, July 12, l877.
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 1:9.
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dozen other grievances. The massacre was also the sole justification
for a senseless war which was, for the most part, fought in Montana by
whites who had little interest in Nez Perce affairs.

CHAPTER III
NEWSPAPER CHARACTERIZATION

The outbreak of hostilities with the Nez Perce in 1877 attracted
immediate national attention. The New York Tribune, for instance,
published prominent, front-page accounts each day between June l8 and
2U, as the first reports of hostilities were telegraphed from the
West.
The alann among Idaho settlers was by no means localized, and
a series of questions needed answers.
Which tribes were involved?
tribes imminent?
the fighting?

How serious was the outbreak?

Was a general uprising of several Indian

What forces were available to control and suppress

What damage to life and property had resulted?

As important as each of the questions was, there remained one
basic question which, as shall be seen, required months to answer fully;
what caused the outbreak?
Journalistic opinion ran rampant with this question. Some papers
cursed the Indians; others the governmentj still others, both.
The problem of immediate concern throughout the war was obtain
ing factual information concerning the various events unfolding some
where in the wilderness of two territories. Most qrewitnesses—
settlers, volunteers, soldiers—were not trained, unbiased observers.
Indeed, the journalists of the frontier were little better in margr
instances because some editors lacked professional training and because

k3
most editors were caught up in the passions surrounding them.^
The most accurate information originated from various officers
after battlefield situations had been assessed carefully. But their
reports did not reach telegraph stations until long after fighting had
ceased in the particular battles described. This meant that before
and during the development of a military clash, editors had to do con
siderable guesswork, piecing together information as it came in, to
give the public some idea of what had happened.
Editors struggled constantly for fresh news from argr quarter at
such times and, when it came from creditable sources, their gratitude
was unbounded. The Weekly Missoulian, its Missoula offices approxi
mately 1?0 miles from the scene of the Big Hole battle, began a report
of that important conflicts

"We are indebted to Mr. Eugene Lent, a

former compositor in this office, and a gentleman of unquestioned
braveiy, coolness, intelligence and veracity, who left Gen. Gibbon's
entrenched camp with official dispatches, on Saturday the 11th., for
2
the following account of the Big Hole fight, ..."

The problem of accuracy was compounded by the problem of relaying
the information from point to point over great distances. The following
news story published on the front page of the New York Tribune, the
first account by that paper about the Nez Perce outbreak, indicates
clearly the complexity of routing the dispatch:

^Robert t». Housman, "Early Montana Territorial Journalism as a
Reflection of the American Frontier in the New Northwest" (unpublished
doctorate dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia, 193h), pp.
12-21.
^Weekly Missoulian [Missoula, Montana], August 17, 1877.

hi;
An Uprising in Oregon
San Francisco, June 17—A dispatch from Portland [^e.J says s
A dispatch received from Lieut, Wlkenson, now at Walluia[sicJ,
conveys the startling news of an uprising of Indians, and,
states that th^ were murdering the whites at Mt. Idahoe[sic],
which is situated 60 miles from Lewiston.3
The remainder of this account by Lt. VBlkenson is sketchy at best
and the editors apparently inserted at the end that "it is, however,
thought the reports have been exaggerated."
Not only did the uprising not occur in Oregon as the headline
indicated, but the next day, June 19, 1877, the Tribune relayed the news
that *?oung [Chief] Joseph and his squaw were killed during the fight at
Cottonwood Creek [idahc]

The account explained that this news reached

Lewiston by stage, suggesting that it was the fault of the observer and
not the press.

Joseph was not killed.

While the telegraph should be regarded as the life line for both
the military and the newspapers in 1877, it was a mixed blessing for
the latter in the technical sense.

Hugh McQuaid, part owner of the

Helena Independent during the Nez Perce conflict, recalled 2h years
afterward that "there was only the government telegraph line in the
territory then, and it was not open for the use of civilians at all
times. The military was using it almost continuously and it was only
by good luck that our correspondents could get something on the wires,
and then they had to condense."^
Nevertheless, important news telegraphed from the various stations

%ew York Tribune, June l8, 1877^New York Tribune, June 19, 1877.
^Helena jMontan^ Independent, undated.

in Idaho and Montana could be published the next day in San Francisco
or New York. Moreover, these urban centers, particularly New York,
received and sent numerous dispatches to Washington, D. C., with great
speed. This gave newspapers such as the New York Tribune a decided
advantage over the press on the frontier because it received both the
news of the war and the reaction by the government to that news within
a matter of hours.
By w^ of contrast. The New North-West of Deer Lodge, Montana,
and the Weekly Missoulian were but 80 miles apart and it required two
days by stage to convey local news. More horses and drivers were added
toward the end of June, 1877, however, so that this "line" could be
spanned in a single day.^

Because of this system between frontier towns

it is not surprising that the first news of the Nez Perce uprising was
not published in Missoula until June 29, eleven days after it appeared
in New York.

Part of this can be attributed to the fact that the

Missoulian was a weekly at the time.

The wire report from San Francisco

however, reached the telegraph station at Helena on June 19 and was
published by the Helena Weekly Herald on June 21. The Deer Lodge paper
ran the story the next day, June 22. Apparently the stage from Helena
to Missoula, a distance of 112 miles, required at least three days
travel time over mountainous terrain, or else the story also would have
appeared in the Missoula issue of June 22.
This time lag over comparatively short distances meant that
frontier towns in general and pioneer editors in particular were, for
all practical purposes, isolated from the necessary flow of information

^he New North—West [Deer Lodge, Montana!, June 18, 1877.

U6
so vital to a military campaign. The problems this created can easily
be imagined. One noteworthy example among many of this informational
Tacuum for frontier editors was reflected in an editorial brief run in
the Mlssoulian on August 10, 1877, noting that no word had been received
from Colonel Gibbon about making contact with the Indians. It was ex
plained that the forms of the paper had been kept open to the last
possible minute in hopes that some news of the pursuit by the soldiers
might be published.

Actually by the time of publication, the Big Hole

battle was concluded. The Indians were again on their way southward
and Colonel Gibbon's command was attending the wounded and burying the
dead.
The editor of the Missoulian, Ghauncey Barbour, noted in his
comments of August 10 that "if anything important arrives it will be
issued in an extra."

So far as is known, the Nez Perce conflict was

the first time during 13 years of Montana journalism that extras were
g
used extensively.
These appeared as leaflets, not entire pages, usually
carrying but one story. Both daily and weekly editors resorted to this
practice and no small importance was attached to them. As shall be ex
plored in depth in a later chapter, the extra published in Missoula on
July 28,

1877,

and reprinted the following day in other towns as distant

as Helena—a remarkable feat because the stage normally required three
days of travel time—helped create a long and bitter newspaper war which,

7Weekly Missoulian, August 10,

I877.

librarians at the Historical Society of Montana ascertained that
the first extra in territorial history appeared July I8, I86?, in the
Montana Post of Virginia City. It was titled "Highway Robbery and
riurder11" Although larger than leaflets published during the Nez Perce
war, it is not believed that these extras were used to any extent until
1877.

strangely enough, reversed much of the strong sentiment expressed
editorially against the Nez Perce. Reason would suggest that the Nez
Perce threat, imagined or otherwise, to communities and ranches through
out Montana Territory would above all else weld journalistic opinion
into common accord. The matter was by no means that simple, particularly
after editors such as Barbour had opportunity to witness the conduct and
understand on a first-hand basis the hopes of the Nez Perce of avoiding
a fight.
An impartial review of the frontier editors themselves is ex
tremely difficult, for these were not impartial men.

Nor was the

frontier existence a simple, happy-go-lucky experience as it is too
often regarded by many today who ponder the complexities of co-existence
with other nations. Missoula, for instance, was literally surrounded
by the Flathead tribe which, as noted earlier, had a long history of
amiable relations with the Nez Perce. This relatively isolated commun
ity with a population of hhl, according to the census in 1877, had a
defensive force of 135 soldiers and volunteers capable of being mustered
9
at Fort Missoula which was still under construction.

When it became

apparent that the town was almost in the direct path of the Nez Perce
retreat, the editor of the Missoulian could be expected to react with
alarm. This situation was extremely atypical in the normal cycle of
frontier events, certainly, and it is important not to characterize
various individuals in the hours of crisis only.
Although the limitations of this study make research into Idaho

9A. E. Rothermich (ed.), "Early Days at Fort Missoula," Frontier
Omnibus (Missoula: Montana State University Press, 1962), p. 390.
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journalism superficial, the editor of the Lewiston Teller, Alonzo Leland,
deserves mention.
Idaho Territory during the i860's endured growing pains similar
to those that pervaded the formation of government in Montana about the
same time. Corruption, graft and theft befell such young communities
as Lewiston at a time when the Nez Perce problems with treaties were
growing.% I876, Alonzo Leland unleashed criticism against these
Indians with unabating vehemence, and he continued this policy through

1878

and into 1879.^^
Once hostilities had erupted in June of 1877, Leland not only

assailed the Indians with the pen, but took to the field with volunteers.
Daring the second foray of the war, which amounted to an extremely con
fused skirmish and resulted in a court martial over the question of
12
bravery, Leland was wounded.
Two weeks later, in an extra, Leland rebuked a comment by Joseph
that he was "not to blame in this war, that he was forced into it" by
stating: "he did not speak for the rest of the hostiles.
Because of the proximity of Lewiston to Lapwai where final nego
tiations were conducted between the government and the Indians before
the outbreak, an intensive study of Leland's role would be enlightening.
One scholar wrote;

"Leland had the outstanding quality of a real

^^Nancy N. T. Donner, "History of Journalism in Idaho Territory,
thesis, Montana State University,

1862-1890" (unpublished Master's
Missoula, 1963), p. 82.
^^Ibid., p. 110.

12
Seal, 0£. cit., p.

69.

^%ewiston jidahoj Teller, extra, July

I6, 1877.
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campaigner—he dramatized his position. In his own vay, he practiced
sensationalism; he helped to build his own war."^^
Many of the antiquated hand presses used by pioneer journalists
in Montana in the i860's and l870's had been carted in pieces over the
Bitterroot Mountains from Idaho. In fact, most Montana editors depended
on western sources for supplies.During 1877, all the major Montana
papers were located in the western half of the Territory.
Among the most respected editors in Montana Territory was James
H. Mills, who started his career as editor of the first pioneer paper,
the Montana Post.

He became part owner and editor of the New North-West

in Deer Lodge in 1877. Mills served as Secretaiy of Montana for five
years and helped to improve the educational system during later years
In

1876, Mills

and his partner, Hariy 0. Kessler, on the New

North-West, gambled on the anticipated prosperity of Butte placer
claims known since I86L and established the first paper in that com
munity, the Butte Miner.

This venture had recondite, pecuniary motives

—as opposed to any particular interest in the community of Butte—and
Mills sold out eventually to the copper magnates, William Clark and
Marcus Daly.^^
During the Nez Perce campaign. Mills was something of a magnate
in his own right, as a result of his journalistic and political prestige.

l^Donner, o£. cit., p. 9it.
^^Housman, 0£. cit., p. 32.
^^Tom Stout (ed.), Montana; Its Story and Biography, Vol. I
(Chicago and New York; The American Historical Society, 1921), p. U97.
^^Housman, o£. cit., p. ihS.
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Gov. B. F. Potts appointed the editor Adjutant General of the Montana
Militia for the specific purpose of resisting the Indians.It may be
assumed immediately that such appointment would compromise Mills' sup
posedly impartial position as a newspaper editor and that he would become
a stooge of political influence. The following letter

Mills to the

governor, July 12, 1877, indicates not only an embarrassment about pub
lishing the news of the military appointment, but also an egotism in
suggesting to the governor how to run the affairs of state:
Deer Lodge, Montana
Your favor of the 11th covering order appointing me Adjutant
General of the M M is to hand. Thank you. It would be a trifle
of a joke if it were published now but occasion may arise when
there will be necessity for it and work to do—I had to scold a
bit today (in the newspaper] about the shape in which the Terri
tories are in cases of the kind now threatening us. If you were
given discretionary authority it might save trouble with telegraph
lines down and no authority to act and incur a dollar of expense
in fighting for the United States. ... It seems to me your
standing with the President and Sherman would procure your re
quest favorable consideration. ... I think you had better order
UO stand [riflesj to Philipsburg, hO to New Chicago Company, and
20 to Bear Mouth, send the form of bond required from Companies,
if it is your duty to go into these details and order that the
secretary (MillsJ shall determine their acceptance and I will
see they are good bonds.^9
Because Mills was the secretary of Montana, this and other letters
he wrote to the governor give the impression the editor was in Washington,
not Deer Lodge. Especially touchy was his intimation that Potts was in
the favor of the President, because in April and May of 1877 there was
a powerful move under w^ to impeach the governor on charges of malad
ministration. Mills was very much a part of the scandal which erupted

^^Paul G. Phillips (ed.). The Battle of the Big Hole, Sources of
of Northwest History, No. 8 (Missoula; State University of Montana, 1929),
p. ii.
^^Ibld., p. 7.
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among Republican factions and the issue became so controversial that
the case was taken to Washington for presidential consideration.

The

following excerpt from an editorial in the New North-West explains the
the situation in part:
Among these [letters given to the PresidentJ is the sworn
disposition of I. R. Alden, clerk of the Supreme Court of
Montana, charging Potts with withholding fees collected and
long due to D. W. Middleton, clerk of the Supreme Court of
the United States. There is also a letter of Potts' copied
from the records of the Department of Justice stultifying
Potts' endorsement of James H. Mills for Secretary of Montana,
whose appointment was recently made, but afterwards withdrawn
by the Resident. In this letter Potts characterizes Mills as
a mudslinger at the administration and as abusing the AttorneyGeneral roundly. Potts further remarks: "I think it bad enough
to be abused by our political enemies, but when men who live by
the favor of the administration abuse us, they should be com
pelled to draw their sustenance from some other quarter." It
is believed that Governor Potts will be suspended or notified
that his resignation would be accepted.20
This denouncement of an editor by a governor in grave difficulty
would have lacked impact, probably, had Mills been solely on a newspaper
payroll.

îïïLs remarks to the governor's charge in the remainder of the

editorial were conciliatory because of his own precarious position.
As it turned out, on May 19, 1877, the President cleared the
charges preferred against Potts and, at the same time, reinstated Mills
21
as secretary.

This was by no means the anticipated outcome, evidenced

in the editorial of May 1|., and the outbreak of hostilities with the Nez
Perce less than a month later was to be a proving ground for the repu
tations of both men.

As shall be seen, the governor faced a personal

crisis during the Fort Fizzle affair near Missoula when the Nez Perce
"invaded" Montana Territory.

Mills' reputation as an editor was to be

^%ew North-West) May It, 1877.
^^New North-West, May 25, 1877.
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tested by the outcome of the same affair when a newspaper war emipted
over the conduct of white defenders.
An example of the feeling that ran against both Mills and Governor
Potts, who were considered the directors of territorial policy during
the Nez Perce war, appeared in an editorial in the Bozeman Times, a paper
edited by E. S. Wilkinson, who did a remarkable job at remaining reason
ably objective in the majority of his viewpoints toward controversial
matters that embroiled other journals:
ADJUTANT GENERAL MILLS
This high-toned and factorum to the Governor, no longer
condescends to his course and action in person. He finds
admiring contemporaries in other parts of the Territory to
defend him from justifiable attack from others. The editor
of the ^Helena} Independent, acknowledges the superiority of
Gapt. Mills and proclaims himself a voluntary striker for
that sublime minon of Governor Potts. That is all right.
It is fitting that the small should bow down to the great
and do them homage and service. Of course the article men
tioned must be copied by the Madisonian, the other admirer
of the Territorial Government, composed of Potts and Mills.
Now, since the two organs of the two hundred and fifty pounds
averdupois of bone and muscle and the thimble full of brains
that runs our government have come to the rescue [meaning
the editors]!, we would advise Gapt. Mills to stand aloof from
the contest, wrap his dignity in his cloak, say nothing, and
leave it to his voluntary henchmen to do his work!22
The reasons for this personal criticism will become evident in
the review of the Fort Fizzle affair when the tide of editorial opinion
against the Nez Perce ebbed and began a turbulent flow in the opposite
direction.
Chauncey Barbour was a close associate and friend of Mills.
Although the Missoula editor had not gained the recognition in Montana
affairs that the latter had, he was to play an outstanding role in the

^^Bozeman ^Montana} Times, October 26, 1877.
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Nez Perce war because of his proximity to historic events in that cam
paign.
That the two editors knew each other well and depended on one
another for small favors is apparent in the following letter written
July

6, 1877, by

Barbour to Mills:

Missoula, M.T.
Dear Sirs I wish you would send me another qyster can of ink
by the cart Thursday. ... I do not know how we stand on our
ink trades; maybe you do. . .
All is quiet along the Bitter Root. The people were under
a panic when you were here, but a reaction set in and many of
the people are laughing at their scare. We are, perhaps, in
as great danger yet as we ever were. The danger is that the
Nez Perces may come or be driven into this country, and it is
almost a sure thing that a large number of our Indians jjlatheadsjwill join them in such case. . . .
Ify last paper was very unsatisfactory to me, and roust have
been to outsiders who were looking for a statement of the
feeling among our people, their alarm and grounds for alarm
and their movements in this emergency.
Fraternally yours,
(Chauncey Barbour)
P.S. Printers drunk.
This casual, very humble approach—observant and articulate-characterizes Barbour's writing, both in personal correspondence and
his journal.

In his invaluable history written in 1885, Leeson said

of Barbour, who still resided in Missoula at the time: "Chauncey
Barbour, the former editor of the paper, is said to be one of the
closest observers and best editorial writers in the territory.
The Mssoulian, which had started only seven years before the
Nez Perce outbreak as the Missoulian and Cedar Creek Pioneer, was
25
relatively unknown compared with the Helena and Deer Lodge papers.

23Quoted in the Poplar {Montana} Standard, March 20, 19^1.
^^M. A. Leeson (ed.),History of Montana, 1739-1885 (Chicago:
Warner, Beers & Company, l885j, pp.33^-336.
^^Ibid.
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This was to change when the Fort Fizzle affair cast that paper in the
limelight. Barbour's editorials started the newspaper war, or were the
basis for it, and in a letter to Governor Potts, he wrote;
Was glad to receive your kind and friendly letter. I felt
myself in the most trying position in the last issue of ny
paper, I ever was in in qy life. There was so much of unreason
and vituperation that I felt it B^y duty to stand against the
current if it swamped me. And it is gratifying to me today to
say that I have compelled a sober, second thought, and that
scores of good men have taken me by the hand and thanked me
for what they are pleased to term the able manner in which I
have performed an intelligent duty.26
Ironically, Barbour's major contender in this newspaper fracas
was his old friend. Mills. Because Mills and Governor Potts were close
allies throughout the war, as noted, it may seem strange that both these
contending editors were in the good graces of the governor.

This will

be clarified when the stand that Barbour took is ejcamined closely.
Governor Potts became very much involved in the newspaper war, but with
another paper, the Helena Daily Herald.
Founded in

1866

by Col. James L, Fisk who had led a historic

expedition to Montana, the Herald became the first daily in the Terri
tory the following year.^?

Colonel Fisk became interested in mining

ventures and sold out to his brothers, Daniel ¥., Andrew J. and Robert
E. The latter headed editorial policy, evidenced by the fact that only
his name appeared on the masthead during the Nez Perce war. Not only
was the Herald the largest paper in Montana—served by four steam presses
and special machinery for folding papers—it also had the service of the

^^Phillips, 0£. cit., p. lli.
^^Leeson,
cit., pp. 327-328. The only other daily in Montana
Territory at the %me of the Nez Perce war was the Helena Independent.
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telegraph at hand.
"The Daily Herald was started August 1 , I867, and reached a
circulation of over liOO within the first month," said Judge Cornelius
Hedges of the Montana Supreme Court who was also an associate editor
of that paper. "Few cities of 25,000 inhabitants can boast of as com
plete a printing establishment as the Herald now possesses, . .
The Herald, like its competitor, the Helena Independent, issued
a weekly edition which, for the most part, was similar editorially.
Editorials run in the daily editions often were reprinted in the
weeklies.
R. E. Fisk, who served as chairman of the Territorial Republican
Committee of Montana, was the power behind the move to impeach Governor
Potts.

He journeyed to Washington in May, 1877, when the case went

before a presidential hearing.

When the editor learned personally from

President Hayes that Potts had been exonerated, he composed a letter to
the President reiterating the charges and demanding reconsideration of
29
the case.

Throughout the Nez Perce campaign, Fisk criticized Governor
Potts relentlessly.

When Gen. William T. Sherman visited Helena during

the week of August 22, 1877, Governor Potts was so distraught about the
editorial policy of that paper that he managed by means not explained
to censor the Herald.This incident will be reviewed in detail later.

^%ontributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol. II
(Helena: Independent Publishing Company, 190%), p. 113.
^^Helena Daily Herald, May 22, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 22, 1877•
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but it serves to point out one festering newspaper condition during the
Nez Perce war.
Of the eight Montana newspapers reviewed for this study, three
editors—Mills, Barbour and Fisk—stand out for the divergent roles
they played in the events of 1877. As a rule, editors of other Montana
papers aligned themselves for or against the stands these individuals
took.
Thomas A. Sutherland, editor of the Portland (Oregon] Standard
and the only accredited news correspondent for metropolitan dailies
personally to report the Nez Perce war, deserves mention. fflLs illumin
ating dispatches of three battles and other occurrences were rushed by
courier to the nearest telegraph station for transmission to the New
York Herald and the San Francisco Chronicle.
A controversy greater than the one of the Fort Fizzle affair
broke out early in the campaign and lasted long after the termination
of the war regarding General Howard's conduct as a military leader.
The following news account, explaining Sutherland's activities and his
attitude toward the general, appeared in the Missoulian, August 10,
1877:
Thos. A. Sutherland .. . made us a pleasant call Wednesday.
He has been campaigning with Gen. Howard from the opening of
the war, and came with them over the Lo Lo trail. Mr. Sutherland
speaks highly of the General as a soldier and gentleman, and the
reason why the Indians have not been crushed before this are not
Gen. Howard's fault.32

Oliver Knight, Following The Indian Wars (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, I960), pp. 2%-29^
32weekly Missoulian, August 10, 1877.
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At no time did Sutherland criticize Howard, as Montana editors
were wont to do, but he did express considerable consternation over the
conduct of civilian Indian fighters who, as will be seen, were ordered
to organize by Governor Potts and Secretary Mills against the wishes of
the militaiy.^^
The only other correspondents who had any connection with the Nez
Perce campaign were Jerome B. Stillson of the New York Herald, Charles
S. Diehl of the Chicago Times, and John F. Finerty of the Chicago Times.
While each gained a national reputation for his coverage of the Sioux
War led by Chief Sitting Bull, their only coverage of the Nez Perce war
occurred when Gen. Nelson Miles fought the terminating battle with Chief
Joseph near the Bear Paw Mountains.^^

Diehl and Stillson, who were

involved with the Nez Perce for less than a week, then ventured north
into Canada where they interviewed Sitting Bull for one of the most
famous press dispatches in the history of Indian

warfare.

There is little doubt that the events of the Sioux conflagration,
such as the Custer massacre, June 25,

I876,

had considerable bearing on

the general attitudes of Montanans toward the Nez Perce uprising.

In

an editorial, R. E. Fisk displayed something akin to a persecution
complex over this matter by writing:
Not only the Indians that naturally belong to Montana are
restive and threatening, but there seems to be a tendency to
djrive all the hostiles of every tribe from all quarters of the
compass into Montana. The Sioux are on our east, the Bloods
and Piegaxis on our north, the Nez Perces to the west, and there

^^Knight, loc. cit.
^^John F. Finerty, War-Path and Bivouac (Normans University of
Oklahoma Press, I96I), pp. 226-235.
^^Knight, o£. cit., p. 297.
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are rumors of fears of the Bannacks to the south. It almost
looks as if by general consent of all but ourselves, Montana
has been selected as the final battlefield id.th all the untamed
savages on the continent.36
The Sioux events brought out another point which was to become
evident during the Nez Perce crisis—the speed displayed by the Indians
in transmitting information. In a letter to Frank H. ¥oo(fy, Chaunc^
Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, remarked: "The Custer massacre
occurred June 25, and the news reached here July 3j but the Indians
[presumably the FlatheadsJ knew of it before the telegraph had brought
37
the news."

Similar remarks about Indian communications were made by

such military personnel as Capt. Charles C, Rawn, commander of Fort
Missoula, concerning the Nez Perce, in a letter dated August 2, 1877,
to Col. John Gibbon.Barbour wrote also to Governor Potts, June 2 9 ,
1877, stating that,
. . . a great many rumors (are) floating in the air, maqy of
which are born of terrified imaginations; but it is certain
that our Indians [Flatheadsj are fully advised of all that is
transpiring across the Coeur d'Alene mountains, and we are
completely in the dark. . . .39
Indeed, Montana newspapers had no great advantage in gathering
and broadcasting information which originated at distant and remote
battlefields. Nez Perce intelligence was remarkable, but not infallible.
When it failed—as happened before the Big Hole and Bear Paw fights—
those Indians suffered immeasureably, as will be seen.

3^Helena Daily Herald, August

I6, 1877.

37Leeson, og. cit., p. 868.
^®Rothermich, o£. cit., p.

389.

39phillip8, 0£. cit., p. I4.
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The Montana press, in its own right, was remarkable in many ways
when compared with contemporaiy newspapers.
whether weeklies or dailies.

All had a similar format,

Each appeared as a four-page folio resemb

ling somewhat current issues of the London Times, if that paper were of
comparable size. Although a number of ads usually were run on the front
page, the Montana papers were conservative typo graphically. Few head
lines of ai^ size were used, except for stories of extreme importance.
And then these headlines rarely, if ever, were larger than 2l|-point
type.
A literary approach was characteristic of all the papers studied,
evidenced by the fact that front-page stories were devoted to topics
such as poetry, features on foreign lands, human interest, and the latest
fashions.

Important local and national news usually was run on the

second page, space permitting, with the editorials.

In many instances,

the editorials and news were interspersed on the page in such manner
that it is difficult to determine which is which. Editors were not
above rewriting or condensing news accounts and adding personal opinion,
as will become evident.
Typographical errors appeared rather infrequently, on the whole,
which is noteworthy in editorials especially.

On occasion an editorial

or editorials would fill nearly the eight columns of a page.

These

were written in a scholarly fashion, often employing French or Latin
phrases to emphasize a point.
Housman, in his study of pioneer journalism in Montana, noted
that this intellectual approach can be attributed to the influence of
men like Dana, Greeley and Bennett.

Although the "Golden Age of

60
Journalism" was waning in the late l870's, the mannerisms and articula
tion of that era were deeply ingrained in the thinking of Montana
editors.Included with this was the concept of "personal journalism"j
something in which these individuals reveled, sometimes to the point
of ruining the reputations of military personnel, government officials
and each others.

^"^Housman, o£. cit., p. 10.

CHAPTER I?

THE MR: PHASE ONE

The Idaho Campaign
News of the first series of Nez Perce murders committed by
Wahlititis and his two cousins on June 13, 1877, reached Fort Lapwai
the next day. By 8:00 p.m., June lii. General Howard sent out two
companies of cavalry, comprising 99 soldiers commanded by Capt. David
Perry.^
The contingent rode through the night over muddy trails and
halted at Qrangeville, about 70 miles southeast of Lapwai, to rest
after an almost continuous 2It-hour ride.

Incensed citizens of that

community urged Perry for immediate, decisive action, but when the
troops departed the next evening, only 11 volunteers joined the march,
2

bringing the total force to 110 men.

At daybreak on June 17, the mounted contingent descended to the
creek running through White Bird canyon, a tributary of the Salmon
River, about l6 miles south of Mt. Idaho and Grangeville, where Joseph,
Ollokot and White Bird had camped. According to Alvin Josephy, Joseph
may have had as many as 1^0 warriors, half of whom may have been too
drunk on stolen whiskey to participage in the fighting that was to

^Beal, o£. cit., pp. ^0-^1.
Zibid.
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ensue.

No reference to drtinkeness can be found elsewhere, and it is

generally agreed by scholars that Joseph had approximately 60 warriors,
as he claimed, to engage in the fighting.^ Looking Glass and other
chiefs had separated from Joseph's bands, and were headed for the
Clearwater River at the time. As will be seen, the deployment of
Joseph's and White Bird's braves, their accuracy in fire, and the
conduct of the battle suggests that all were very sober.
Meanwhile, Joseph's wife, Ta-ma-al-we-non-ny, was expecting her
child any moment.^ And the Nez Perce were fully aware that the troops
had arrived, for during the night a soldier had struck a match to
light his pipe and an Indian scout had spotted it.^

Joseph's anxiety

at dawn that day was by no means small.
Although it is not recorded in military records, a truce party
of six Indians led by Wettiwetti advanced toward the soldiers with a
white flag and shouted, "What do you people want?This Indian party
had been sent by Chief Joseph to learn General Howard's intentions,
for there remained some hope that the military force came to demand
that the tribesmen responsible for the murders be turned over for trial.
But as the Indian delegation neared, a U. S. scout named Arthur Chapman

3Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Patriot Chiefs (New York: The Viking
Press, 1961), p. 236. This account of the battle at White Bird canyon
states that Joseph's child was born before the battle, which is not
correct.
^Bracfy, 0£. cit., p. 6ii.
^Chester Anders Fee, Chief Joseph (New York: Wilson-Erickson,
Incorporated, 1 9 3 6 ) , p . $ 2 .
^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. lUO.
^Beal, loc. cit.
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fired twice. Unhurt, the six Indians returned the fire and killed the
trumpeter, John Jones.^

Thus began the war.

A sentry named Mox-Mox, who had been posted on a ridge above the
Nez Perce camp, brought word of what had happened to Joseph.

Ollokot

suggested immediately a plan that would have been suicidal—to move
westward and ford the Salmon River.
Joseph is said to have refused, claiming that the soldiers'
horses would scatter at the sound of firearms.

He ordered White Bird

to deploy along the southern ridge of the canyon. Joseph's warriors
were posted behind rocks and logs along the center and northern portions
of the carQTon.

This formed a "C" shape defense approximately four miles

east of the camp.^
Captain Perry, having made no assessment of the strength or
whereabouts of the Nez Perce, moved down the widening canyon from the
east in columns of fours.

Lt. W. R. Parnell, who was in charge of

approximately half of Perry's men, recounted after the battle that "it
was bad judgment and certainly not tactical to put the entire command
on the line, leaving no reserves whatever in either troop, and, to
increase the danger of such a fatal error, the men were in the saddles
in an exposed position, while the Indians were on foot . . . taking

„10

cover."

In the confusion which followed. Perry's entire column rode
headlong into what should have been an obvious trap. Ironically, that

O
Chalmers, og. cit., p. 62.
%ee, 0£. cit., p. 130.
^"^Bracfy, 0£. cit., p. 102.
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same morning, General Howard penned a note to Perry at Lapwai warning
about such a situation.
When the firing broke out, the soldiers were flanked on both
sides by well-positioned Indians.

A dozen soldiers fell, wounded or

dead. And, as Joseph had predicted, many who returned the fire were
thrown from their horses as the animals reared. Panic and a disorderly
12
retreat were the result.
Perry, meanwhile, found himself nearly helpless in issuing battle
commands because the trumpeter was dead. By running among his men and
shouting commands above the din of fighting, he tried vainly to regroup.
Joseph, having routed the soldiers and volunteers from their
position, sensed victoiy, but realized he had not beaten them.

His

was still the inferior force in numbers and equipment, for although
the majority of Indians had modern firearms, a few had to fight with
,
ll
bows.
As the troops scattered toward higher ground, making a renewed
fight probable, Joseph ordered a herd of Indian ponies, a few of which
were ridden by warriors, through the center and to the rear of Perry's
wavering lines. This tactic eocposed the military force to an effective
and deadly fire from all sides.The soldiers retreated in two widely
separated columns through the surrounding mountains, pursued by the Nez

llpee, 0£. cit., p. lltO.
1p

Chalmers, og. cit., pp. 63-61;.

13

Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 1^8.

^%eal, o£. cit., p. 58.
^^Bracfy,

0£.

cit., pp.

102-10^.
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Perce until they reached safety at Mt. Idaho. Thirty-three soldiers—
one-third of the original force—had been killed, and a large number
wounded. Reports of the Nez Perce loss varies, but it is agreed that
no Indians were killed and as many as four were wounded.Actually the
Nez Perce found that one life had been added to their tribe during the
battle.

While rifles were cracking, Joseph's wife gave birth to a

daughter.
Although the Nez Perce had gained a decisive victory in the
initial onslaught. Chief Joseph realized he was in no position to engage
General Howard and he began the retreat. Five days after the battle at
White Bird cargron. General Howard had assembled eight companies compris
ing I4.OO regulars and 100 volunteers. His battalion left Fort Lapwai on
June 22, flanked ty two Gatling guns—the forerunner of the machine gun
1 ft
—and trailed by a howitzer.
This heavy equipment proved to be a
hindrance in mountain travel, and when Joseph learned that Howard was
encumbered by a cannon, the retreat was directed over some of the most
difficult terrain in Idaho—Lolo pass, the old buffalo trail, which had
tested the endurance of the Lewis and Clark expedition 72 years earlier.
Meanwhile, Captain Perry was criticized severely by newspapers
for his conduct during the battle.

Newspapers, such as the New York

Herald, claimed that Lieutenant Parnell, who was awarded a commendation

^^ewiston Teller, June 23, 1877. This paper reported that four
Nez Perce were wounded. The Indians claimed only two casualties.
^^Fee, 0£. cit., p. 137.
^^Ibid., p. ikO.
^%cWhorter, Yellow Wolf: His Own Story, p. 17.
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for bravery in the retreat, saved the soldiers from annihilation.
Parnell denounced the Herald and its correspondent in no uncertain
20
terms.

When the war was ended. Captain Perry, then a colonel,

demanded a Court of Inquiry to review charges made against him by the

21
press. This was done, and he was cleared.
The initial dispatches which were sent throughout the nation
by the San Francisco Chronicle on June 19 and have been cited already,
created a feeling of considerable alarm.

But the New York Tribune ran

a remarkable story two days later after a consultation with the Bureau
of Indian Affairs in Washington.

It reported, in part:

CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK
Treaty Obligations Violated
White Settlers
Joseph's Aversion to Reservation Limits
HLstoiy of Negotiations
Washington: June 20—Reports and correspondence on file in the
Indian Bureau threw abundant light upon the cause of the Indian
War in Idaho. It is the old story of aggression by the whites
on lands which the savages believed to be by right their hunting
grounds. . . .22
The article explains in some detail the numerous and sordid
violations of trust by whites, particularly regarding the treaties, but
the editorial published the same day took an opposite viewpoint:
Short, unhesitating, decisive war against the Indians who
havQ.taken to the war-path in Idaho will be kindness to their
race by discouraging such outbreaks in the future. The farce
of making treaty obligations with these savages as if they
were a foreign nation, has borne its natural fruit. It gives
as usual the pretext to the Indians for beginning the conflict,
and the delays which enable them to concentrate their forces.

2%rady, 0£. cit., p. 110.
^^Ibid., p. 121.
Op

New York Tribune, June 21, 1877.
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But when frontier towns are revaged and settlers are murdered,
all question as to which side violates treaties is out of
order. 3
G. ¥. McCrary, secretary of war, issued a concurring statement,
printed the following day, June 22, in the Tribune, stating:

"The Indians

estimate the power of the Government by the number of soldiers they see
in the country they inhabit; and believing they can master three or four
warriors to the United States one, th^ are emboldened to begin hostil
ities."^^
Beyond any question, this was not the cause for the Nez Perce
outbreak.

When General Howard had resorted to a show of force during

the final council hy incarcerating Toohoolhoolzote and serving a 30-day
ultimatum to move to the Lapwai Reservation, the Nez Perce had no choice
but to back down.
Meanwhile, the tide of opinion swelled against the Nez Perce as
other minor battles were fought in central Idaho. In a news account,
the Helena Daily Herald noted that nine companies of infantry left
Atlanta, Georgia, for Idaho on July 13, 1877.
were mobilized in San Francisco.

Some 100 men also

Another news report in the Herald

the same d^ indicated that President Hayes would call out the militia
because "the available military is inadequate to suppress the savages.
This never happened, as will be seen, and it was against the policy of
the administration to organize militia.

When Gov. Mason M. Brayman of

^^New York Tribune, June 22, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, July lli, 1877. None of these troops
reached the destination because of a national railroad strike.
^^IbiXl.

Idaho learned of the White Bird cation defeat, he wired the War Depart
ment for authority to organize militia. Secretary McCrary denied his
request, but Brayman decided to arm Idaho citizens anyhow. The only
citizens who received weapons lived in cities such as Boise, well removed
from Nez Perce danger.

This policy rankled Alonzo Leland, editor of the

Lewiston Teller, who expressed the hope that General Howard would drive
27

the hostiles to Boise where war supplies were being kept. '
The Avant Courier of Bozeman, Montana, made the unusual suggestion
that Governor Brayman arm 20,000 "friendly" Indians-—the Paiute, Bannock
and Shoshoni—to quell the Nez

Perce.Perhaps

it was fortunate for

Idaho that this policy was not adopted, for no Indian tribe had proved
itself more friendly to the government than the Nez Perce. Moreover,
such an idea was contrary to Secretary McCraiy's policy, noted in the
New York Tribune editorial, which stated that armed Indians in superior
numbers were dangerous Indians.
While this was happening, Joseph had moved northward and westward
along a circuitous route some ^0 miles through valleys and across rivers.
HLs bands passed along Cottonwood Creek, about l5 miles north of Orangeville, before swinging northeastward to the Lo Lo trail. General Howard's
command, which had a shorter distance to march, stopped for a day at
Cottonwood Creek to await word from scouts about the whereabouts of the
Nez Perce. The Lewiston Teller accused General Howard of halting to
preach and distribute Bibles, because it happened to be a

^Tseal, o£. cit., p. 62.
^^Avant Courier, June 28, 1877.
^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 1^7.

Sunday.^9
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General Howard marched southward toward White Bird canyon in
search of the Indians, and on reaching the mouth of the creek on June
28,

1877,

was attacked by a small band of Nez Perce snipers who fired

from the west bank of the Salmon River. Considerable effort was required
to get horses, mules and unwieldy equipment to the opposite shore. As
it happened, none of the Nez Perce was caught and General Howard failed
to realize that the sniping episode was a ruse by Joseph to gain time.^^
Howard learned from scouts that Chief Looking Glass still was
camped on the Clearwater River, so he detached two companies commanded
by Capt. Stephen Whipple to make a surprise attack with Gatling guns.

31

On arrival at the Nez Perce camp at daybreak, July 1, the troops
deployed and a scout was sent forward to request a parl^.

He returned

with word that Looking Glass did not want to become involved with the
war and that the soldiers should leave his people in peace.

The scout

was sent out a second time, but on the way he shot and wounded an Indian.
Rifle fire burst from the hillside where the soldiers waited, killing
a woman, her child and another youth.Although several Indians were
wounded, the Nez Perce made good their escape and rode to join Joseph's
bands. The village was plundered and burned by Whipple's men. Like
Joseph, at no time did Looking Glass desire war, and he did everything
possible to prevent it.

But the Lewiston Teller printed a different

versions

3°Ibid., pp. 159-160.
3lBeal, o£. cit., p.
^^Ibid.

67.
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Baird reports that the Clearwater Indians under Lookingglass
had turned loose and plundered George Dempster's place between
the Middle and South forks of Clearwater and driven off all the
stock of the settlers. . . . This confirms JChiefJ Jim Lather's
statement made in Indian Council yesterday at Lapwai as to the
purposes of Lookingglass and his forty men. Baird says these
Indians told two Chinamen near them on Clearwater that they had
declared war against the whites and would commence their raids
upon the inhabitants within two days. When this news reached
Mt. Idaho a force of 20 volunteers started immediately for the
Clearwater. No news from them when Baird left. General Howard
was notified and said that he would send a detachment of regulars
to scour the country in that direction this morning.33
While the facts of this account are erroneous, the report obviously
stirred the people of Lewiston to action and, in turn, may have been the
reason Howard sent Whipple's detachment to engage Looking Glass. Had
the fallacious report by Baird not been published and had the people
of Lewiston left military affairs to the military, it is possible Look
ing Glass would have been by-passed and General Howard would have had
to contend only with Joseph to gain victory.

As it was, all the Lower

Nez Perce tribes unified in the war against the government when the
"sneak" attack on Looking Glass became known. When the next battle
broke out on the Clearwater River, July 11, Joseph claimed that his
fighting force swelled from 70 to 2^0 warriors.
Just prior to the Clearwater battle, three minor engagements
occurred as Chief Joseph maneuvered to divert Colonel Whipple's command
which had pursued Chief Looking Glass northward to Cottonwood Creek.
Joseph succeeded in covering the retreat of Looking Glass and, in the
only decisive skirmish of the three fights, killed one officer and ten

^^Lewiston Teller, June 27, 1877.
^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 2k^.
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cavaliymen.

One Indian was killed.

In this skirmish, and in the one that followed at "Misery Hill,"
volunteers—including Alonzo Leland, editor of the Lewiston Teller, who
who was wounded—became disgruntled over the conduct and attitude of
the military. The Nez Perce had effectively harassed and demoralized
the whites. Leland and other citizen volunteers retired from the
36
field in anger.
General Howard, meanwhile, moved his main force from the Salmon
River and joined Colonel Whipple.

Outnumbering Joseph's warriors two

to one, Howard marched swiftly eastward along the Clearwater River and,
to his surprise, reached the Nez Perce camp near the junction of the
south and middle forks on July 10. Without being discovered by the
Indians, breastworks were established near the river. At dawn the next
morning, howitzer shells burst into the Nez Perce camp and the Indians
deployed hastily.

The warfare was fiercej Joseph's men charged repeat

edly and nearly turned the right flank of the soldiers.

Howard, however,

maintained excellent discipline—reminiscent of his action at Gettysburg
in the Civil War—and brought the full potential of his command to bear
•V7
as Joseph led the several assaults to point-blank range.^
When darkness fell, the soldiers, cut off from the river by
Indians, spent a night without water. Several Nez Perce braves—
discouraged by the effectiveness of Gatling guns—defected before the

^^Paul I. Wellman, The Indian Wars of the West (New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 195h)> p. 173.
3%eal, og. cit., pp. 70-71.
^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 17li.
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battle was renewed the morning of July 12.38
The Indians failed in subsequent attempts to turn the flanks of
the soldiers. They were on the defensive for most of the day and, unable
to cope with the superior firepower of the soldiers, withdrew from the
field slowly.

Although General Howard had failed to capture the Indian

camp, which might have been possible during the opening surprise attack,
the victory was his.

Approximately 23 Indians were killed, UO wounded,

and i^O taken prisoner.

Howard listed his casualties as 13 killed and

27 wounded—two of whom died later.

Invasion of Montana
General Howard did not follow up the Indian retreat as they
crossed the Clearwater in skinboats and established another camp on
July 13. This policy of lagging behind throughout the campaign gave
rise to the name "General Day After Tomorrow" among the Nez Perce. But
Joseph facilitated the delay of the soldiers the next day by halting
Howard's column with a truce party.

It was midaftemoon before the

general realized he was being tricked. Nevertheless, when the command
had marched north about 20 miles and was about to enter the western end
of Lolo trail. General Howard camped his men at the village of Kamiah
for two weeks to rest, await reinforcements and supplies, and to organ
ize.

This delay was to intensify the press criticisms of Howard

^^eal, 0£. cit., p. Th*
3%cWhorter, 0£. cit., p. 323. Heated dispute arose over the
number of Indian casualties in this battle after the war when the Nez
Perce set the figures at four killed and six wounded. Howard's claim
of taking I4O prisoners during the battle was not true. This group
surrendered to him later.
^%eal, o£. cit., pp. 77-78.

FIGURE 1

Herald Extra.
mONDAY.JUI^Y 16, 1877.

Howard Overtakes Joseph and
a Bloody Fight Ensues.
Two Officers and 11 Soldiers
Killed and 24 Wounded.
Thirteen Indians Killed and a
Large Number Wounded.
The Hostiles Dispersed and the
Troops Pursuing.
Fight between General Howard's command,
400 men, and Hostiles under Joseph, 300
strong, discovered in Deep Greek Canyon,
mouth of Cottonwood, on South side of
Clearwater, took place on the 13th inst. The
Indions lost 13 killed and a large number
wounded. The military lost Capt. Bancroft
and Lieut. Williams, and 11 enlisted men
killed and 24 wounded. *
The hostiles were finally flanked, and they
broke and fled, making for the Snake river
country.
The Indian camp and much plunder fell
into the hands of the soldiers.
The fighting is represented as most de
termined on both sides.
Howard is following the fleeing savages
and expects soon to capture or kill them all.

Ik
because Joseph's people had reached Montana, 1^0 miles east, before the
general left Kamiah on July 30.
The press criticism of General Howard predated the Clearwater
battle and it seemed to become louder with eveiy move he made or failed
to make. The Missoulian reprinted from the San Francisco Bulletin an
editorial which stated, in part:
We find it stated in the Oregon papers that two months ago
Gen. Howard had Chief Joseph entirely in his power, could have
held him and forced him to go upon the reservation. Instead of
this the General permitted him to roam around the country on
the pretext of gathering up his stock, when in fact he was
preparing to take the war-path. . . . This Indian trouble
should operate as another lesson in teaching the authorities
to discard the temporizing policy. . . . There are within the
radius of 200 miles from the scene of the outbreak at least
52,000 Indians.W
Obviously this assessment about the beginning of the Nez Perce
fighting was incorrect, but the initial criticism of General Howard and
the government concerned the failure of negotiations conducted with the
Nez Perce.

Apparently the editors did not understand wty the negotia

tions had failed so often.

This is demonstrated in Chauncey Barbour's

editorial in the same issue of the Missoulian when he wrote:

"There

is a great deal of sickly sentimentality abroad about the difficulty
of changing an Indian's nature and habits.Barbour put the blame
on the government for the "temporizing policy" and stated that this was
the cause of the outbreak.

He added that "no good can ever come to the

Indian so long as the authorities treat him as a freeman and put no
abridgment upon his liberty."

^^Weekly Missoulian, July 13, I877.
^^Ibid.
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This editorial was to start a chain reaction of Montana newspaper
controversy which became intensive when the Nez Perce outmaneuvered and
outsmarted volunteer defenders.

James H. Mills made the following

observations about this editorial after the newspaper war had festered
for four weeks:
In the Missoulian of July 13th, in the leading editorial
entitled "The Temporizing Policy," appeared the following
infamous utterance: IVhen an Indian agent sees that the money
and blankets provided by the government are dissipated in
gambling or are bartered for whiskey and gewgaws and trinkets,
he is worse than an infidel if he does not see to it that this
money and property goes where it will do the most good—in his
own pocket."
The New North-West, having some friendship for the Missoulian
and its editor, but regarding the above as dishonest, disreput
able and atrocious and trusting it was written by one "simple
and unschooled" and which Mr. Barbour would take the first
opportunity to repudiate, denounced it. No retraction was
made. It is such infernal scounderelism as advocated in that
paragraph that instigates and is responsible for nine-tenths
of the atrocities on the frontier and which has drenched the
American settlements in blood while our more honest Canadian
neighbors lived in peace with the Indians.
Two important points were made in this rebuttal concerning the
early phase of the war in Montana.

First, Mills indicated the influence

newspaper opinion had at the time, especially when incorrect.

Second,

the "temporizing policy" which had been indelibly affixed to General
Howard's name had been carried to extremes.

But this was to be only

the beginning of the press controversy over the general's actions.
While the Nez Perce were making the arduous passage through the
Bitterroots, editorial opinion in Montana papers swelled to flood stage
against them.

R. E. Fisk wrote for the Helena Daily Herald;

"It is

deplorable to have grasshoppers from the East and Indians from the

^%ew North-West, September 7 , 1877.
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West raiding us at the same time."^^

But three days later, on July 27,

Fisk predicted that the Nez Perce would "arrive in condition to need
hospital care rather than meditating new campaigns.
The Missoulian took a different view, however, when townspeople
questioned the need for defenses.

Barbour wrote:

Some of our good friends here are skeptical as to the need
of protection in Missoula county. Although living on the
frontier some of them entertain the Eastern notion that there
is such a thing as good Indians, and friendly Indians, and
Indians who keep faith with the whites. They forget that most
of our Indian wars have been with just such Indians and that
Indians are more dangerous in war the more they have been
brought in contact with the whites.
During the various battles in central Idaho, Montanans were not
particularly concerned about the fighting being carried to their terri
tory because it was believed General Howard would suppress the Nez Perce
there.

The New North-West during this period went so far as to praise

these "pinysic ally fine Indians" who. Mills wrote, "are well-to-do, dress
better and have better stock than any other Indians that come into our
country and barring the times when disreputable white men furnished them
whiskey, they have never made any serious trouble in traveling through
Montana."^7
These remarks were to be quickly forgotten by Mills later when,
as an editor and Secretary and Adjutant General, he was instrumental
in initiating the defense policies of Montana.

The first change in his

^^Helena Daily Herald, July 2 k , 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 27, 1877.
^^Weekly Missoulian, July 29, 1877. This article appeared as a
news stoiy, not an editorial, under the headline "Missoula Post."
^"^New North-West, June 22, 1877.
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viewpoint about the war was directed not so much at the Nez Perce, but
at the conduct of the militaiy.

Two weeks after the above-mentioned

editorial, he wrote:
The later news from Idaho is not indicative of an efficient
campaign against the Indians. General Howard has been severely
censured by the press as an incompetent commander and he has
certainly done nothing so far to leave any other impression»
He moves his six hundred or eight hundred men with all the
laborious slowness of an army corps, camps over against a
hundred or two Indians, sends stilty dispatches about trapping
them and capturing great caches and meantime lets the handful
of Indians walk around him and drive his "trap" into rifle
pits.GG
Mills was referring here to the Clearwater battle, and he went
on to criticize Captain Perry's "cowardly" action in the three minor
skirmishes just before that battle.

And he no longer depicted the Nez

Perce as "good, friendly Indians" who for years had traveled the buffalo
trail through western Montana without incident.

He wrote that "murder,

destruction and outrage are depopulating fair valleys and covering the
frontiers with the bones of those sacrificed to savages.
The next day, July lU, a press dispatch which had been routed
through Portland, Oregon, and San Francisco was published in the Helena
Daily Herald confirming the fears that the Nez Perce had escaped and
were on their way to Montana.But to confuse matters, Fisk denied
this report in an editorial the same day by stating:
We are not fully prepared to believe that the hostile Indians
are now fleeing from the troops on the west side of the mountains
and making their way towards the Bitterroot Vall^. They have
thus far been victorious in nearly every encounter with the
militaiy, and seem to be even more active and smart than the
soldiers in concealing their whereabouts, routes of retreat, and
direction of attack.

^%ew North-West, June 22, 1877.

^^Ibid.

^°Helena Daily Herald, July lU, 1877.

^^Ibid.

79
On August 2,

1877, the

Bozenian Times ran the following editorial

four days after the Fort Fizzle affair had ended and the Nez Perce had
started down Bitterroot Valley in western Montana:

GCNTRADICTORÏ
It is difficult to reconcile the contradictory reports
concerning the Nez Perces Indians, from Missoula and Idaho.
Each claim that Joseph is in their vicinity. We publish all
the accounts just received as they came, and if our readers
can understand them, all right. We cannot. They are worse
jumbled up than Bogert's report of the whereabouts of Sitting
Bull. . . .52
The major concern throughout this important period of opinion
formation by Montanans who anxiously awaited definite news of Chief
Joseph's whereabouts and disposition was self protection, which is
certainly understandable. Yet, surprisingly, newspaper opinion was
not solidified on this by any means.

Fisk, who was nearest the tele

graph in the Territory and had good access to news from Idaho and New
York, wrote an editorial on July lit for the Helena Daily Herald stating
that the Nez Perce "would be foolish to leave the sanctuary of the
mountains and attempt to cross the open plains of Montana where all
the troops at Forts Shaw and Ellis would surround them on every side."
Mills, editor of the New North-West, did not support this view
point and, as Secretary of the Territory, he officially Issued a report
to newspapers throughout the nation than an invasion of Bitterroot
Valley was anticipated and people were preparing.

He termed the situa

tion "very grave" and "very serious.The Butte Miner, largely owned

^^Bozeman Times, August 2, 1877.
^^Helena Dally Herald, July ih, 1877.
^^New York Tribune, June 30, 1877.
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by Mills, concurred with the secretary and stated that when the Indians
were confronted with a defensive force, the only way to conduct peace
negotiations would be to disarm the Nez Perce and force them "to put
their women and children under the protection of the whites, to serve
as hostages . . • to keep them on their good behavior»
The Missoulian, however, reprinted as a news story an editorial
by the Benton Record of Fort Benton, Montana, stating:
Record does not like the Peace Policy»

"The Benton

It says: 'The pious hypocrites

who have so long fattened at public expense are still permitted to carry
on this system of plunder to the disgrace of the nation and against the
protests of an outraged people»'"
Chauncey Barbour's appraisal in the lead editorial of the Missoulian the same d^ was as follows:
IS THERE DANGER?
Because we doubt an Indian's peaceful intention or his truth
is no reason why we should become the aggressor. A collision,
if it comes, will come in its own good time, and it should not
find us in a state of unreadiness from our indulging in the
fatal delusion that an Indian is truthful, and peaceably inclined
and altogether lovely.57
The importance of these views in assessing the imminent danger,
whatever it could be, was the general agreement by editors that a mili
tary force, undefined as to whether it should include militia, be ready
for any eventualities»
Apparently the people were not as alarmed as the editors were,

^^Butte Miner, July 2U, 1877.
^^eekly Missoulian, July 20, 1877» President Grant had been
responsible for the "peace policy" during the l870's, according to Dr.
Verne Dusenberry, anthropologist, Montana State University.
^7Ibid.
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even in Missoula where the "danger" was greatest.

The Missoulian ran

an editorial titled "Apathçr Among Settlers," stating thats
o . o from gloomy apprehensions two weeks ago, there has been
a reaction to a state of apathy that may not be well for us.
. . , Our danger lies in telegraph communications being
interrupted when we need it. In such case the Indians would
be on us before we cound concentrate our forces.^"
A report from Washington was published in the Helena Daily Herald
the next day, however, stating that the Cabinet had convened to consider
the Nez Perce outbreak.

The news account concluded;

"This latest out

break is considered as serious as any of late years.

The government
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will use every resource to give a final stroke to the Indian troubles."
What was meant ty "every resource" was to become highly controversial
during the Fort Fizzle affair.
The second major consideration—the first being the matter of
defense—by editors in Montana was an assessment of the causes of the
outbreak.
Without question, the series of murders perpetrated by Nez Perce
braves in Idaho was the recurring reason, and perhaps a very understand
able one, throughout the war in Montana Territory.

But the pioneer

editors realized that such a massacre by formerly friendly Indians did
not occur because it was simply decided to kill whites.

The facts of

the outbreak were not immediately available, of course, and the first
reactions were shock and dismay, as evidenced in the Missoulian;
As a tribe they have been noted for their friendship for
the whites, , . . Considering the intelligence of this tribe,
the accumulations of property they have made, and the habits

^^eekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, July lit, 1877.

82
of civilization they have taken on, if the question had been
asked one month ago, "What Indians are most likely to make war
on the whites?" the Nez Perces would have been the last named
of all the Indians bordering on either side of the Coeur d'Alene
mountains. The fact of an uprising of these Indians is suffi
cient to shake our confidence in the friendliness of any Indians.
But having asserted this, Barbour still had not explained either the
causes of the war or the reasons his faith in former friends had been
shaken, so in another editorial in the same issue he struck on some
imaginative ideas which, to his credit, he was to repudiate later.
First, in unusually eloquent terms, he dwelled on the normal, human
love for land.

He cited the Briton's love for his "tight little isle,"

the German's pride in the Fatherland, and the Frenchmen's glow of enthu
siasm at the mention of

belle France.

"But," wrote Barbour, "with

the Indian this sentiment becomes a passion,"

He then continued;

Another peculiarity of the Indian mind is that it fails to
discriminate as to the causes of things or to place responsi
bility where it belongs. If some lawless white kills an Indian,
the fault is not imputed to the offender, but to the white race;
and if an Indian is slain for some wrongful act of his, the ,
Indian mind fails to consider the justifiability of the act,
Barbour and the other editors were not aware of the fact that
approximately 22 Nez Perce had been murdered by white settlers—usually
during drunken sprees—in the years preceding the outbreak.Fleas to
the government for justice were ignored, as already noted.

Were this

history realized--as it should have been because Idaho, Oregon and
Washington papers had access to much of this information, both in office
files and from the non-warring Nez Perce, the Indians' sense of justice

^^Weekly Missoulian, July 6, 1877•

^^Ibid.
^^Beal, op. cit., p. hi'
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would not have questioned.

Tribal jurisprudence among the Nez Perce

from times antedating the Revolutionary ¥ar and before had a remarkable
resemblance to that of western culture.
The following week when the Nez Perce were still approximately
100 miles from Missoula, Barbour modified his stand somewhat on the
same topic by stating that "there are bad white men in every community."
He reiterated the charge that "the Indian is no respecter of personshe visits his vengeance upon the just and the unjust alike."

But he

ended the editorial by stating that "such [unjustj men [white or Indiari
should receive the first cold lead that opens an Indian war."^^
The next Friday, July 20, the New North-¥est quoted from the San
Francisco Examiner one of the first journalistic analyses of the causes
of the war;
THE INDIAN MOHAMMED
"Smohala the Dreamer" the Prophet IiThom the
Bloody Nez Perces Follow.
The original cause of the dispute with the Nez Perces may
be said to date from the treaty ... in June 1857• At that
time Governor Stevens refused to recognize the hereditary chief
of the Nez Perces, and practically elevated Lawyer, a cunning
and tractable Indian, to the chieftainship.
Thus far, this assessment is correct except for two facts.

The

treaty referred to was in l8$^, and the time Chief Lawyer of the Upper
Nez Perce received preferential consideration by Governor Stevens was
in the signing of the Treaty of I863, as noted in Chapter II.

Without

further explanation about any of the treaties, the account contended

^3^eekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877°
^'^New North-West, July 20, 187?.
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that:
• . » it is a most inspiring hope or idea to the average savage
that he shall yet see the day when he can glut his never-dying
revenge upon the white man, exterminate the race, and again
redeem himself and his people the lands from which the whites
have driven them.
To thoroughly indoctrinate his believers, Smohala impresses
upon them certain cardinal duties<> They must be "wild Indians,"
th^ must not practice any of the arts of civilization, but live
as their fathers lived before the coming of the whites. They
must not tolerate the approach of the white man, hold no inter
course with him, accept no favor from him, enter his house, or
deal with him except for fire-arms, powder and lead, . . » It
is to this exclusively savage doctrine young Joseph has committed
himself. ... He has a haughty scorn of white men, and despises
those of his own race who will consent to be at peace and submit
to them. With him are the allied renegades, or "wild Indians"
of the various other tribes of that broad region, and no doubt
there are nearly a thousand of them all. . « . They have been
for years preparing for war, and the country is entirely favor
able to their hostile purposes. 5
Although this may have been an editorial in the Examiner, it was
printed in the New North-West as a news story.
be easily imagined.

The effects it had can

Other Montana papers ran the same story as it cir

culated, and headlines on other news stories appeared in condemning
phrases, such as:
Hostiles."

"The Idaho Savages," "Red Murderers," and "Escaping

This account tended to confirm the fears expressed earlier

in the Missoulian that there might be a general uprising among Flatheads,
Pen d'Oreille and Kutenais tribes to the north with whom Nez Perce had
intermarried.
The first "scare" that Missoula experienced came approximately
July 20 when a dispatch reached there from San Francisco, advising;
In this emergency [Nez Perce about to arrive in Bitterroot
Valley] there is no need of leaving homes, or any foolishness
on the matter. We have military organizations with arms in

^^Ibid.
^"^Weekly Missoulian, June 29, 1877.
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their hands. Let videttes be posted on the Lo Lo trail, to
give settlers timely warning of approaching danger, after
which there will be plenty of time to fort up.°7
When the Nez Perce hordes did not materialize as expected, the
people of Missoula drew a sigh of relief.
which Barbour warned against.

Then the "apathy" set in

Also, other papers in the Territory

became confused, as already noted, especially after the following
editorial comment in the Helena Daily Independents
The Indian Scare
We have the pleasure of announcing to the reader that Joseph
has decided not to come to Montana to hunt buffaloj he has con
cluded to remain in Idaho and find Gen. Howard, if possible,
who has been slandering him by circulating the report that he
had run away.
When the Nez Perce crossed the border into Montana Territory four
or five d^s later, the question of what to do had not been answered for
or by Montanans.

The government had taken no positive stand; what

troops were available remained at Fort Shaw lh9 miles northeast of Missôula
or as distant as the scene of the Clearwater battle had been from
Missoula.

No territorial policy had been established yet as to whether

Montanans should "declare war," establish defense measures, or do noth
ing.

Governor Potts was in a predicament despite the fact that Chief

Joseph was considered to have had astonishing success in the campaign
against the government.

Contradictory advice came to Potts from govern

mental and military organizations and in personal correspondence and
newspaper accounts from editors.
At this critical moment, Montana newspapers played a decisive
role in the affairs and outcome of the Nez Perce campaign.

Weekly Missoulian, July 20, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Independent, July 22, 1877°

CHAPTER 7

THE WAR; PHASE TWO

Fort Fizzle Affair
Militarily the Fort Fizzle affair was not of great importance,
for no battle was fought»

Strategically, however, the events during

those final days of

877. were the, prelude to what micht be

considered the most significant engagement of the war, the Big Hole
battle of August 10-11, 1877.^
The first definite news concerning the intended route being
taken by the non-treaty Nez Perce reached Capt. Charles C. Rawn, com
mander of Fort Missoula, on July 22»

A half breed named Tom Hill, who

had been held and released by the Nez Perce, overtook Rawn's scouts
returning to Missoula over Lolo Pass after an attempt to locate the

2
Indians.
Captain Rawn telegraphed the news to his superiors and, on July
2^, rode out with 30 troops to erect defensive fortifications on the
east side of the pass.

Eight miles west of Bitterroot Valley and the

confluence of Lolo Creek with the Bitterroot River in Montana, Rawn's
men erected log breastworks, piled three high, and dug trenches at the

^Scholars do not categorize the Nez Perce campaign into segments,
such as "Phases" in the chapter headings, as is done in this study.
Until the Big Hole battle, the Indians had not been hurt seriously. As
will be seen, the damage to life and property in the Big Hole conflict
was to be the turning point.

2

Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 19ii.

88
narrowest point of Lolo canyon.

From this position, the captain rea

soned that riflemen could command the valley and both opposing slopes
which were steep and lightly timbered.^
The Nez Perce, meanwhile, moved down Lolo Creek and camped near
hot springs two miles above Rawn's blockade of the trail.

Lewis and

Clark dubbed these springs "Traveler's Rest," and it was an appropriate
name so far as the Nez Perce were concerned.

Mountains.

Wounded were bathed and

Many horses had been crippled or lost in the crossing--

several of which were mercifully shot later by General Howard's men—
but it has been estimated that the Nez Perce herd still exceeded

3,000.^
The following day, July 27, a meeting was arranged with Captain
Rawn about half way between the two encampments.

In a report to the

Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Dakota, on September 30, l877.
Captain Rawn recounted this first council as follows s
On the 27th of July, I had a talk with Chiefs Joseph, White
Bird and Looking Glass, who proposed if allowed to pass unmol
ested, to march peaceably thru the Bitter-root valley, but I
I refused to allow them to pass unless they complied with itgr
stipulations as to the surrender of their arms. For the
purpose of gaining time for General Howard's forces to get
up, and for General Gibbon to arrive from Ft. Shaw, I appointed
a meeting for the 28th. . . .5
This delay suited the chiefs who knew that General Howard presented
no immediate threat (he had not departed from Kamiah Village in central
Idaho).

It would provide time for their people to rest and the best

^Rothermich, _op. cit., p. 390.
^Beal, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
^Rothermich, loc. cit.
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escape.

This latter matter was uncertain for three major reasons.

First, while it may seem contradictory to much of what has been
said, unity among the Nez Perce had weakened and undercurrents of
demoralization had set in.
of fighting and running.

Some of this can be attributed to weeks

But scholars agree that Chief Joseph himself

was heartsick, and for good reason.
behind in Idaho.

His wife and child had to be left

He already had lost the one thing he was fighting

for—his homeland.

According to Seal, lj.0 of his people had defected

along the Lolo trail| these were the same kO that Howard claimed he
had captured in the Clearwater battle.

Also, a band led by Chief Red

Heart that was returning from a buffalo hunt refused to join its flee
ing brothers.^

Moreover, the Nez Perce chiefs did not agree about a

destination in Montana Territory.

Joseph had deferred when this

matter was discussed earlier at a camp called Weippe on Lolo Trail.
Looking Glass, whose bands represented the majority, suggested strongly
that they head for "Old Woman's Country" along the Yellowstone River
basin in Crow country of Montana,
reported to have said:

The two chiefs argued and Joseph is

7
"This is your fight, not mine."

None of the

chiefs wanted a fight, for little could be gained.
The second reason for uncertainty in policy matters was the
disposition of Montanans, both Indian and white.

The Flathead Indians,

long close allies of the Nez Perce, sent word that th^ refused to join
the conflict against the whites and would resist any attempt to traverse
their country.

The basic reason for this was that Chief Chariot of the

%eal, 0£. cit., pp, 78-80.
7lbid.
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Flatheads wished to do everything possible to maintain good relations
with the whites, despite treaty difficulties similar to those of the
Nez Perce.®
Chauncey Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, had attempted to
contact Chief Chariot unsuccessfully on June 29 and, subsequently, wrote
several letters to Governor Potts informing him that a general uprising
was imminent.

On July l5, he wrote;

. . . there are restless young men from all tribes, lured by
the prospect of plunder, who are operating with the Nez Perces»
I have reliable information that some Flatheads passed over
into the Nez Perces country this spring. . . » There are some
of our people who are trying to persuade themselves that the
Flatheads and Pen d'Oreilles will not war on the whites—that
the Catholic religion has the effect of making an Indian lamb
like. There are some who affect to believe that Charles will
not lie.9
Despite a denial of a general uprising by Gen. Philip Sheridan,
who had been kept informed on this matter by General Howard, Barbour
continued to instill fears about the Flatheads.

After an incident among

those Indians involving the shooting by whites of a subchief named
Adolph, Barbour made an editorial statement, reprinted in the New York
newspapers, that "the Flatheads assembled and expressed their determin-

11
ation to come down and clean out Missoula."

He credited Chariot and

and Father D'Astie, a Catholic missionary, for having prevented such

^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 195» Chariot, chief of the
Flatheads, refused in 1872 to sign a treaty that would force his bands
to move onto the reservation south of Flathead Lake, James A, Garfield,
commissioner of Indian affairs and later president, forged Chariot's
signature to the treaty. Garfield admitted this later.
^Phillips, o£. cit., pp. 8-9.
Weekly Missoulian, June 29, 1877.
Weekly Missoulian, July 13, 1877.
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a plan.

Yet his letter two days later to Governor Potts discredited

both Chariot and the Catholics, as noted.
Surprising as it may appear, the Nez Perce continually refused
help at this time from disaffected Indians from other tribes.

Accept

ance of such help would damage chances of reaching a peaceful settlement
with the whites over their major concern—the homelands. The chiefs
believed nothing should be done to aggravate the whites and everything

12
possible done to renew their friendship of long standing.
This raised the third major concern regarding the matter of un
certainty in policy.

How could the Nez Perce best avoid a conflict with

Captain Rawn without being trapped?

The answer would come only through

careful negotiations.
Before reviewing these, it is important to understand the think
ing on both sides, for this was the golden opportunity for calling off
the fighting.
Because of Joseph's general demoralization at this time and
because Chief Looking Glass had been forthright in formulating a general
goal for the flight, the latter was regarded the chief by the Nez Perce.
Joseph was indisputably the war chief—the difference explained in
Chapter I.

Moreover, Looking Glass was the logical leader at this

point, because he was known personally by settlers in the Bitterroot
Valley, having stayed at several ranches there while traveling to and
from buffalo country.

Indeed, Mrs. Eliza Derry, a practical nurse, had

administered first aid to his bands at her homestead on numerous occasionso

13

Looking Glass was, therefore, the chief chosen to negotiate

^^Howard and McGrath, ££. cit., p. 20L.

^^Ibid., pp. 338-339.
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•with Captain Rawn»

He and the Nez Perce in general regarded the whites

of Idaho and those of Montana as separate»

With Idaho people th^ had

been in constant turmoil for years, and with Montanans, who were 100
miles distant J they had been extremely friendly.
its

"Montana people are not our enemies.

As Yellow Wolf put

The war we leave here in

Idaho."lb
The people of Montana Territory were equally confused on this
issue, and were to become more so as events unfolded.
reaction, however, was one of great fear.

The immediate

Except for an extra issued

on July 28 crying "Help! Help12" for volunteers, the Missoulian did not
publish that week.

The following week, the editor explained:

"When the

news came in last week of Indians on Lo Lo, it would have been a diffi
cult task to hold the compositors of this office as it is now for the
Governor to strip the county of arms.

Hence no paper that week."^^

As a precautionary measure, the women and children of Missoula
and surrounding areas were crowded inside Higgins and Worden's store
in Missoula.

One unidentified woman made such a hasty buggr ride from

an outlying ranch that it was not until she joined the others that she
realized her bonnet, decorated with ribbons, was on backward.
Owing to the fact that the combined tribes of the Flathead, Pen
d'Oreilles and Kutenais had a total population of 1,970 people; the Nez
Perce, 7^0 (including women and children who were capable of handling
firearms); and Missoula fewer than 500, it is not surprising that the
latter had cause for fear, especially if the newspaper editorials were

^%lcWhorter, Yellow Wolfs His Own Story, p. 112.
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877.
^^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. 196.
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accurate regarding a general uprising.

Governor Potts relayed these

fears to Washington, as evidenced in a somewhat erroneous editorial in
the Cincinnati Weekly Stars
Reproduced message to Governor "Pettiss" ([PottsJ from Post
master Dickenson of Missoulas
Th^ [the Nez Perce] will come into the head of the valley
and clean it out, and if the Flatheads don't join them th^
will clean them out too. The Flatheads have driven all their
horses out of the valley and their squaws and children are
going up to Lot [LOIOJ Fork. A Nezperces chief told Major
Ifhal^r that the Nezperces were going to clean out Bitter Root
Valley, and that the Flatheads would join them. . . .^-7
This editorial serves to show that Governor Potts relied heavily
on the opinions of the people in Missoula in keeping the government in
formed, despite the fact that no reliable information had been obtained
from the Flatheads»
On July 13, Governor Potts sent a telegram to President Hayes
requesting authority to form a militia of ^00 volunteers to meet the
Nez Perce when they entered Montana Territory.

Secretary McCrary sent

back a hazy reply stating that General Sheridan, then in Chicago, was
carefully watching the situation.

Both he and Gen. Alfred Terry, com

mander of the Department of Dakota Territory which included Montana,
deemed such a move unnecessary.^®
To confuse matters, the Helena Daily Herald ran a news story
with an erroneous headline:
THE HOSTILES
Available Military Inadequate to
Suppress the Savages

l^Cincinnati [ohio] Weekly Star, July 5, 1877°
^^Beal, o£, cit., p. 96.

9h
The President Will Call Out the Militia
New York, July 13-—The Tribune's Washington special says: .. .
If the case continues to look as serious as at present it is
not improbable that the President may call upon the States to
furnish militia for the suppression of the war.^^
As can be readily seen, the difference between "will" call out
out the militia in the headline, and "may" call out the militia in the
last sentence of the story, is an important difference.

Contrary to

the news account, the position taken by the government in refusing
authorization to Governor Potts to organize militia was that the militaiy forces in Idaho and Montana were sufficient to suppress the Nez
Perce.
Gen. Irwin McDowell, with headquarters in San Francisco, sent a
telegram, which was reprinted in the Helena Weekly Independent, to
Governor Potts asking what aid could be given by Montana militia in
20
arresting or detaining the Indians.

The governor replied that he

had no authorization to form militia and that all Montanans could do
21
in the emergency was to defend their homes and property.

Three days before the governor sent that telegram. Secretary
Mills, editor of the New North-West, sent a letter to Charles S. Warren
of Butte stating that if a company of men were organized, an adequate
supply of breech-loading rifles would be issued to them.

In effect,

on July 20, the editor, without authorization, countermanded the
orders issued by the Secretary of War and received by the governor

^^Helena Daily Herald, July II4, 1877.
^^Helena Weekly Independent, July 26,
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 96.

I877.
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one week earlier»

The Butte company, headed by Maj. William A. Clark,

who later became the copper magnate, was ordered by Mills on July 30
to proceed quickly to the Big Hole River where a battle was antici. , 22
pated.
Meanwhile, the governor, having no idea that Mills had authorized
the formation of a volunteer company, went to Missoula.

Captain Rawn

assured the governor that militia would be of great benefit to the small
force of regulars then at the fortifications on Loloo

The governor

acquiesced, and on July 26 issued a call for volunteers.

But a strange

thing happened which is rarely mentioned by scholars.
When a special stage carrying the proclamation reached Bear
Mouth, it appeared that the message must have been placed in the express
box.

To have this box opened, it was necessary to return to Deer Lodge.

But when opened there, no proclamation was found.

VJhile the facts are

by no means clear, the volunteers were called—not by the governor's
proclamation—but by a note from Mills.Why the proclamation was
missing is uncertain.
is uncertain, also.

How Mills got the information to write his note

But it may be suggested that the governor's

proclamation would have been embarrassing to Mills in Butte where,
without authorization, he authorized formation of a comparer of militia.
The governor issued a second proclamation on July 31 and, on the
same day, wired Major Clark to organize a company of militia.

Clark's

men, acting on Mills' orders, already were on their way toward Big Hole

Leeson, 0£, cit., p. 137»
^^Ibid., p. 138. In a telegram to Ben. R. Dittes, July 26, I877,
Mills stated that the governor's proclamation was verbal. This is
possible, but very unlikely in view of the evidence.
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FIQHTINeONLO-LO.

A PROCLAMATION.
Potts Galls for Volunteers

The Indians Below Rawn's
Position.

PROCLAM rION:

lu THR FIKLIX JMiftPOUl A. |
JUI.Y '>(> 1H77 \
Whsubaa, Motiiuua rerritt>ry is invaded
Inutile Indian# from Idalu» aa<1 there
and thiirebei^^tod thuu fifty United Sta es
anldiera to oppose said Indians, hy virtue
of the aiithfiritjr vested in me aa Governor
and ComOiander-iD-Chief of the militia. I
Mmmamd that the organized volunteer
mititiaof Missoula and Deer Lodge coun
ties to
lorthwith lo the Commanderm-OWW ^ Miséouta for temporary duty
(Wted Stales forces now serving
(he Indians in Western Montana,
^aid oumpanies will l>e armed and equip
aed for service in the Held. The under
I âgned is without authunty to bind the
United States or the Territory of Montana
or supplies furnished volunteer companies
vhUe serving in the fields but will use
Very effort tn his power to secure pay
aent lor supplies, etc., from the Territory
•r the United States. Officers will be de
ignated to receive and receipt tor supplies
^rniahed.
Witness my hand.
B. P POTTS,
Governor and Com in Chief M. M
' .ttest:
JA8. fl. MNJUS, Sec'y and Adit.-Gen.

B£ZF !

RELF I /

Volunteers Flocking
Lo-Lo Trail

to the

Missoula, M. T. July 28—4 p.
The
Irwlinns this al tern mm threw a frii^ bekw
Capt. Hawn's position on the W
trail
and I fenr a severe battle will bo the msulL
The Derr Ijodge company has gone to open
conmiimication witb Capt. RaWtt. Tb#
Philipsburg company of 16 arnvad at LoLo to dny Wc need Mp aipil It
come soon or it will be too fate. 8e#d
er^body ^that cnii
be armed. No
intormation from Qibb^Ni.
Th# in
dtans appear to be determined to force
their way to the buffalo eo#ntry against
all opposition. The situatS<Mei is vfsrf critic
cal and those movinir thi# way mnst lotik
out for Indians on the road for they may
break our lines. A proclamation was
sued Suly 26th, 1877, calling out all of t#e
organized companies in Deer Lodg^àftd
Missoula counties.
[Signed.]
B. F. POTTS, .
Another letter from Potts says the FIi^
heads are co-operating with Rawn and
Charlos has already sent a number of wai^
nors to RaWn^s camp.
Dbbr Lodge, M. T. July 29, 7 a. m.
Capt. Clark^s Company from Butte wit#
69 men, are just leaving for the front.
Another Company of the same number are
expected by ten o'plock.
The Deer Lodge reserves left last
ing at Revto, numbering 25 men.
The excitement is intense.
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and had to be called back to Butte for the march to Missoula which the
governor had requested»

Obviously Potts had no idea of what had trans

pired between Mills and Clark, and by calling the company back, it missed
an opportunity to participate in the battle that occurred at Big Hole.^^
Clark's command—comprising 35 men, two doctors and four wagons—reached
the Big Hole basin two days after the battle had ended.
The second proclamation, abrogating orders from the government
not to call out militia, met with enthusiastic response throughout the
Territory and may be regarded as a declaration of war against the Nez
Perce

Montana,

Reprinted by most, if not all, the newspapers in the

Territory, the document was as follows:
There are now in the Bitter Root valley certain Nez Perce
Indians who have perpetrated theft, murder and outrage upon the
citizens of Idaho» Although ordered from Gen. Sheridan's
headquarters to be treated as hostiles, they were permitted to
escape from Lo Lo Pass and encamp in the Bitter Root valley.
These hostiles will soon attempt to pass through other portions
of Montana.
Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I hereby
call for 300 Montana volunteers to organize at once under gen
eral order No. U, issued herewith and to report for duty at
Deer Lodge forthwith.
The governor's statement makes it clear that the second proclam
ation of July 31 came after the Fort Fizzle affair had ended.

Whatever

became of the first proclamation of July 26 is a matter of conjecture,
perhaps, but if Mills had any part in destroying it and substituting
a letter in its place, as some evidence suggests, he did a great favor
for the Nez Perce.

The organization of volunteers during the Fort

Fizzle affair was confused and disorderly at best, partly because there

25ibid., p. 135.
^^Avant Courler, August 9, I877.
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was no certain word from Potts that th^ were needed.

Some small com

mands did reach Missoula before the Nez Perce departed, but they were
too late to help Captain Rawn's inferior force, which was unreliable
and mutinous at the critical moment when the Indians advanced.

Volun

teers from the Bitterroot Valley and Missoula—totaling some 100 men,
or more than half of Rawn's command—departed "without leave" when th^
learned of the Nez Perce pledge for peace in the final negotiations.
27
Rawn posted rear guards to prevent further desertions.

The negotiations held with the Nez Perce between the two encamp
ments on July 28, 1877> were, for both sides, of momentous significance
in determining the course of the war. Governor Potts and Captain Rawn
met with Chief Looking Glass and his interpreter, Delaware Jim,

The

only first-hand report extant by any of the negotiators about what
happened was a brief summary written by Rawn two months later when his
actions were being reviewed by the general staff at the Department of
Dakota headquarters.

Rawn wrote:

The meeting was had accordingly, but I submitted to him the
same conditions as before, to wit: that if they wished to enter
the vall^r, th^ must disarm and dismount, surrendering all
stock. Looking Glass said that he would talk to his people
and would tell me what they said at 9:00 AM the next day. Dis
trusting him, I would not agree to that hour but proposed 12'M.
We separated without agreement. Nothing satisfactoiy having
resulted from the conference, I returned to the breastworks
expecting to be attacked.
In the meantime that portion of the volunteers, some 100 or
more, representing Bitter-root valley, hearing that the Nez
Perces promised to pass peaceably through it, determined that
no act of hostility on their part should provoke the Indians to
a contrary measure, and without leave, left in squads of from
one to a dozen.^

Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. 200.
^^othermich, 0£. cit., p. 390.
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It is very strange that Rawn made no mention of the fact that
the governor was in attendance; according to Seal a number of questions
were never answered by Rawn or Potts.
make?

What terms did the Nez Perce

Did Rawn agree to let the Indians pass without a fight?

What

was the governor's attitude, remembering that he had issued the first
29
call for militia two days previously?
Possibly the best answers, rarely cited, were given by Chauncey
Barbour in several editorials run in the next issue of the Missoulian,
August 3, 1877•

Regarding the negotiations, he wrote;

The only intelligent conclusion that can be reached is that
the Nez Perces, tired of fighting with Gen. Howard, has come
here for the purpose of surrendering. They know that th^
must make their peace with the government sometime, before
they can resume their old habits of going to and fro through
this country on their annual hunting expeditions. They camped
on the Lo Lo three days on an open flat with their women,
children and horses about them» They would not have fought
in such position, but would have surrendered if attacked.
They continually expressed their friendship for the whites
of this section, and their desire for peace. They proffered
to surrender their ammunition. One of them came in and offered
to surrender eight lodges. Th^ marched through an open coun
try Saturday and camped that night with all that was dear to
them on an open plain. . . .30
Speaking again about the negotiations on July 28 in another
editorial the same day, Barbour wrote:
The council was held, and Looking Glass proffered to surren
der all the ammunition of the camp as a guarantee that the
Indians intended to go through the country peaceably. IVhen
told that nothing but an unconditional surrender would be
accepted, he asked for another meeting at nine o'clock the
next day to give him time to consult with the other chiefs.
Capt. Rawn told him that any further communication he desired
to make must be made under a flag of truce at the fortified
campo^l

29Beal, _op, cit., p. 100,
3^eekly Missoulian, August 3 , 1877.

^^Tbid.

100
This last sentence strongly suggests that Captain Rawn refused
to come to terms "with the Nez Perce offer to surrender ammunition and,
as General Howard had done just before the outbreak of hostilities in
Idaho, served an ultimatum which might be paraphrased:

"We are at

total war; any further negotiations you wish to conduct will be useless.
If you come to our fortified camp tomorrow, it can be only to surrender
unconditionally."

Chances were that Captain Rawn was in no position to

make such an ultimatum because his force was smaller than the Nez Perce.
At this time the volunteers deserted, and circumstantial evidence
indicates Governor Potts was not in accord with Rawn and did nothing to
halt the volunteers which he had called at the captain's request.

In

stead, Potts retired to the rear—for which he was censured severely by
other papers later—because "he saw that the volunteers were under an
experienced officer and taking their orders from him, and felt that he
could be of more service in the rear forwarding reinforcements and
32
directing a flank movement as soon as a sufficient force should arrive."
This explanation, undoubtedly given to Barbour by the governor,
was superficial at best in view of the desertions.

Apparently Potts

wished to avoid open controversy with Captain Rawn, but at the same
time wished to avoid a fight with the Nez Perce that would have endan
gered ranches in the Bitterroot Vall^.

This reasoning was to become

Potts' one defense—and a valid one—in the press controversy which
erupted over the conduct of the whites at Fort Fizzle.
When dawn broke on July 29 and Captain Rawn awaited word from
the Nez Perce, "anticipating their surrender," what happened was

^^Ibid.
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•unexpected»

At 10 a.m. the Indians moved to within a half mile of

Rawn's position, ascended the north slope, circumvented the bewildered
soldiers, and then descended to the Lolo trail again approximately a
half mile behind the breastworks.

The tactic was one of considerable

daring, for Nez Perce women and children were exposed.
At 11:30 a.m., approximately one hour after the passage of the
Nez Perce, Captain Rawn detailed
escape and arrest any stragglers.

mounted troops to follow up the
According to Barbour's chronicle

of this, when three of these troops caught up with the Nez Perce rear
guard. Chief Looking Glass "waved his hat, and came up and exchanged
friendly greetings.
At 12:1$ p.m., according to the same account by Barbour, Captain
Rawn retired from the breastworks—already dubbed "Fort Fizzle" by
volunteers—in skirmish deployment.

He sent Lt. ¥. J. Stephens of the

Missoula volunteers and $0 men to pursue the Indians while he returned
to Missoula,

Stephens' force came to the Nez Perce camp being con

structed for the night and found that his men were welcomed.
wrote;

Barbour

"Looking Glass came forward to meet them, and renewed his

friendly protestations.

The greater part of the force with Stephens

were from Bitter Root and were disposed to let Mr. Looking Glass and
his people go in peace,

Lieut. Stephens returned to town.

Contrary to Barbour's claims that the Nez Perce would have
surrendered if attacked, Rawn's men would have been annihilated had
they fired at the Indians.

Indeed, Governor Potts—interviewed by a

correspondent from the Avant Courier when he was returning to Deer Lodge

^^Ibid.

3^Ibid.
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—praised Rawn for this decision because the outcome would have been
disastrous both to the defenders and nearly settlements.

The governor

reiterated his position taken before calling for militia that his
obligation was to protect Montanans, not defeat Joseph.
Unfortunately for the governor, he had to endure a major portion
of the criticism that arose later in the newspaper war over the Fort
Fizzle affair when, in fact, the entire policy—from the calling out
of volunteers to the passage of the Indians—was determined by Captain
Rawn.

Rawn's personal conduct during the critical moments was less

than admirable militarily.

VJhen a volunteer, W, B. Harlan, informed

the captain that the Nez Perce were going around, he rebuked him by
saying there were too many "God Almightys" around camp.^^

Editorial Opinion Shifts
Until this time, few complimentary words were used by editors
to describe the Indian participants of the war.

As already noted,

opinion was at "flood stage" against the Nez Perce,

Two articles,

published at approximately the same time in distant communities, mark
the historical moment that the tide shifted.
The first article, published in the Nation on August 2, 1877,
explained in detail and gave to the public for the first time a full,
37
accurate account of the causes for the war.

Titled "Responsibility

for the Idaho War," it was published by many Montana newspapers two or

^^Avant Courier, August 9, 1877.
^^Beal, op. cit., p. 100.
^^The Nation, August 2, 1077, pp. 69-70.
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Herald Extra.

Herald Extra.

HEIigBTA, SITUrPAY, JUIiY 29.

EEEMWA, SUNDAY, JTUIiY 29.

ESCAPE OF THE HOSTILES.

Joseph's Band Escaping by
way of Henry's Lake.

THEY PASS WITHIN GUN
SHOT OP RAWN.
DBEB LODGE, July 29.—A courier from
Missoula arrived at 11:30 a. m. A letter from
Governor Potts says that Joseph and his
band passed Capt. Rawn'g entrenchment
yesterday late in the afternoon and
although they passed within gunshot
Not a gun was ûred at them. A letter from
Knowles and Dixon says : The Indians are
going out by way of the head of Bitter Root
and Big Hole. They are about 400 strong,
well armed but probably short of ammuni
tion. Co. A and Co. B from Butte were
ordered back to Deer Lodge. Sec. Mills
says—will have 300 men in Big Hole vallley
by noon to-morrow.
Volunteers are now leaving the town by
all kinds of conveyances for Big Hole Basin.
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ndependent Extra
The Indians Going Out by the
Head ot the Bitter Root

HETOSTA» SATURPAY, AUORCT LLFH.

A Fight with the Hostiles.
Several Killed and Wounded
on Both Sides.

Gen. Gibbon telegraphs for a surgeoor to b6
sent tQ him.

DBBR LODGE, July 29.—A letter from old
Beaverhead Station says : Thirty or forty
lodges of Indians are camped forty miles
south of that place, on the road from Franklin to Montana.
There we abcmt 125 Indians and are riding
large American horses. It is supposed to bé
the advande guard of Joseph's band escaping
by Henry's Lake.

THE INDIANS PASS CAPT.
RAWN'S COMMAND.

Herald Extra,

Qeu. Oibbon*8 command overtook
fought the Stz Perces in the Big ijole.
Several of the command, officers and men,
are killed and wounded, and a number Qt the
Indiana killed.

j
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DBSK LODGE, July 29.
A Coarier from Missoula arrived at 11:30
j with a letter from Gov Potts.
It sayf
I Joseph and his band passed Capt Rawn s
entrenchment yesterday late in the after
noon, and although they passed within
gunshot not a gun was fired at them. A
letter from Knowles nnd Dixon says the
i Indians are going out by the head of the
Bitter Root and the Big Hole.
They
A'>out 400 strong, well armed but pn b
ably short of ammunition.
Company A and Co. B, from But$e, were
ordered back %o Deer Lodge,
Secretary Mills says he will have 800
men in the Big Hole Valley by noon to
morrow* Volunteers are now leaving the
town by all kinds of conveyances for Big
Hole bridge basm.

\
'
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three weeks later.^8 (The text of this article appears in the Appendix).
The second article, published in the Missoulian the day after the
aforesaid article appeared in New York, was a personal tribute by Barbour
who at last had a first-hand understanding of Nez Perce character in the
face of great difficulty.

It was as followss

The movement of the Nez Perce last Saturday was one of the
most brilliant strategically of modern warfare. It was, of
all others, the move that nobody expected them to make. Its
audacity was stunning. It will ever stand as a monument to
the bravery of that people that they moved, with their horses
and women and little ones, through an open country that was
swarming with armed men.39
But this was not all Chauncey Barbour, who only a few days before
had criticized the character of the Nez Perce mind, had to say that day
in his editorial columns.

It should be noted again that the tide of

editorial opinion was just beginning to shift concerning the Nez Perce.
Meanwhile, a storm was gathering swiftly over the sea of troubles that
the young Territory was already experiencing with the Fort Fizzle affair.
Barbour wrote:
"S" writes for the Independent concerning the Indian escape
last Saturday a remarkable article, which only shows how ridi
culous a man can make himself by writing about something he
knows nothing about. He states that the Indians stampeded
square over Rawn's rifle pits; that the Indians were turned
by the Deer Lodge company—32 men—and that th^ broke south.
. . . ¥e wish to detract nothing from the bravery of the Deer
Lodge Company, but will state that it was nearly two o'clock
when they reached the lower Bitter Root bridge, and that the
main body of Indians had crossed . . . nearly two hours before;
that the Deer Lodgers saw no Indians except those who were
posted on the bluffs to guard the retreat; that they did not
break at the sight of the thirty-two men, but proceeded veiy
leisurely . . . moving only twenty miles in the next four days,
so that they might overtake them if there was any disposition
to do so. Bless you unsophisticated soul, Addison; you are
too easily imposed upon.^O

^^Avant Courier, August 23, l877.
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3> 1877.

^'^Ibid.
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With this, the newspaper war was beginning to thunder about the
Fort Fizzle confusion, certainly, but this was only the beginning.

To

recollect, already in question was the reputation of General Howard.
Moreover, as noted in Chapter III, the reputation of Governor Potts
had been assailed by editors, and was to be again.

The full fuiy of

the storm was not felt until after the Big Hole battle, so it will be
reviewed then.

The Turning Point of the War
As the Nez Perce moved southward through Bitterroot Valley,
trading xfith anxious settlers but causing no harm as promised, the
people of Deer Lodge, 80 miles east of Missoula, fled to the peniten
tiary and locked themselves inside.On July 31, 1877, Chauncey
Barbour wrote a letter to the governor stating that word had reached
him that "75 bucks were raiding Stevensville . . .

Although this

report was untrue and Barbour was just passing along what he heard,
the editor expanded his comments to the governor concerning the lack
of military leadership.

He wrotes

I hear from Indian sources that th^ intend to go down to
the Big Hole by Twin Bridges. I am glad you are going to give
them a game. There is the best place to strike them. You
don't want any military, or any one to hold your men chafing
and tell them to "wait," "wait" until the hostiles are gone.
Take command yourself, and don't let good men be humiliated
by imbeciles or cowards.^3
Strangely, the governor was confronted again with the question
of whether to use militia as a defensive force for the protection of
lives and property or to engage offensively in an attempt to accomplish

Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 203.
^^Phillips, ££. cit., p. 12.

^3xbid.
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what the military had not done--crush the Nez Perce.
On July 2% the reaction to news accounts about the Fort Fizzle
affair prompted the citizens of Helena to call a "war meeting" at
International Hall.

According to a report of this meeting in the

Helena Daily Herald, the participants reviewed what had happened in
Lolo Canyon, dismissed Rawn's actions hy concluding that he believed
they were "friendly Indians, or the Captain would not have allowed
them to pass without bringing on a fight right there," and decided to
raise a company of cavalry, one of artillery and one of "mounted
infantry.
What the difference between cavalry and "mounted infantry" might
be was not explained, but according to the news article, signed by five
prominent citizens, a committee was appointed to solicit funds for this
venture.

The problem of paying for a militia campaign was one of the

major considerations facing the governor.

Because General Sheridan

and the Secretary of War had refused authorization for organizing a
militia, the Territory could expect no financial help from the govern
ment.

the time the governor returned to Helena from Missoula, the

militia movement was already strong there, in Butte, and, as noted,
in Deer Lodge.

Then a curious editorial blunder occurred which may

have aided the public cry for offensive action in the war.
Gen. William T, Sherman, the immediate superior of General Howard,
arrived in Bozeman, Montana, and sent a telegram to Governor Potts.
The general refused to sanction the call for volunteers, but he praised

^^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877» See Figure
extra published July 29 calling this "war meeting."

for the
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the "readiness of citizens" and added that he thought the cost of local
operations—presumably in Missoula—would be paid eventually
gresso^^

Con-

The Helena Daily Independent interpreted this telegram to

mean there was little or no question about receiving federal funds for
militia.

The story appeared, in part, as follows:
UNCLE SAM TO THE RESCUE

The dispatch from General Sherman to Governor Potts, which
we publish, in another place, indicates that the General Govern
ment will pay the damages and save the Territory from an enormous
expenseo . . » The spirit of General Sherman's dispatch confirms
this, and shows that he fully appreciated the necessity, and was
willing, as far as he could, to provide for the emergency.
On July 30, the Helena Daily Herald debunked the military by
writings

"How easy an Indian force, whether seeking pillage or only

escape, could pass around, through., and by our untrained troops.

So

far as infantry goes, except to defend the larger towns or some forti
fied position, they are as useless as boys with popguns.

Even mounted

and well-armed soldiers need skillful leadership to be of any. account.
On the following'day, July 31, Governor Potts made his second
appeal for volunteers. Apparently he had made no decision about how
the militia would be used—offensively or defensively.

The predicament

was explained in an extra published by the New North-West on August 3>
which stated, in parts
The circumstances of the past week have prevented a regular
issue of the New North-West this day. . . . Under the call for
300 volunteers by the Governor's Proclamation, three Butte
companies, 1^0 or I60 strong, remained in camp until Thursday

b^Helena Daily Herald, August h} 1877.
^^Helena Daily Independent, August Ii, I877.
Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877.
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morning. A company of 30 or liO men were in readiness to move
in an hour from Deer Lodge. Philipsburg, Cable, New Chicago,
Bear, Bear Mouth, Yreka, Pioneer and Yamhill had fully 7? men
reacfy for instant service, and tenders of companies of ^0 men
each were telegraphed from Helena and Pony on condition of
being armed. The request of Governor Potts, Delegate £MartinJ
Maginnis and Judge Knowles to the War Department for authority
to organize and move this force to co-operate with the U. S.
troops was, however, answered adversely. . .
Two telegrams, dated August 1 and 2, were quoted in full, stating
that the President, the Secretary of War and General Sheridan agreed
that "it will not be necessary for the Governor to call out 300 volun
teers to intercept the Indians."
In view of the pressure on the governor from Montanans and the
newspapers to take positive action, and the directives by the militaiy
and the government not to, it would appear he was in an inexorable
dilemma.

But what may have stirred Governor Potts to decide to use

volunteers for offensive warfare was a letter written by Col. John
Gibbon who had left Fort Shaw on July 28 with a small force of regulars.
On arrival in Missoula, August 2, he enlisted a command totaling ll|6
men, including 3h Missoula volunteers.He wrote to the governor as
follows;
As soon as I can get ttçr command here, probably day after
tomorrow, I propose to move up the Bitterroot after the Nez
Perces & fight them if they will stand. It is all important
that the passes behind them leading into the Big Hole basin
be occupied at once, and as I learn from Capt. Rawn that you
are moving some companies of militia in that direction I have
to request that you will give instructions to have such passes
occupied as soon as possible. Please give instructions also
to have no negotiations whatever with the Indians, and the men
should have no hesitancy in shooting down any armed Indian they
meet not known to belong to one of the peaceful tribes.

^^New North-west, August 3^ 1877°
^%oward and McGrath, og. cit., p. 206.
^^Phillips, 0£. cit., pp. 13-li|.
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This directive to "shoot and ask questions later" may be regarded
as the death warrant of many Nez Perce, including women and children, at
the Big Hole, for until Colonel Gibbon arrived there no blood had been
spilled on Montana soil.

The assertion in this letter that militia was

alreac^ moving toward the Big Hole was true, but the governor had not
authorized this.

Secretary Mills, as noted earlier, had given the

command to Major Clark on July 30.

Subsequently, Governor Potts called

them back for service in Missoula and, in the confusion, this company
of militia did not reach the scene of the Big Hole fight until two days
after it had ended.
On August 3, the day after Colonel Gibbon had written his letter
and was bu^ organizing men in Missoula, Chauncey Barbour expressed his
views to the governor in a letter concerning the plans being made.
wrote, in part:

He

"The whole force, nearly 1^0 men, will move on them

Saturday, and try and hold them until Howard gets up. The Indians will
mock them."
Exactly when the governor decided the militia should take offen
sive action by aiding Colonel Gibbon is not certain, but the fact that
the latter had enlisted volunteer help in Missoula already makes the
question academic.

As Gibbon moved down the Bitterroot Vall^, he

recruited a handful of additional volunteers.

But many valley residents

argued against his plan to attack the Nez Perce on the grounds that the
Indians had been friendly.
way.

Gibbon was plagued with desertions along the

I'Jhen General Howard, who still was crossing the Bitterroot Mountains,

learned that Gibbon's command now comprised I63 men, he remarked that at

^^Ibid.
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least 100 additional soldiers would be needed.
Because of the delay in issuing the second proclamation, as
already noted, the companies in Butte and Helena were not under arms
until August h or

In Butte at 7 a.m» that Sunday, August 5, "a

do
council of war was held within the hour to swear men in for duty.
But none of these men saw action during the Big Hole battle*

Had

th^ been organized at the time of the first proclamation, which
nçrsteriously disappeared, the Big Hole fight might have been far more
disastrous for the Nez Perce.

The events of the battle, which have

been well documented, are as follows.
On August 8, the Nez Perce—having crossed Lost Trail Pass at
the southern end of Bitterroot Vall^ and camped on the banks of Ruby
Creek in the relatively open, rolling country of the Big Hole basin
twelve miles west of Wisdom, Montana—stayed up late in the night danc
ing and playing the "stick game" common to Northwest tribes.

Little

serious concern was given to an attack by whites, so no scouts or
guards were posted as had been the routine during the flight through
Idaho Territory»

The camp comprised 89 tepees lined approximately

a half mile along the southern fringe of willows bordering the creek«
It was by no means a well-chosen, defensive position—such as had been
the case at White Bird and Clearwater canyons—for directly to the north
lay a wooded slope, hidden from view by the willows, which afforded an
easy route for undetected approach ty soldiers.

^^Beal, op. cit., pp. 108-110.
^^Leeson, op. cit., p. 138.
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 206.
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Indians had been ascertained by a small detachment of soldiers led by
Lt. James Bradley on August 7.^^
When this news reached Gibbon, whose force was laboring over
Lost Trail pass, he ordered his command forward on foot, leaving 20
men to bring up the wagons and howitzer (which had been obtained at
Fort Owen, near Stevensville)»

The unmounted force reached the edge

of the trees, 1,200 yards from the Nez Perce camp, at approximately
2 a.m. on August 9 without discovery ty the slumbering Indians.

The

whites depleted in the vicinity of the Indian ponies which had been
picketed on the hillside to graze.

The wait for dawn commenced; the

men cursed softly as they endured the cold.^^
At approximately 3:30 a.m. when the first glow of light promised
warmth from the east, Indian women emerged from the tepees to stoke the
campfires.

About this time an aged Indian, Natalekin, rode from the

camp to check the horses.

As he blundered into the waiting whites,

four shots dropped him from the mount, and the battle was begun.
The soldiers rushed the camp, wading through the creek and
crashing through the willows.

Some of the Nez Perce were half awakened

the shots nearly three-quarters of a mile distant, but most did not
perceive what was happening until the whites leveled their firearms at
tepees.
Colonel Gibbon had given the order, "We don't want any prisoners.

^^Beal, 0£. cit., p. 110.
^^Brady, 0£. cit., pp. 165-173»
Beal, op. cit., p. Il6,
^^Ibid., p. 111;.
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The reaction by Yellow Wolf was as follows:
I grabbed tiçr moccasins and with the others ran out of the
tepee. I had only nçr war club. . . . Men and women were lying
flat on the ground listening. I saw one woman . . » I heard
her call out, "Why not all men get ready and fight? Not run
awayI"
I did not know her. IVhen I heard this, it convinced me she
was right. Minthon, a younger bey than I, was also convinced.
He gave me his gun. It had but one shell. . . . Î saw a man
running this way. It was not nearly daylight. He came close
and said, "Wahchunçnis (Rainbow) is killed!"^9
As the Indians scattered for cover, the whites took possession
of the camp. The first soldier killed was Lt. Bradley who had located
the Nez Perce two days earlier. Tepees not made of hides were set
ablaze and women and children, many still huddled inside, were shot
or bludgeoned with rifle butts. One l8-year-old girl who survived had
her teeth knocked out and later was called In-Koko-Lio (girl with
broken teeth)^^ An aged Indian, too old to run for cover, was shot
repeatedly as he sat smoking on a buffalo robe. "He did not feel the
shots," said Yellow Wolf. "After the battle, he rode horseback from
t h e r e . A woman, her newborn child, and the midwife were found later
6

in one tepee; another woman and her two children in another—all dead.
Chiefs Joseph, %ite Bird and Looking Glass rallied their scat
tered warriors by shouting commands in different sectors. After a
series of fierce charges and counter charges by both sides. Gibbon's
command was forced to retreat. He regrouped on a knoll approximately
a half mile northwest of the Nez Perce camp and his men dug rifle pits

59chalmers, o£. cit., p. 129.
'^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 137.
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., p. 13^.

^^Ibid., p, ll|l.
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with trowel bayonets. Meanwhile, the Indians reoccupied their camp,
tended to the wounded, buried their dead and packed what belongings
that remained.
Wrote Gibbon later;

"Few of us will soon forget the wail of

mingled grief, rage and borrow which came from the camp. . . when the
Indians returned to it and recognized their slaughtered warriors, women
and children.
That afternoon, Indian marksmen kept the whites pinned down with
an effective fire which mortally wounded one officer and wounded another
for the second time. The cannon and a supply wagon with 2,000 rounds
of ammunition arrived about a half mile west of Gibbon's position.
Indians promptly captured both.

The

Because the Nez Perce could not oper

ate the howitzer—which would have been lethal against Gibbon's tightly
grouped men—they destroyed it by removing the wheels and hammering the
muzzle out of shape.
The fighting continued throughout the day—the warriors set fire
to the grass at one point in hopes of routing the whites, but the wind
shifted—while the Indian withdrawal commenced.

No further attack was

mounted against the whites during the night or the next morning by the
rear guard left to harass Gibbon's command and learn if reinforcements
arrived.

From the afternoon of August 10 to the late morning of August

11, no more than 12 braves, under the leadership of Ollokot, kept the
soldiers and volunteers in their trenches.

General Howard arrived with

a small detachment at 9 a.m. on August 11, too late to do more than ask

^^Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 21$.
"^^Brady, 0£. cit., p. 66.
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Gibbon, who was wounded in the thigh, how he felt.^^
Gibbon's casualties were listed at 29 dead, 1|0 wounded.

The Nez

Perce toll is uncertain, but a year after the battle. Chief White Bird
listed the dead at 87, 53 of whom were non-warriors.

But this was

only a fraction of those who died of wounds during the flight.
years. Chief Joseph set the total figure at 208.^?

In later

Most of these Indians

were killed outright or fatally wounded during the initial hour of fight
ing. Yellow Wolf, who had taken part in capturing the howitzer and
keeping the whites pinned in the trenches, claimed that the only "bravery"
shown

the whites was during the morning when "killing women and

children, crushing new bom babies' heads while in the mothers' arms
[andJ shooting men who had no guns!"

After this, he said, "they lay

too close in dirtholes to know when we leftl"^^
The question is unresolved about which side won the Big Hole
battle.

Because of the severe Nez Perce losses, there is little doubt

that Gibbon's smaller force won military plaudits in executing a welltimed, devastating blow with comparatively few casualties.

69

men were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Seven of his

The press through

out the nation saluted Gibbon and the 3^ Montana volunteers—the first
universal expression of its type about a military leader since the
opening of the conflict.

But, as will be seen, General Howard was

^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., pp. 216-218.
^'%eal, op. cit., p. 129«
Anaconda [Montana] Standard, September 29, 190b.
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., p. llt9.
^^"The Siege Area Trail Guide," Big Hole Battlefield (Department
of the Interior, National Park Service, 1962), p. 6.
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condemned as "incapable" for failing to arrive in time to assist.
But in the cold light of history—recognizing the bravery of both
sides and heeding the careful analyses of the numerous events by quali
fied scholars—one question remains unanswered above all others about
this turning point of the war.

The question has been dealt with super

ficially in several studies, but no general conclusions have been reached»
The question: %y was Chief Joseph lulled into the false security of
thinking that it was unnecessary to post scouts or guards around the
Big Hole encampment?
Scholars note that he was warned by a medicine man, Pile of Clouds,
the eve of the battle that "death is on our trail J"

He requested the

chiefs to gather and told them;
VJhile I slept, ny medicine told me to move on; that death
was approaching us. Chiefs, I only tell you this for the good
of our people. If you take ny advice you can avoid death, and
that advice is to speed through this country. If we do not
there will be tears in our eyeso"^*^
This points to the fact that the chiefs were confronted with the
problem.

The general explanation for the lack of. action is that General

Howard was still a considerable distance north, Montanans had shown
considerable friendliness, and there was fun in camp at the time»
It could be dismissed at this, except for two statements made by
Chief Joseph and Yellow Wolf in later accounts.

Joseph's brief descrip

tion of the Fort Fizzle affair and the Big Hold battle was as follows:
Finding that we were outnumbered (by Howard at ClearwaterJ,
we retreated to Bitter Root Valley. Here another bocfy of
soldiers came upon us and demanded our surrender, ¥e refused.
They said, "Tou cannot get by us." We answered, "We are going
ty you without fighting if you will let us, but we are going by

"^"^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 205.
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you anyhow." We then made a treaty with these soldiers. We
agreed not to mol est any one and th^ agreed that we might pass
through the Bitter Root country in peace. We bought provisions
and traded stock with white men there. We understood that
there was to be no war. We intended to go peaceably to the
buffalo countiy, and leave the question of returning to our
country to be settled afterward.
With this understanding we traveled on for four days, and,
thinking that trouble was all over, we stopped and prepared
tent-poles to take with us. We started again, and at the end
of two days we saw three white men passing our camp. Thinking
that peace had been made, we did not molest them. We could
have killed, or taken them prisoners, but we did not suspect
them of being spies, which they were. That night the soldiers
surrounded our camp.-^
The important remark here was, "We then made a treaty with these
soldiers."

Joseph referred to the July 28 negotiations between Captain

Rawn, Governor Potts and Chief Looking Glass when, it was reported by
the Missoulian, the Nez Perce offered to surrender their ammunition to
secure a peaceable passage.

More likely, the negotiators reached a

verbal agreement that there would be no shooting by either side.

This

probably was agreeable to the governor whose purpose was to defend life
and property and let the military defeat the Indians,

It justifies why

he retired to the rear and made no attempt to stop the desertions of
volunteers who, apparently, were equally satisfied there was no need
for fighting.

But before going on. Yellow Wolf gave this interpreta

tion of the events of July 28 after explaining the policy endorsed ty
all the chiefs that no fighting was to be done in Montana.
These were instructions from the chiefs [he said]. Strong
laws, nor were they broken. The chiefs thought the war ended.
To be no fighting in Montana. But not so, the Montana people.
They did not regard the peace made with us there at Lolo Pass.
Because of that lie-treaty we were trapped. Trapped sleeping,
unarmed.'

^T-Brac^, op. cit., p. 6$.
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 127.
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Assuming that a verbal "treaty" had been made, it would explain
why Rawn did not order his men to fire as the Indians passed above him.
Or, if he realized that too risky, why he failed to move his main force
from the breastwork until two hours after the passage.

Or, more import

ant, why he did not move on the Indians the following day when Missoula
had additional volunteers from Deer Lodge and small communities nearby
when the Nez Perce had camped only eight miles south of Lolo Canyon.
As will be seen, such an alleged treaty (never publicly declared
by Captain Rawn or Governor Potts) also would explain wl^y the latter
sent a telegram to Helena ordering additional militia which he supposed
might be heading toward Missoula to "halt."
The correspondent from the Bozeman Times, in Deer Lodge at the
time, sent this report to his paper;
Today fjuly 3l], upon the call of Gov. Potts for 300 men,
nine of the sixty of the Cavaliy Company, which had organized
yesterday, responded. liJhen they got ready to start for the
west side, a telegram was received from Gov. Potts calling a
he It, so nobody went. There was quite a stir on the streets
to-day, and squads of men could be seen on main street dis
cussing the Indian question.
More will be said about this incident in regard to the newspaper
war, but it should help support the hgrpothesis that no offensive action
was planned by Governor Potts or Captain Rawn for two reasons. First,
the Secretaiy of War and the President had advised against it and had
refused to authorize the organization of militia»

Second, because of

the inferior force available to white negotiators on July 28, a verbal
treaty was entered into with the Nez Perce to avoid an immediate con
flict which would endanger Bitter Root dwellers.

^%ozeman Times, August 9, 1877.

Once this agreement
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had been made, the two white negotiators chose to keep it secret because
of the tremendous pressure on them by newspapers and the people to take
action.

Nevertheless, Captain Rawn and Governor Potts apparently had

agreed also to honor their obligation to the Nez Perce without losing
face.
If this were the case, it is apparent also that Secretary Mills
had not been informed about the "treaty."

Whatever intrigue he was in

volved in, if any, easily could have brought on a fight because he had
ordered, without consulting the governor, a company of militia to the
Big Hole area before any word had been received about Colonel Gibbon's
plans.
In the final analysis. Colonel Gibbon probably was responsible
for breaking the treaty because, after writing his intentions to the
governor on July 27, he proceeded to Missoula where, between August 2
and I4, he undoubtedly had opportunity to discuss the entire matter with
Captain Rawn.

What Rawn may have said to him may never be known.

But,

there was nobody with authority in Montana to counter plans made by
Gibbon.

The governor had no voice in military affairs and Captain Rawn

was outranked.

Because of Colonel Gibbon's attitude toward the Nez

Perce, it is doubtful that he would let a subordinate officer's agree
ment with those Indians stop a campaign.

But is also is possible that

Captain Rawn said nothing, hoping Colonel Gibbon's command would not
catch the Nez Perce, as Chauncey Barbour predicted in a letter to the
governor on August
Once Colonel Gibbon had obtained 3k volunteers from Missoula, and

^Phillips, op. cit., p. lij..
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started down the Bitterroot Valley to fight, the additional volunteers
he accumulated at such places as Fort Oifen were a trifling number be
cause of the general friendly feeling toward the Indians.

This was

not, to be sure, universal. But the thought undoubtedly occurred to
those settlers that it would be foolish to shed blood.
The strong opinion against the Nez Perce—which alreacfy was
beginning to shift, as noted—still was largely centered in Helena,
Butte and Deer Lodge.

The people of Deer Lodge locked themselves in

the prison as the Nez Perce were moving southward approximately 70 miles
to the west when, in reality, the Indians presented no threat whatever.
But because of the plan executed by Colonel Gibbon and because of the
pressure on the governor to help crush the Indians, he finally sent
the militia toward Big Hole for offensive action.

Of course, those

men failed to arrive in time.
The breaking of the alleged treaty had one other facet which
was summed up by Joseph:
The Nez Perces never make war on women and children; we
could have killed a great many women and children while the
war lasted, but we would feel ashamed to do so cowardly an
act. ¥e never scalp our enemies, but when General Howard
came up and joined Gibbon, their Indian scouts dug up our
dead and scalped them. I have been told that General Howard
did not order this great shame to be done.7^
The scalping incident was confirmed and was "the beginning of
the most wanton, persistent and insatiable vandalism upon a battlefield
known in western America," according to Beal."^^

As shown in Chief

Joseph's statement, the breaking of the peace treaty

"^^Brady, o£. cit., p. 66.
"^^eal, 0£. cit., p. 127.

a surprise
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attack on women and children changed the character of the war. Yellow
Wolf explained that in their rage, the Indians without reason killed a
prominent Bitterroot citizen who had been taken prisoner after the
soldiers had been driven to the knoll
After the Big Hole battle, the Nez Perce pillaged ranches and
killed several whites.

No longer were the Indians disposed to be friendly,

for th^ had been hurt seriously.

Their trail southward was spattered

with the blood of the wounded. Yet, they were not beaten.

The Nez Perce

were to run, maneuver and fight for 55 more days and another 1,000 miles
before the military could defeat them.

^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. lUO,

CmPTER VI

THE WAR: PHASE THREE

MLlderness Escapade
Perhaps Colonel Gibbon's one major failure in the Big Hole fight
was in not capturing or scattering the Nez Perce herd of horses when
he had the opportunity on the morning of August 9, because the fleeing
Indians were to give General Howard a "merry chase."

Howard began the

pursuit on August 13, 1877, accompanied by ^0 of Gibbon's men.

On

arrival at Bannack, Montana, the next day, the general learned that
the Nez Perce had murdered four settlers during a raid to secure all
available horses so that Howard's command would not have fresh mounts.
p ^ fit

^

Meanwhile, the Deer Lodge volunteers, led by Major^lark, arrived.^
The Nez Perce then followed a circuitous route over the Contin
ental Divide via Bannack Pass. This maneuver was intended to trick
Howard into thinking the Indians would head into Idaho, but the general
perceived this, headed straight south for Yellowstone Park, and avoided
being slowed by mountainous travel.

As a matter of fact, the Nez Perce

disagreed about their intended route.

Joseph suggested continuing west

into the remote Salmon River country of Idaho which, if done, would
have made a military pursuit as difficult as the one over Lolo Pass.
Chief Looking Glass apparently persuaded the chiefs to head eastward

2
through Yellowstone Park.

^Beal, op. cit., pp. lh^-lk6.
Howard, op. cit., p. 22^.
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The Burning Homes ofBeavehead Settlers.
Families Reported
Massacred.

PLEASANT VALLEY, August 13—7:30 p. ni.
—Tbe driver and a passenger just in on, the
coach from tbe Tworlb report that a messenger
came in from Horse IVarie when they left
Loveil's Station this morning, and reported"
that Pierce bros.' rr. ich vyas burned and tha
firing was heard iu tbe vicinity It îa twenty

miles to Lovell's.
Tbe Deer Lodge coach reports soiue fami
lies massacred.
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The Savages' %ork on Horse
Prairie.
Péople Killeàfand Stock
Stoleni
PLKASANT VALLKt, August 14.—POlliOgef
fiends the following^ Lovells :
Scouts from Horse Prairie report « cquaw
camp of Indians with some warriors and
stock were at Horse Prairie diggings ; on 13th
run off 37 head of horses from Pierces corral,
killing James Smith, Montague, and one man
whose name is not known. Some five men
are also missing, and are supposed to be killed. They also killed 5 Chinamen. The Indians were supposed to pass out through
Bloody Dick's gulch, on to Medicine LWge.
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It was at this time that the impact of news about the Big Hole
fight and its consequences for both the Indians and whites was being
felt in Montana and elsewhere.

General Sheridan wrote a letter to

Washington on August 13, praising Colonel Gibbon and stating that he
"inflicted a severe if not a disastrous punishment on the hostile Nez
Perces."^

On August 1$, the news of the Nez Perce murders at Bannack

was published in the Helena Daily Herald, and stated that the people
in Beaverhead were under arms.^

When the Missoulian learned of this,

the editor related what had happened at Bannack with what might have
happened had there been a fight at Fort Fizzle.

He wrote that the

. . . consequences of an attack upon the Indians while th^
were on Lo Lo can be readily seen now after the battle of Big
Hole. Bitter Root valley would have been utterly stamped out.
. . . Even if the punishment had been greater on them than .
it was on Big Hole, the result could not have been avoided.5
The New North-Mest printed an article by S. F. Dunlap, a citizen
volunteer, stating;

"Wliy were they not vigorously pursued by General

Howard? ... We [the volunteers^ are suffering in the loss of time,
our hay crop is going to destruction. ... We are spending money for
scouts, fortifications, etc., and the rest of the country looks and
mocks at our calamity.
The Helena Weekly Independent noted further that "after laying
over a day and two nights at Gibbon's battlefield, Howard only made 72

. ^Letter from Col, John Gibbon to Gen. E. D. Townsend, August 13,
1877 (ffi-storical Society of Montana, Microfilm 88).
^Helena Daily Herald, August 1^, 1877.
^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877.
^ew North-West, August 17, 1877.
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miles in the next three days.
Nevertheless, General Howard had correctly assessed the route of
the Nez Perce who had moved toward Yellowstone Park, and he intercepted
them on the evening of August l8 on a broad, rock-strewn plain called
Camas Meadows, approximately l8 miles east of Beaver Canyon and IiO miles
west of Yellowstone Park along the Montana-Idaho border.

The general

was well aware of the newspaper criticism that was swelling against him,
and with a fighting force of probably more than ^00 men (approximately
350 of his regulars, $0 of Gibbon's command, three or four companies of
militia, and Indian scouts), it seemed that his long-sought victory was
at hand.

He knew the location of the Nez Perce camp fewer than 20 miles

ahead on the prairie, and Nez Perce scouts had informed Chief Joseph of
the predicament now facing his weary people.

But, as Bancroft put it,

"his people seemed made all of endurance.Joseph executed one of the
most skillful and daring maneuvers in the annals of Indian warfare.
General Howard split his force, sending Lt. George Bacon and UO
cavalrymen ahead to block the passes into Yellowstone Park,

On the

evening of August 19, the general camped the major bocfy on Camas Meadows
in strict military fashion with guards posted and horses and other stock
tethered nearby.

Two or three Nez Perce scouts wandered right to the

edge of camp at twilight.

They were spotted by guards, but nothing was

done to chase them off because, strange as it may appear, there was
nothing unusual about this happening,^

Pursuing scouts on horseback

^Helena Weekly Independent, August 23, 1877•
^The Works of Hubert H. Bancroft, Vol. XXXI (San Francisco: The
Histoiy Company Publishers, T890), p. 512.
^Chalmers, op, cit., p, 1^3.

FIGURE 9

Herald Extra,
Fight of Howafé's Ad
vance With the Hostiles.
Lieat. Norwood's (kllant At
tack.
The Indians Capture 110 Pao^
Animais.
Lieut. Benson, 7th Infantry,
Wounded.
Pnnmt df%IflJiaâs Oernm
tini##^i%.^ •
[«peoial to>nb jrn^am).]
HfmABO*8BxFBDlTIOH^AMPOALLAWAT,>
041CA» jlsADowdi Idiho, August 3D. f
The bostiles fred into our camp at dawn«
#^mpedmg tk« pAOk mules and somé horses,
companies of cavaky followed (hem
miles, and recovered part of the herd,
which Wooght oa a severe engagement. Reenforcements moved out and the Indians mtreated.
Oftt>t, Norwood's company gallantly hdd
on advanced part, till relieved. One officer
Ll^t. Benson,Seventh Infantry waswounded^
not sevei-ely. One soldier killed and seven
wounded and several hostiles reported killed.
Col. Miller with two hundred and thirty
Infantry overtakes us to-night. Pnrsoit coniinttcs to morrow. Lost one hundred and ten
mules and several scouts' horses.
GURNBY.

Herald Extra.
MEMXA, THIJKSDAY, AUGUST 23,18^7

NEZ PERCE SQUAW CAMP
AT HENRY'S LAKE.
Howard Expects to Strike the
HostileS:To-Day.
Return ot some of the Virginia
Volunteers.
virginia [City, August 23.—Two scouts
from Fort Ellis got in here at 6 o'clock this
morning. /;,They report the squaw camp at
Henry's Lake, but were breaking camp and
moving toward the Geyser Basin, when they
left yesterday.morning.
Lieut. Leary,y Howard's commissary, \%
here. He says when he left the front the In
dians'were fortifyinc^ at a place called the
Lava Beds, and thinks thit Gen.; Howard
struck them yesterday. Some of [the men
that went out from here got in this^moming.
.Several of them went on with Howard.
»» —
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in darkness would be foolharcfy if other Indians were in the vicinity.
As darkness approached^ four columns of l50 mounted men could
be seen heading for the camp.

Thinking it was Bacon's detachment

returning, the sentry showed no alarm.
Meanwhile, the Nez Perce scouts crept into the camp and, with
great care, began cutting the hobbles and tethers on militaiy livestock.
But before they had an opportunity to get past the first group of ani
mals, the sentry issued his challenge, received no response, and fired.
War whoops followed, and 1$0 Nez Perce rushed the camp."^*^
In the confusion—soldiers trying to get their pants, boots and
rifles arranged in the dark as bullets whizzed—the animals that had
been loosened were driven off by the Indians»
attack was to leave Howard without mounts.

Joseph's plan in the

But as stated later ty

Suhm-Keen (Sam Tilden), the Nez Perce were dismayed about what th^
had captured.

"I helped to guard those animals—those mules which

th^ thought were horses in the dark," he said.^^
was killed in the raid'—the bugler who

blew

Only one soldier

12

"Boots and Saddles»"

General Howard knew that the Nez Perce would have difficulty
driving the mules with any great speed, so the following morning he
sent out a detachment of cavalry, led by Maj. George Sanford, to pursue
the raiders.
animals.

An advance guard managed to recover a few straggling

Joseph had prepared for such an eventuality as a cavalry

^"^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 228,
^^Rowena L, and Gordon D, A]corn, "Old Nez Perce Recalls Tragic
Retreat of 1877," Montana,Magazine of Western History (Winter, 1963),
p. 69.
^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p, 1^5.
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attack, however, by deploying men ahead of the nrnle herd in a "U" shape.
Sanford's command rode into the trap with three companies.

As the

Indians opened fire, his command was thrown into confusion and retreated.
Seven soldiers were wounded or killed; two Indians were nicked by bul-

lets.^^
The significance of the Camas Meadow raid was not so much the
loss of life and livestock—which, incidentally, included a number of
militaiy horses--but that General Howard lost his greatest opportunity
to defeat the Nez Perce when they had been seriously weakened by the
Big Hole fight and he had been strengthened by additional men.
The general did not take to the pursuit again until August 27,
when General Sherman, who was in Montana, ordered him ahead.Joseph
alreac^ had gained three days travel.

Howard, in traversing Yellowstone

Park, was subjected once again to the perils of mountainous travel.

In

places, it was necessary to lower wagons down 200-foot cliffs with

15
ropes.
Editorial reaction in Montana was not kindly toward the general
and, as will be seen in the next chapter, strong suggestions were made
to have him replaced as commander.

One of the more temperate editorials

appeared in the Missoulian:
The press of Idaho have been fierce in their denunciation of
Howard's military career in that region; but the papers of this
Territory have been, with perhaps one exception Fwew North-Westj,
disposed to treat him with fairness. His campaigning in this
Territory does not compare favorably with that of Gen. Gibbon.

^3Beal, o£. cit., pp. 159-160.
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 233«

^^Ibid.
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. . . Howard's career during the rebellion does not inspire
the belief that he is a feather-bed warrior, but he certainly
has not shown a large amount of push here. He can put down
adverse criticism better with his sabre than he can with his
pen.^
On receiving orders on August 27 to move ahead. General Howard
exchanged a series of four dispatches with General Sherman, who was
returning from Yellowstone Park after a pleasure trip.

Howard wrote

that his "command is so much worn by over-fatigue and jaded animals
that I cannot push it much further. . , , I think I may stop near
where I am, and in a few days work Ky way back to Fort Boise slowly
and distribute ny troops before snow falls in the mountains."

Sherman

replied that Howard's men should pursue the Nez Perce to the death and
suggested that Howard turn his command over to "some young, energetic
officer.
So far as is known, this was the only instance in which any such
suggestion was made to Howard by a high-ranking military officer.

The

decision that Howard be relieved was, of course, left entirely to him.

Howard replied to Sherman;
You misunderstood me. I never flag. It was the command,
including the most energetic young officers, that were worn
out and weary by a most extraordinary march. You need not
fear for the campaign. Neither you nor General McDowell can
doubt irgr pluck and energy.^"
General Sherman sent back a somewhat apologetic note, tempered,
however,

the reasoning that "men of less age and rank are best for

Indian warfare.

They have more to make."

^^eekly Missoulian, August 2h, 1877.
^"^Beal, op. cit., p. l67.

^®Ibid.
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The Nez Perce, meanwhile, successfully penetrated the blockade
of the Park set up

Bacon's cavalry without incident and intercepted

two civilian expeditionso
The first party, consisting of 10 men and women who were led by
George Cowan, were surprised at their camp near the Firehole River on
the morning of August 2k-

Frank Carpenter, who later gave an extensive

newspaper report of what happened, walked forward and shook hands with
Yellow Wolf who was in charge of the five Nez Perce intruders. Yellow
Wolf stated later that this gesture saved the tourists from an immediate
massacre.

Carpenter invited the warriors to a breakfast of pancakes

and secured permission from Yellow Wolf to see Chief Joseph.

But when

Carpenter agreed to the Indian demand of giving them flour, bacon and
sugar, George Cowan emerged from his tent and objected strongly.

He

made further protests about the manner in which the Nez Perce stared
19
at his wife and sisters.
Meanwhile, some I4O or more warriors passed the camp after view
ing geysers, and began teasing the tourists who loaded their wagons and
headed hastily for the camp of Chief Looking Glass who, they hoped,
would allow them to leave the Park unmolested.

Along the trail, however,

groups of young braves continued to harass the tourists in a spirit of
cruel fun and the Cowan party, badly frightened, tried to escape.

Bullets

20
dropped Cowan and Albert Oldham from their saddles.
Oldham escaped into the bushes, wounded through the jaw.
Cowan rushed to her husband who lay wounded in the thigh.

^9chalmers, op. cit., pp. 169-170.
^^Howard and McGrath, op. cit., pp. 237-238.

Mrs.

She pleaded

I3h
with the braves that surrounded her prostrate husband, but one stepped
forward with a revolver and discharged it into his forehead.

The

Helena Daily Herald paid the following tribute to Mrs» Cowan which,
according to Carpenter later, was well deserved:
A WOMAN'S COURAGE
It is only at rare intervals that womanly courage approaches
in dramatic effect the brave act of Mrs. George F„ Cowan, who
surprised by painted savages in Wonderland the other day, tried
to save the life of her husband by offering her own body as a
shield to his. He was shot with her arras entwined about him,
and expired in an embrace which she intended should sacrifice
herself and spare him. As an example of lofty heroism and selfsacrifice, this act of Mrs. Cowan will hereafter be mentioned
among the first. It deserves a prominent page in frontier
history. ^
Miraculously, however, George Cowan did not die. This was not
op
reported in Helena until September 5.
On August 27, the initial
report by the Helena Daily Herald indicated that nine of the tourists
in the Park at the time had been murdered.

23

Actually, two were wounded

in the Cowan scuffle and two were killed later in the other expedition
led by A. J. Weikert of Helena.

This latter group easily could have

escaped without harm, but they waited until Nez Perce braves discovered
their camp and shooting erupted as they fled.^^
This brutal savagery cannot be dismissed by any means, but it
is well to understand at this point that the Nez Perce were in full
rebellion as they had never been before.

The Avant Courier commented:

^^Helena Daily Herald, August 29, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Independent, September
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 27, 1877.
^^Beal, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
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FIGURE 10

Herald Extra.
HEMBIA, MOXI>AY,'AI GUST 37.

independent Extra

MASSACRES IN THE NA
TIONAL PARK.

OFFICIAL DISPATCH.

/The Number of Killed,

Telegram from Maj. Benham
to Gen. Gibbon.

Mrs. Cowan, Sister and
Brother Taken
Prisoners

jSeven Men Killed and one Man
and two Women Prisoners,
FOKT ELLIS,

August 27.

To Oen. Gibbon;
Schofield reports that he was OD the top
of Mount Wasliburu yesterday aiui the Tn
«Mans appeared in the Geyser basin on The
24th and struck the Helena and Radcrs
bur^ parties,killing seven men and taking
two women anii one man prisouers. Just
be lejt Mt. Washburn yesterday
tfie
Indians
attacked
another
party killing nine; one escaped. The In
dians released Mrs ( owan, her sistJ-r and
biother who reached SchotiiolH.s eanip
yesterday. The main camp {crossed the
Yellowstone on the 25th. Warriors went
back to fight Howard. W hite Bird and
Looking <Tla8s remained with tlie camp
and Joseph went with the warriors. They
say the are going to Wind river,
and Brown to get supplies. Schotield
thinks they are ^oîng towards the Lower
Yellowstone by Clark's Fork. They cross
ed the river between Washbnrn and the
lake; Schofield does not sav iust wrtoro^
Will send A courir:
Sntrgis

nrxiiA M.

They are Afterwards
Released.
FT. ELLIS, August 27. 1877.
ïo^General John Gibbon :
fiieutenant Schofield reports that he was on
top of Mount Washbtirné yesterday. Indians
appeared in the Geyser Basin on the 24th
inst They struck the*Helen a and Raderebùrg party, killing seven men and taking two
women and one man*prisoners. Just ai he
lèft lîtoiftit Wàshburne yesterday the Indians
attacked andtÏEer party, killing nine of them.
One éwaped.
The Indians released.Mrs. Cowan, her sis
ter and brother, who reached! Schofield's
camp yesterday. The main camp crossed the
Yellowstone on the 25th. The warriors went
back to fight Howard. White Bird and
Looking Glass remained, with the camp.
Joseph went with the warriors.
They say they are going to Wind river and
Camp Brown to get supplies. Schofield
thinks they are goln to the Lower Yellowston
fia Clark,8 Fork. They crossed the river be
tween Mt. Washbern and the Lakes.
Bchofidd does not say just where. Will
send courier to Sturglss.
Signed

^
IteNHAM,
Capt Yth inft*
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t^'Juàâ Extra.
«iEi.iorv

a %:r DAI AtiiVr r sn.

THE HELEN A PARTY SURV IVORS.
Most of them Escape and Ar-r
rive at the Springs;
Kanok

Foller the Only
-Ones Still Out.

Geo. OowaD ïîiilsd in His
Wile's ArmsR*;ZKM A
tSl 2Ç.
[•>i frt U.i. TO l iZJ'. 1WKA1D.J
Pâstçy Just anived.
All of the Helexia
party Lad arrived at Mammoth 3gi-in%$, Î0 ii.
m., yesterday, exccpt Keiitk and Folicr who
are Ktijl miasiDg. A. J. Weikari is wounutd
in the siiuuldcr. sil,vjî/iîy/.tind J. Stuart i:) sido
andaukks bui not seriously.
The ludians surrounded laeir camp, six
mxle? iiLovo Muil Yolcauo. Tiiey took ihcm
rjxihi-\y by surpri«e. Did not folic iv the mcu
ai^-er they fled. Kenck was lc.3t ^ccu running
cluBC to the timber.

Mrg. Co\V5in's, ]rûâb:;îtù was oiiul irt iier
Rfpifl He is the only oue or the Kadcrcourg
party known to
Lcix; kiile ? I'he
Tii'jy have esc11,:
arc i i'2)Oi(ed

Herald Extra.
RKf ENA, THUKSnAir, ACCIUMT SO.

The Gyser Party Coming In
to Virginia City.
viuginia City, August îiO.
To \V. K. Eobcrh :
Your SOD aud August Foller arrived here
•well. They kuow nothing of the fate of the
the others. Joe. starts for home on to-mor
row's coach.
W. II. KODGERS.

figur:^ 12

Herald Extra.
«i;Xi>Air, REPTKMBER

THE HOSTILES' ATTACK
AT MAMMOTH HOT
SPRINGS.
Richard Dietrich Killed,
Slaughtering Cattle and
Burning Bridges.
BOI:EMAN, September 2.
[bPECIAL DISrATCllES TO THE HERALD.]

Prof. Dietrich w;;.s killed at llie Mammoth
Spriugs. Donne's advance guard foiuiil the
body still warui.
. ïbe Ktz Perces are still at East Fork killiiig tjeatty's cattle. They hbive burned BaroLjit s bridge and lienderson's ranch.
P. KOCH.

independent Extra
COWAN ALIVE.
He to with General Howard's
Command.
Whereabouts of Howard.
[8PBCIAL TO THE UfDB]>SMDBNT ]
BOKKMAN, September 5.
Two mcomte
in $rnm floward's com
MAN#
tbat COWBR !B witli Howard and
$e doing well a«d will recover.
He is shot through the thigh and in the
%ide and wounded ID the bead.
Howard was fourteen mHes thin side ot
Yellowstone lake. This news is reliable.
LAITGHORNË.
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News of a startling and heart-rending character reached
us on Monday. Sixteen inoffensive pleasure-seekers were
reported murdered in the National Park hy hostile Indians.
. . . Who is the cause of all this suffering? On whom
does the responsibility rest? The cause of all our present
troubles with the Nez Perces can be traced back directly to
the General Government
Such a statement at a time when "the Territory is again mourn
ing for her dead" was remarkable for its insight.

While Nez Perce

opinion of the whites had soared to hatred, white opinion of the Nez
Perce—even in such times as the Park killings—was beginning to be
one of understanding.

Only one Montana paper clung to the notion

that the Nez Perce were savage killers—that was the Helena Daily
Herald edited by R. E. Fisk.

But even his opinion changed somewhat,

as will be seen, when the full account of the Cowan party's release
by the Nez Perce was related by Frank Carpenter;
lihite Bird lit a pipe, took a few puffs and passed it
around the circle. Those who smoked it were in favor of
letting us go. I watched them—oh, how eagerly. Never in
iqy life did I experience such delight in seeing a person
smokeI Twice the pipe passed around the circle. Four of
the chiefs smoked the pipe, and three refused!
The council dispersed. White Bird informed me that
nyself and sisters should go home.2°
Carpenter's account is the only known first-hand report of a
Nez Perce council in action during the war.

Some scholars have con

tended that the chiefs did not reach important decisions by majority
rule. In this instance they apparently did and, once the decision was
reached, it was respected by their people.
One of the humorous aspects about newspaper coverage of the
Yellowstone murders—estimated at first between nine and l6 persons—

^^Avant Courier, August 30, I877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, September 8, 1877.
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happened when Ben Stone, a cook for Weikert's party, returned to Virginia
City and read his obituary written

a local friend, T. H. Ifhite.

According to the death notice. Stone was about to be scalped the last
time anybocfy saw him.

27

As the Nez Perce moved eastward in the Park, Col. Samuel Sturgis,
heading six companies of 360 troops, arrived from Clark Fork for the
purpose of establishing a blockade of all passes into Montana Territory.
Scouts informed Chief Joseph of the predicament: to the east was Sturgis,
to the west, Howard, and to the north, the towering and impassable
Absaroka Range. The southern border also was blocked by unfriendly
Bannack Indians who, as noted, had been helping Howard as scouts.
The New North-West, having learned of Sturgis' movements, con
fidently predicted that the Nez Perce were being trapped and would be
brought to defeat;
In view of the bad effect their success and escape would have
on other Indians, and in view of the evil they would probably
hereafter do Montana, this concentration of forces, and the
determination to destroy them, is in the highest degree grati
fying. ¥e are largely indebted for it to the presence of
General Sherman in Montana, who has had the lion in him roused
ty the defiant progress of the Nez Perces and by personal
attention to the movement of troops has raised up an arity on
the four sides of Joseph just when it seemed most probable
that he was about to escape, scot free, except for the blow
Gibbon struck him, and laden with booty, into the great open
country of the hostiles. We wait now hopefully for news that
the Nez Perces have been struck hard and fatally. They are
too brave and dangerous a foe to escape, for their escape
unscathed means still darker days for the border.
The Nez Perce executed three plans designed to confuse the soldiers.

"^Helena Daily Herald (undated clipping).
OP
Beal, ££. cit., pp. I87-I88.
^^New North-West, August 31» 1877.
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First, military scouts traveling between Howard's and Sturgis' lines
were hunted and killed.

This, of course, hampered militaiy intelligence

and created considerable fear for anyone who approached the general
vicinity occupied by the Indians.

Secondly, the Nez Perce ran their

ponies in numerous directions so that no well-defined trail could be
followed as had been the case formerly.
superbly camouflaged.

The trail they did take was

Thirdly, Joseph created a feint to the south

which drew Sturgis' command away from the northern passes.

So well

was this executed that the exact route out of Yellowstone Park taken
by the Nez Perce remains uncertain. General Howard wrote that the
30
entire performance was an example of consummate generalship.
The Nez Perce left the Absarokas on September 9 and turned
northward in the general direction of Billings, Montana.

This was the

country inhabited by the Crow nation, the original destination suggested
by Looking Glass. Not only did the Nez Perce find the Crows unwilling
to help them, but these former allies joined Sturgis in the battle that
was to follow.

Because of the pressure put on the Nez Perce "bj

Sturgis' command—enlarged by reinforcements to more than I4OO cavalry
men, plus two cannons—the Nez Perce realized they had but one hope
left.

That was to head for Canada as the Sioux had done to escape

fighting.

This change of policy about the destination is believed to

have ended the role of leadership played by Chief Looking Glass in
tribal councils, mentioned earlier.

He had been instrumental in plan

ning and negotiating the "peace treaty" with Montanans at Fort Fizzle

^%oward, o£. cit., p. 225.
^^Bozeman Times, September 29, 1877.
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which terminated with the Big Hole attack.

He had persuaded his people

to travel to Crow country where, on arrival, they found themselves
unwelcorned.
Moreover, it may be speculated that if the Nez Perce had followed
Joseph's suggestion of heading westward into the remote and rugged Salmon
River countiy of Idaho, as noted earlier, instead of traversing Yellow
stone Park, it is possible that the war would have ended by default.
General Howard at no time tried to engage the Indians in mountainous
terrain, for he was at a disadvantage with heavy equipment.

One of the

frequent reasons cited for Howard's slowness throughout the campaign
was that for every mount he had for his men, the Nez Perce had four or
five. In order to pursue the Nez Perce into the wilderness of Idaho—
still the largest in the U. S., excluding Alaska—he would have needed
substantial supplies and reinforcements which were not readily available
in western Montana.
The Nez Perce had demonstrated their ability to live off the land
during the difficult passage of the Bitterroot Range.

Had they remained

in the wilderness until winter, then migrated to their homelands to the
north, it is possible that the war would not have been renewed for
several reasons.

First, during the nineteenth century winter campaigns

were almost out of the question, especially in country as far removed
as Idaho Territory.

Secondly, as alreac^ noted, the real causes of the

outbreak in June, 1877, were being understood finally, and editorial
opinion was shifting in favor of the Indians and against the government.
Third, the Nez Perce not only had showed friendship toward the whites,
but th^ had gained considerable respect for their conduct as diplomats,
strategists and fighters, as evidenced in editorials.

No doubt negotiation

1L2
would have been reopened in the spring of I878 and, in the light of what
had happened the previous year, a more equitable solution reached for
both sides.
Not until September, 1877, did Joseph emerge as "chief," a title
which meant that he was no longer just the head militaiy general, but

32
was the chief executive as well.

His people and horses were exhausted.

General Howard had reported passing along the route many fresh graves
of persons who died of wounds from the Big Hole fight.

A Montana volun

teer, J. ¥. Redington, who later became Assistant Adjutant General of
Oregon, reported that the saddest sight he encountered along the trail
was meeting up with an aged Indian, abandoned to die as was Indian
custom in such cases, because the old warrior could not endure the pace
set by his fleeing children.
He volunteered a wan smile at the sight of a human being
^wrote Redington] and made a feeble motion with one arm,
pointing to his forehead. ... I could understand that he
was inviting me to shoot him . . . and end his misery. Instead
of accommodating him, I fed him half of the piece of bread I
had found, which he ate ravenously. He seemed quite disap
pointed when I made a motion of flapping Ky wings to indicate
that I must skiddo and be on ray way.33
Both Indians and whites suffered extensively, and it was because
of the exhausted and weakened condition of his people that Joseph sought
to avoid a fight with Sturgis who, having fresh mounts, made a deter
mined pursuit, while General Howard followed more slowly.
Near Garçron Creek, a tributary of Yellowstone River which is

^^Beal, o£. cit., p. 19ii. Joseph's role was not one of absolute
leadership, strictly speaking. As alreacfy noted, important policy
decisions were reached by voting in council. But it is generally agreed
that he was the architect of the plans that were adopted.
^^Glasgow [kontanj Courier, March 27, 1933*

Ili3

approximately 30 miles west of Billings, the Nez Perce raided a roadhouse and stole a stagecoach which not only added some sorely needed
amusement, but helped in hauling equipment over the rolling prairie
they were traversing.
When the Nez Perce entered the canyon, flanked on both sides "by
cliffs, Sturgis' command arrived after having made a forced march of

60 miles in one dayWhat Sturgis realized that day, September 10,
was that he had been in pursuit of a detachment of warriors, not the
main column of Nez Perce, for two weeks.

This deception had allowed

Joseph t o travel nearly 100 miles without d e t e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to
an account ty Theodore Goldin, a soldier, the colonel was as exhausted
as his men and, on the morning of September 10, he decided to quit the
chase.

But as they were resting in camp, a scout came rushing back

yelling, "Indians! Indians!
Sturgis attempted to follow the Indians up the defile of Canyon
Greek and ran into a crossfire from the bluffs.

Joseph had detached a

rear guard under the command of Looking Glass to cover the retreat of
the main column.

For reasons difficult to understand, Sturgis presumed

he was in a general engagement with the entirety of Joseph's warriors.
He ordered his iiOO men to dismount—a tactical blunder described later
by several soldiers—and proceed on foot to rout the sharpshooters.
As the fighting progressed, Maj. Lewis Merrill requested permission to

^^Josephy, 0£. c i t . , p .

336.

Brady, 0£, c i t . , p . 2lS<.
^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. c i t . , p p . 25^2-257.
^^Brady, loc. cit.

iliU
charge headlong through the canyon to catch the main body of Indians,
but Sturgis, viewing the entire episode from a half mile away, refused
gO
the request.
As sunset neared, "only one warrior, Teeto Hoonod, was doing the
fighting," according to General Howard.

"His horse was hidden, he was

39
behind the rocks holding a line of dismounted soldiers back."
Colonel Sturgis made no immediate attempt the next day to catch
the Nez Perce, but his men rounded up some i^OO horses that had been
abandoned by Joseph in the escape.

The report published in the Helena

Weekly Independent about the battle was as follows:
Gen. Sturgis had a hard fight with the Nez Perces on the
13th. There were a good many killed and wounded and several
hundred head of horses captured.
His own loss was considerable.
The Crows brought into the Agency one hundred and fifty Nez
Perces on the 12th. Several hundred started out at once to
assist Sturgis.
This account came from a Captain Benham in Bozeman.
completely incorrect as to warrant analysis.

It was so

First, the dates were

wrong; the fight occurred on September 10. Secondly, the Crows did
make an attack on the Nez Perce rear guard on September ll;, killing
three Nez Perce, but there is no evidence to support the claim that
l50 of the latter ever surrendered.

In fact, the Crows were quickly

chased off and, according to the Benton Record, one of their warriors
who had been captured was physically beaten, then released.Third,

^^Beal, o£. cit., pp. 195-196.
^^Howard, 0£. cit., p. 261i.
^%elena Weekly Independent, September l6, 1877.
^^Benton Record, September 21, 1877.
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neither side lost heavily in the Canyon Greek fight. Sturgis lost three
men killed, 11 wounded»

There has been considerable confusion about how

many Nez Perce casualties resulted, but it is generally agreed that none
was killed and three were wounded.
On September 29, the Bozeman Times quoted a report by the Crow
agent, George Frost, stating that the Crows had captured approximately
200 Nez Perce pack animals.This may explain the statement made by
Captain Benham that 1^0 Nez Perce had been captured.
The significance of the Canyon Creek clash was that Joseph was
successful in fighting off and again eluding the combined forces, total
ing approximately 7^0 soldiers, of General Howard and Colonel Sturgis,
without losing the life of a warrior»

Such a feat is nothing less than

remarkable, especially in view of the fatigued condition of his people.
Colonel Sturgis, whose men had been left short of rations and
were exhausted by their two-week chase before the fight, did not renew
the pursuit until five days after the battle.

It appeared that Joseph

had no opposition for the remaining 2^0-mlle journ^ north to the
Canadian border.
The Helena Weekly Independent claimed that Sturgis fought several
skirmishes with the Nez Perce along the Musselshell River, which runs
northeastward approximately ^0 miles above Canyon Creek.This report
is not true. The Nez Perce saw no further action until they reached

^^Beal, 0£_. cit., p. 197. Chalmers lists 21 Nez Perce killed
(p. l8l), but this conflicts with reports by Howard and Yellow Wolf.
^^Bozeman Times, September 29, 1877.
b^Helena Weekly Independent, September 27, 1877«
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Cow Island, a fording place of the Missouri River east of Fort Benton,
on September 23.

Sturgis had lingered at his camp on the Musselshell,

awaiting General Howard, who arrived September 20.

A dispatch reached

them that day stating that Col. Nelson A. Miles, commander of Fort Keogh
on the Yellowstone River (since named Miles City), had left two days
previously in pursuit of the Nez Perce with 375 men and two cannons.
Meanwhile, a dozen soldiers led by Sgt. William Moelchert from
Fort Benton prepared breastworks at Cow Island landing to protect sup
plies regularly left there ty river steamers.

According to the Missoulian,

which reprinted a dispatch from Fort Benton, "the Nez Perce crossed at
Cow Island on the 23d.

They attempted to approach the rifle pits in a

friendly manner, but were ordered off by the detachment in charge of the
freight."^^
What happened was one of the most humorous displays of courage
offered against an overwhelming number of warriors.
walked up to Moelchert and asked for supplies.

Nez Perce scouts

He refused, even when

offered payment, although he did give them some bacon and hardtack.
satisfied, the chiefs came forward and helped themselves.

Not

A soldier

scribbled a note to the commander at Fort Benton as follows:
Rifle Pits at Cow Island
September 23, 1877, 10 A.M.
Colonel:
Chief Joseph is here, and says he will surrender for two hundred
bags of sugar. I told him to surrender without the sugar. He
took the sugar and will not surrender. What will I do?
.
Michael Fol^^'

^^Howard and McGrath, 0£. cit., p. 269.
^^Weekly Missoulian, October
^"^Beal, o£. cit., p. 203.
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Whatever the reply might have been is not known, but Foley, who
had acted as interpreter, took Nez Perce women to a supply dump and
treated them to a feast.

The stubborn defenders did not abandon the

rifle pits, however, and the Indians made no attempt to charge them.
That evening shots were exchanged, wounding two whites and one Indian,
when the latter returned to pillage another stockpile.

The Wez Perce

found whiskey and, after a spree, set fire to an estimated 50 tons of
supplies.
When the raiders departed the next morning, a detachment of 36
volunteers and one soldier headed by Maj. Guido Ilges and Lt» E. E.
Hardin from Fort Benton, caught up with the Nez Perce rear guard.
Indians had attacked a wagon train, killing three teamsters.

The

When pre

cision shooting dropped a citizen from his saddle. Major Ilges retired

[lO
his command from the field.
As seemingly insignificant as the Cow Island encounters may
appear, the episode is generally regarded as the prelude to disaster.
The Nez Perce had delayed a day in their flight to Canada, which in
itself was no problem and had been a considerable help in resting and
strengthening for the final push to the border, approximately 75 miles
But on September 2k, Chief Looking Glass, who alreai^ had lost

north.

considerable prestige but who also had performed brilliantly in the rear
guard action against Sturgis at Canyon Creek, was put in command of the
column.

He proposed a series of slow marches.

This plan was vigorously

^^Oscar 0. Mueller, "The Nez Perce at Cow Island," Montana, the
Magazine of Western History, Vol. lii. No. 2, Centennial Edition, pp.
51-52.
^^Helena Weekly Herald, October 11, 1877 «
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disputed by Lean Elk, the leader whom Looking Glass replaced. Lean Elk
urged a rapid march as had been the policy for 1,200 miles.

Joseph

apparently agreed to the suggestion made by Looking Glass, because he
admitted later that a feeling of security had set in with the knowledge
that Howard and Sturgis were far behind. He said he had no idea that
a "fourth artiçr" (the other three were led by Gibbon, Sturgis, Howard)
led by Colonel Mies was in pursuit.
On September 29, Nez Perce scouts killed several buffalo near
Snake Creek, ten miles above the northern spurs of the Bearpaw Mountains
and [|.0 miles south of the Canadian boundary.

Scholars have contended

that the Nez Perce thought th^ already had crossed the border, but this
was not 80.^^

Suhm-Keen, one of the last survivors of the Nez Perce war,

recently clarified the statement

Yellow Wolf that the Indians knew

they had not crossed the international boundary.

He said, quoting Chief

Looking Glass, "we are at least two suns ahead of the soldiers and only
two suns from the 'Land of Redcoats,' so we can rest here awhile.
So a camp was built that afternoon, September 29.
The Nez Perce had delayed too long, and to compound the error,
Chief Joseph, who apparently was not worried, failed to order scouts
to check the progress of the soldiers.

If he had. Colonel Miles would

have been quickly discovered and left far behind in the race for the
border.

Joseph took the responsibility for this most serious tactical

blunder, admitting that a precious victory was taken from his people

^%rady, op. cit., p. 67.
^^Fee, 0£. cit., p. 2^0. This author stated that it was probable
that the Nez Perce thought th^ had crossed the Canadian border.
^^Alcorn, o£. cit., p. 70.
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because there was not sufficient warning to make a final dash north.
Critics of Joseph's generalship note that every time the Nez Perce suf
fered severe punishment in battle, the reason was that no scouts had
been posted.

During the Clearwater battle this was understandable be

cause the tribes were still scattered and were attempting to unite
when Howard attacked.

Strong evidence suggests that the Nez Perce

thought they were at peace with the whites until Colonel Gibbon awoke
them one morning at Big Hole with a fusillade.

The Nez Perce were

doubly certain to keep an almost ceaseless vigil thereafter, making it
nearly impossible for either Howard or Sturgis or both to form any
traps."

R. E. Fisk, editor of the Helena Daily Herald, had made re

peated predictions that an Indian flight across the open countly of
Montana would be quickly halted by soldiers.

Time after time the Nez

Perce had evaded well-designed and well-executed moves by the military.
That the "Elusive Joseph" was brought to bay finally was as much a
surprise to editors as had been his successful evasion.

The Surrender
According to John Finerty, correspondent for the Chicago Times,
Colonel Miles made forced marches for three consecutive days before
reaching the Bear Paw Range east of the Nez Perce position on September
29.

Scouts located the Indian trail.

At 8 a.m. the following day,

Miles' command approached the Nez Perce camp and was discovered while
still several miles distant by Indian buffalo hunters.

When the colonel

reached a bluff two miles from the camp, he contemplated his next move.

^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 207.

1?3
Miles, having served in the Aritçr of the Potomac throughout
its bloodiest campaigns, and having witnesses the heaviest
slaughter at the Death Angle of Spottsylavania, [wrote Finerty]
is not a man who cares much about exposing his officers and
men to death if an object is to be attained.54
Miles ordered his cavalrymen into battle formation and began an
immediate assault.

A few Nez Perce had mounted and were beginning to

flee from camp, but the majority, who had been busy striking their
shelters, milled in confusion attempting to gather belongings and catch
scattered ponies.

Realizing there would not be time to load and start

moving the caravan, Joseph ordered his people into a defensive posture.
Miles' attack—which he described later as one of great powerwas approximately a mile from the Indians and moving at a brisk trot
when Capt. Owen Hale was heard to exclaim, "% God, have I got to go
out and get killed in such cold weather.
Minutes later, on entering the depression formed ty the Snake
Creek drainage, orders were bugled for the charge. Suddenly militaiy
horses were running without ridersj one of the first to tumble was
Captain Hale.

The Indians were now delivering voiles of well-aimed

fire and the charge was slowing as the first soldiers reached the
southwest corner of the camp.

57

Joseph and a group of other warriors who were trying to recover
horses on the bank of Snake Creek opposite the camp were cut off from
their people as the first wave of cavalry struck.

^^Finerty, og. cit., p. 232.
^%eal, 0£. cit., p. 2l5^%oward and McGrath, o£. cit., p. 271.

^7
Beal, loc. cit.

Joseph, unarmed, rode

headlong through a line of soldiers and reached camp safely, although
his horse was wounded and his clothes were ripped in several places by
bullets.^®
Several other warriors, including Yellow Wolf, continued round
ing up their horses and encountered Cheyenne and Sioux Indians who had
joined Miles' command.

According to Yellow Wolf, a Cheyenne chief

halted and assured him that his people would not fire on the Nez Perce.
But later, the narrator said, he saw the Cheyenne kill several Nez
Perce women who were some distance from the camp.^^
The fighting in the camp was furious but short lived, and the
soldiers retreated eastward to an escarpment.

Twenty per cent of the

soldiers who had been engaged were killed or wounded.The Nez Perce
had unquestionably won the first round despite the surprise and being
outnumbered two to one, but they suffered heavily, too.

Although the

number of dead and wounded are not known. Yellow Bull reported that
three chiefs—Pile of Clouds, Ollokot and Toohoolhoolsuit—were killed
in the first day of fighting.What disabled Joseph's people at this
point was the loss of the major portion of their ponies.
To avoid another blood bath. Miles changed his tactics and began
a siege that was to last four more days.

Meanwhile, the Indians dug

trenches—the first time they had been compelled to do so during the
war—using cooking utensils for shovels.

That night it snowed and both

^^Brady, 0£. cit., pp. 67-68.
^^Chalmers, 0£. cit., pp. 2214-225.
'^^'inerty, o£. c i t . , p . 2 3 3 .
Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 273»
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sides, especially the wounded, still lying scattered, suffered terribly.
Said Yellow ¥olf in recounting that tragic night:
A young warrior, wounded, lay on a buffalo robe dying without
complaint. Children crying with cold. No fire. There could be
no light. Everywhere the clying, the death wail.
heart
became fire. I joined the warriors digging rifle pits. All the
rest of night we worked. Just before dawn, I went down among
the shelter pits. . . . Wrapped in a blanket, a still form lay
on the buffalo robe. The young warrior was dead. . . .
Morning came, bringing the battle anew. Bullets from every
where! A big gun throwing bursting shells. From rifle pits,
warriors returned shot for shot. Wild and storny, the cold wind
was thick with snow. Air filled with smoke of powder. Flash of
guns through it all. As the hidden sun traveled upward, the war
did not weaken.
,
I felt the coming end. All for which we had suffered lost!
The "big gun" was a 12-pound Napoleon howitzer, brought up with
other supplies the morning of October 1. It changed the tide of the
battle,according to some observers, but its accuracy was notably poor
and the only persons killed in the Nez Perce trenches ty it were a woman
and child.Its effectiveness was primarily psychological.
It has been ascertained by numerous interviews that the first
white flag shown on October 1 was by the soldiers and not the Nez Perce,
as widely reported.From his position in the rifle pits to the north
of camp. Yellow Wolf said he thought the soldiers did this because th^r
wanted time to eat.^^

But Colonel Miles wished a parl^, and after

several other displays of white flags, a cease fire was ordered. Miles
and Joseph met about half way between their respective breastworks and

^^Chalmers, og. cit., p. 227.
^^Finerty, o£. cit., p. 233•
^^Beal, o£. cj^., p. 217.
^^Ibid., p. 220.
^^Chalmers, op. cit., p. 228.

1^6
the terms of a surrender were presented to the latter.

Joseph wished

to retain half of his firearms for hunting, but this was refused, and
Colonel Miles took the chief prisoner, breaking the truce he had
arranged.

Meanwhile, he sent Lt. Lovell Jerome to "reconnoiter" the

Nez Perce camp to determine their strength.

The Helena Weekly Indepen

dent reported this as follows:
Daring the truce Chief Joseph remained in Miles' tent and
Miles sent some whites into the Indian camp to explore, one
of whom was Lt. Jerome, of the 21 Cavaliy. The Indians held
him, when he attempted to leave, as a hostage for the return
of Joseph.
In the meantime, on the afternoon of the 1st of October,
the fight was renewed and continued during the night and all
day of the 2d. An exchange was then,effected—Lt. Jerome for
Chief Joseph, and the fight went on.
Actually, the fighting had reached a stalemate and, according
to Finerty, the correspondent, not a great deal happened after the
exchange.Miles issued a report, printed in Montana papers, that it
"would cost many lives" to take the Indians by assault.

"I may wear

them out and eventually compel them to give up. They fight with more
desperation than arçr Indians I ever met.
It was about this time that a news dispatch was sent to Washington
and then reprinted in the New York Tribune with an erroneous headline.
It was, in part, as follows:
GENERAL MILES'S VICTORY
The War Department has received a dispatch confirming of
General Miles's fight with the Nez Perces, o . . It is not

Howard and McGrath, op. cit., p. 278.
^^Helena Weekly Independent, October 11, 1877.
"^^Finerty, og. cit., p. 23k.
^Weekly Missoulian, October 19,
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considered certain here that General Miles has sufficient force
to keep the Indians at bay until reinforcements can reach him;
but if he has, it is thought the Indians cannot defend their
position unless cold weather forces the troops to seek their
Winter cantonments.71
Joseph, meanwhile, waited in vain for assistance from Chief Sit
ting Bull of the Sioux nation whose main camp was just north on the
Canadian line. Joseph had sent six warriors to find Sitting Bull, but
they were killed on the way."^^

It is generally believed by scholars

that Chief Sitting Bull refused to move south and attack Miles when word
73
finally reached him from a group of ItO Nez Perce escapees on October 6.
One of the escapees, Suhm-Keen, said that Sitting Bull not only welcomed
the bedraggled band of Nez Perce and treated them well, but, after hear
ing what had happened, started south with warriors.

Enroute he encoun

tered Chief White Bird and another band of escapees who were on foot.
According to Suhm-Keen, "when Sitting Bull saw their sad plight, he
dismounted and stood there and wailed in sympathy for their lost cause.
The reason that Chief Joseph could not hold his position longer
was that on the evening of October h, General Howard arrived with his
command.

Strangely enough, no approximations of the number of soldiers

who were on the battlefield the next cold and snowy morning has been
given, but it is probable that the figure was more than 600.

Owing to

the number of deaths in the Nez Perce camp and those who had escaped,
Joseph probably had fewer than 1^0 warriors in camp on October 1;.

Chief

T^New York Tribune, October 9, 1877.
7%eal, op. cit., p. 219.
"^^Ibid. He claims that Sitting Bull moved north to avoid a fight
with the soldiers.
^Alcorn, o£. cit., p. 71.
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Looking Glass had been killed the previous day as he stepped from a
rifle pit to see if it were true that Sitting Bull was approaching.
yd
The column in the distance turned out to be a herd of bison.
According to Chief Joseph, on the evening of October U a white
truce team invited him to a council with Miles and Howard.

Joseph had

a low regard for Miles ever since the colonel broke the truce on October
1 by arresting him, and there is evidence that the chief was tied and
tossed in a blanket during his captivity.?^ (Lieutenant Jerome, who
was the hostage in the Indian camp at the same time, was treated well,
and food that had been sent by soldiers was delivered).
opinion of Colonel Miles was not the highest, either.

General Howard's
When the first

report was received that Miles was starting his pursuit of the Nez Perce,
an officer in Howard's command, Maj. Lewis Merrill, remarked that Miles
was "something of a glory chaser like Custer."

Howard agreed.

77

Thus, in a sense. Chief Joseph was glad that Howard was available
as a negotiator.

Regarding the first council, he said:

talk understanding^^'

"We could now

General Miles said to me in plain words, 'If you

will come out and give up your arms, I will spare your lives and send
you back to the reservation.
On the morning of October

firing continued.

A cannon ball

"^^Beal, op. cit., p. 219.
^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p. 231.
"^"^Beal, op. cit., p. 201.
"^^Brady, 0£. cit., p. 69. There is confusion about the exact
times of the final councils. Scholars indicate that the whites made
no contact with the Nez Perce until the afternoon of October 5» But
all agree that it was Howard who arranged the first parley in order
to reach terms for an honorable surrender.
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exploded in the part of camp where the women and children had been
sheltered, "burying six of them when a trench caved in.

7'

Four survived.

That afternoon a truce team composed of Nez Perce interpreters
from Howard's command went to the besieged Indian camp to convince the
Nez Perce that Colonel Miles would keep his word about surrender terms.
Chief >Jhite Bird expressed fears that he and the other chiefs would be
executed once their arms were turned over.

The interpreters argued

against this, stating that "those generals said to tell you, '¥e will
have no more fighting. Your chiefs and some of your warriors are not
seeing the truth. ... We will have no more warJ'
This was not a demand for unconditional surrender; it was more
of an armistice so far as the fighting was concerned.

It was an honor

able way for the Nez Perce, unbeaten militarily, to accept the promise
of Colonel Miles and return peacefully to their reservation in Idaho.
But Joseph knew that to surrender his weapons was to put his people at
the mercy of the whites who had broken other promises.
Chief Joseph rode forward that d^ to where General Howard and
Colonel Miles stood waiting on the snow-swept prairie. The chief dis
mounted, walked up to General Howard and handed him his rifle.
motioned him toward Colonel Miles.

Howard

An officer present recorded the

following words by Joseph:
Tell General Howard I know his heart. What he told me
before I have in nçr heart. I am tired of fighting. Our chiefs
are killed. Looking Glass is dead. The old men are all killed.
It is the young men who say yes or no. He -who led the young
men is dead. It is cold and we have no blankets. The little

^^Chalmers, o£. cit., p. 233.
SOlbid., p. 23S.
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children are freezing to death» îfy people, some of them, have
run away to the hills and have no blankets, no food; no one
knows where they are, perhaps freezing to death. I want time
to look for Bçr children and see how many of them I can find.
Maybe I shall find them among the dead. Hear me, my chiefs,
1 am tiredJ my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now
stands, I will fight no more forever.
Colonel Miles replied:

"No more battles and blood.

From this

sun, we will have a good time on both sides, your band and mine."®^
Joseph returned then to his people.
According to J. J. Healy, a correspondent, "Joseph was walking
round about his people talking to the wounded and occasionally addres
sing the warriors by signs and seemed quite unconcerned about his
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defeat."
But Colonel Miles was quite jubilant over the outcome and he sent
a dispatch to Gen. A. H. Terry, commander of the Department of Dakota,
which made no mention of General Howard at all.

His victory announce

ment appeared in the New York Tribune as follows:
Dear General: ¥e have had our unusual success. We made a very
direct and rapid march across the country, and after a severe
engagement, and being kept under fire for three days, the
hostile camp of Nez Perces under Chief Joseph, surrendered at
2 o'clock to-day. , , ,"3
The question was whether the promise made ty Colonel Miles would
be honored.

Chief White Bird decided that it would not, and that night

he escaped to Canada with a small group of followers.
correct.

During the following two years,

White Bird was

I878-I879, the

Nez Perce were

shuttled to camps throughout the mid-West, At Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

®^Beal, 0£, cit., p. 229.

8?

Benton Record, October 12, 1877.

^%ew York Tribune, October 11, 1877,

I6l
half the band contracted malaria and approximately 100 died.
Apparently Colonel Miles' surrender terms were given little heed
by "higher authorities." When General Sherman returned to Washington,
D. C., from Montana, a reporter interviewed him and rendered the follow
ing explanations
It is learned that the Administration is at a loss to determine
what disposition shall be made of Chief Joseph and his band,
now that they have been caught. General Sherman says that
Joseph fought in a Christian manner, not taking scalps or
mutilating the dead, and that he is not in favor of putting
him to death. He is, however, opposed to releasing Joseph
and allowing him to return to Oregon, The chief knows too
much of that country, and may again become troublesome.
Thus, another agreement of honor with a valiant people was broken.

Chief Joseph's summary of this breach of agreement was as followss
I could not bear to see ny wounded men and women suffer any
longer5 we had lost enough alreat^. General Miles had promised
that we might return to our country with what stock we had left.
I thought we could start again. I believed General Miles, or
I never would have surrendered. I have heard that he has been
censured for making the promise to return us to Lapwai. He
could not have made any other terms with me at that time. I
would have held him in check until ay friends (sitting Bull]
came to nçr assistance, and then neither of the generals nor _.
their soldiers would have ever left Bear Paw Mountains alive.
A total of iil8 Nez Perce men, women and children surrendered to
the generals. But escapes continued, and it has been estimated that
between 1^0-233 Indians found refuge in Canada.How many escaped
before the surrender and how many after it remains uncertain.
In the Bear Paw battle. Nez Perce losses have been estimated

^^halmers, op. cit., p. 2hl»
^^New York Tribune, October 23, 1877.
S^Bracfy, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
^^Beal, o£, cit., pp. 230-231.
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between l8 and 23 killed and 1^0 to U6 wounded.®®
casualties at 23 dead,

wounded.®^

Miles listed his

Nearly all the soldiers and the

majority of Indians who suffered wounds, fatal or otherwise, received
them during the first hour of fighting on September 30 during the charge
of the camp.
The New York Tribune commented editorially that "in general the
public has shut its eyes to the disgraceful character of our dealing
with the Indians. Perhaps we may now be stung into temporary wakeful
ness."^^

®®Howard and McGrath, o£. cit., pp. 283-28L.
®%eal, o£. cit., p. 233.
^%few York Tribune, October 23, 1877.

CHAPTER VII

THE NEWSPAPER WAR

Scholars make mention of the criticisms heaped on various govern
mental and military organizations and their respective leaders during
the Nez Perce campaign by journals throughout the nation, but no compre
hensive study has been done to date about this.

Particularly interesting

is that the editors became infuriated with each other on maqy of the
issues; so much so, in fact, that in Montana Phase III of the war was
a sidelight to the editorial battles which arose over Phase II and
continued until well after the Nez Perce had surrendered.
This review will be devoted primarily to Montana papers, for it
was not until the Indians crossed into Montana that the editorial voices
of newspapers—-other than those in Idaho—began booming.
For the sake of clarity, the "newspaper war" will be divided into
five aspects with sub-titles as follows:

"Fort Fizzle Reaction," "The

Volunteers," "Potts' Reputation," "Howard's Reputation," and "Swing of
Opinion."

These divisions are somewhat arbitrary and it is important

to stress that each was intertwined with the others to form a most
complex web which, in places, defies clear description.

For this reason,

it is essential to have an intimate understanding of the war itself—
an understanding many editors then did not have.

Fort Fizzle Reaction
The first newspaper report of the Fort Fizzle debacle, when the
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Nez Perce circ-amvented the breastworks on Lolo canyon, was published in
the New North-West the following day, as follows:
Startling News From West Montana
The Indians in the Rear of Rawn's Command
Escape of the Hostiles
They Pass Within Gunshot of Rawn
Missoula, M.T., July 28, 1; p.m.—The Indians this afternoon threw
a force below Capt. Rawn's position on the Lo-Lo, and fear a
severe battle will be the result. . . .
A courier from Missoula arrived at 11;30 a.m. A letter from
Governor Potts sayss Joseph and his band passed Capt. Rawn's
entrenchment yesterday late in the afternoon and although th^
passed within gunshot not a gun was fired at them.ï
This account was run in the Helena Daily Herald the next day and
the editor, R. E. Fisk, stated that Helena was "bewildered" over the
2
news.

No better word could be chosen, for both the New North-West and

the Herald became indignant over the editorial explanations by the
Weekly Missoulian on August 3> cited earlier. The week following,
Ghaunc^ Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, responded to these charges
as follows:
One of the errors that is being constantly reiterated to
the discredit of Capt. Rawn is that the Indians coming out of
Lo Lo passed within gunshot of his camp. . . „ Col. Jenkins of
Philipsburg, who was in camp all the time of the passage, an
intelligent man of wide military experience, says he did not
see that Rawn could do anything but what he did do—hold the
camp; and J. B. Wilcox, Esq., a Deer Lodger of sound judgment
... has reached the same conclusion. Those who still insist
that Capt. Rawn is a coward, are respectfully referred to the
battle of the Big Hole.3
The charge of cowardice was a most complex one, as evidenced in
an editorial in the Herald as followss

%ew North-West, July 29, 1877.
^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877.
^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877»
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The salaamls of the Mlssoullan, together with the apologies
and. explanations proffered in behalf of the Governor, appear
to the average reader a trifle ludicrous in the light of the
Executive dispatch making a scape-goat of Rawn^ and of the
cowardice charge against the Missoula and Deer Lodge volunteers
implied in his war call of the 31st.%
It should be apparent that the explanations given to newspapers
apart from Missoula by the governor and Barbour had failed to clarify
the actions taken by Captain Rawn during the Fort Fizzle passage. As
noted earlier, it is probable that a "peace treaty" had been made with
the Nez Perce on July 28„

Captain Rawn and the governor were apparently

in disagreement about this policy| the latter was extremely anxious to
avoid a suicidal fight that would endanger homesteads in the Bitterroot
Valley, so he retired from the field, as did some 100 volunteers. This
move so weakened Rawn's defense that he had little choice but to comply
with the secret agreement reached with the Nez Perce»

It is certain,

however, that neither Governor Potts nor Captain Rawn made argr public
explanation about what had transpired during the negotiations with the
Indians. The reason seems to be that both realized that emotions were
at such a pitch about an "Indian invasion" that ary announcement about
a peace agreement with Chief Looking Glass would have angered Montanans
in general and newspaper editors in particular.
The only inference about the possibility that a peace pact had
been made appeared in the Heralds
One conference had been held and another set for the next day.
Could it be possible that while this conference was going on,
the Indians were successfully evading the troops, or had the
conference settled upon the conclusion that the fugitives should
be allowed safe transit without the ceremony of being interned.^

^Helena Daily Herald, August 6, 1877.
^Helena Daily Herald, July 30, 1877.
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Meanwhile, editorial criticism spread across the Territory. The
two weeklies in Bozeman (the Avant Courier and the Bozeman Times) became
embroiled over a local meeting called the "Montana Conference—The Indian
Question."^ The Rocky Mountain Husbandman, a farm journal in Diamond
City, Montana, came to the conclusion that Captain Rawn and his men were
drunk, which the Missoulian brushed off by stating that some "wag" evi
dently experimented on the editor to see how much nonsense he could
hold.?
Another somewhat amusing account, which originated with the
Missoulian and was subsequently printed in other Montana papers, was
brought to light. Apparently "three fighting parsons" had taken up arms
during the Fort Fizzle affair and volunteered their services in defend
ing the Bitterroot bridge east of Lolo canyon»

The stoiy noted that
O

"Rev. Russel came all the way from Deer Lodge with his war paint on."
The newspaper war, however, was anything but a light-hearted
matter and, as the weeks passed, it grew in intensity. Two factions
formed. The New North-West and the other paper owned by Mills, the Butte
Miner, joined forces against the Missoulian. The latter gained some
sympathy from the Herald, not so much because they were in agreement on
the issues at stake, but more because they had a common eneny—Mills.
The Miner claimed that their editorial foe, the Missoulian, had joined
forces with the Herald. But Barbour refuted this:

^Avant Courier, August l6, I877.
"^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877.
^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877°
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The Butte Miner says that the Herald and Missoulian have
resolved themselves into a mutual admiration society. We
do not admire the Herald—we read it. Right or wrong, it
shows ability, force and elegant diction. We know of but
one end the Miner is fit to subserve.^
One of the curious aspects of this "alignment" was that a major
contender, Mills, was unusually quiet during the initial weeks of the
controversy. Then on September 7, he opened fire by citing an editorial
which appeared in the Missoulian on July 13—which has already been
noted in a previous chapter—and concludeds
In less than a month the Missoulian has reaped of the tares
it has sown. Joseph's band of Nez Perces—a band which we
believe was outrageously swindled and mistreated in Idaho
under the same diabolical policy of dishonesty and plunder
advocated by the Missoulian—-appeared in force on the Lo Lo
trail demanding exit to the buffalo country. . . . Then the
Missoulian cried lustily for "helpJ" ... The Indians professed
peaceable intentions toward the people of Bitter Root and they
in turn were seemingly satisfied to let them go, the volunteers
were ordered to return.
. . . As publisher of a public journal we were mortified to
see the Missoulian pile upon its mountain of sin the final,
contemptible and degrading reproach of ingratitude, and in
rebuking that have given it opportunity to squirt its venom
at us for denouncing its villainous advocacy of robbery. . . .
His intimation that we have disparaged any people of Missoula,
except in identifying them with him as "a press and people,"
is to the best of our recollection totally untrue; and in view
of personal declarations to us that the Missoulian does not
represent the sentiments of that people we very cheerfully on
their behalf retract the offensive remark associating them.
Mr. Barbour has made friends in this county. He has been
entirely successful in alienating them. . . . For some petty
or malicious purpose, incomprehensible save on the theory that
Joseph scared him out of his seven senses and left his reason
a wreck on the shores of Lo Lo, he refuses and rebels against
decent treatment of the Deer Lodge county volunteers and adheres
to his dishonest plan of swindling Indians—the practice of
which has been the prime cause of nearly all Indian troubles
and which within a few weeks has left scores of yet unsodded
graves in our fair land.ïO

%eekly Missoulian, September 7, 1877.
^%ew North-West, September 7, 1877.
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Barbour's reply was a classic;
FRIENDSHIP AND RESPECT
The modest man who runs the Northwest has persuaded himself
that, when he has a cutaneous eruption, the people of Deer
Lodge county ought to scratch. ... It is possible that the
people of Deer Lodge county have lost respect for their organ;
that thqy have become weary with maintaining magisterial vanity
and overbearing dogmatism; that they have tired of the splenetic
nature that is continually fermenting jealousies and depriving
the most populous county of the Territoiy of its proper right
of political influence. ... We challenge any living being to
produce a line from this paper derogatory to the Deer Lodge
volunteers. Mr. Mills has not been able to do this. He stands
before the world a falsifier and perverter of holy truth. He
gets mad. He gibbers nonsense. He leaves the Deer Lodge
volunteers to their fate, and the gratuitous insults of Miss
oula people unretracted, and howls a screed against diabolism
of those who rob Indians. He takes the noble red man to his
perturbed bosom.H
Secretaiy Mills was no longer on the sidelines of the newspaper
war.

Whçr he chose to stay out of the thick of it so long is a matter

of speculation, but it should be noted from Barbour's embittered reply
that the Deer Lodge volunteers were very much involved in the dispute.
That was the command which Secretaiy Mills organized without authority
on July 20, as already noted. This fact was never brought out in edi
torial columns, but Mills was to be assailed for his triple role as
"editor," "Secretary," and "Adjutant General,"
The Missoulian began referring to Mills as "Corporal,Barbour
left Missoula during the week of September 21 on a "three-week pilgrimage"
to Philipsburg, Deer Lodge, Butte and Helena to rally support for his
cause.
The Herald, meanwhile, decided to expand on the matter of Mills'

^^Weekly Missoulian, September llj., 1877,
^^Weekly Missoulian, September 21, 1877»
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rank. Fisk wrote that.
Corporal Mills is the way the Missoulian prints it» Correct,
we believe, so far as any rank attained, or title conferred, 'byreason of amy service performed. « . , By the grace of our
glorious Commander-in-Chief of Militia—by whom is meant His
Excellency the Governor of Montana—Mills was lifted at one
swoop from Corporal to Adjutant-General.^3
It would appear that the fighting had reached a deadlock, but the
Bozeman Times threw its weight with the Missoulian in a most interesting
appraisal of the newspaper war itself:
A controversy has been going on for some time in the New
Northwest and Missoulian, between their two editors. Mills and
Barbour, growing out of the recent invasion of Missoula county,
etc, M-th the issues the people of Eastern Montana have no
interest, but to a looker-on the battle affords some interest.
... ¥e are equally friendly to both. Candor, however, com
pels us to say that Barbour is developing considerable ability
as a writer and editor, and is showing himself to be a full
match, at least, for Adjutant-General Mills
The editor then made some caustic remarks about Mills' rank and
concluded, ^'¥e shall insist that Mills be still called 'Captain,' [of
the Home GuardJ and that he shall not be reduced from his rank to Corporal,
or elevated to a 'General.' In the latter capacity he recently failed."
It would appear that the editorial tide was against Mills.

A most

unexpected editorial appeared in the Avant Courier, a paper that had
recently opposed its competitor, the Bozeman Times, as noted, supporting
the criticism against Mills. But the Courier stated that the criticism
had been carried too far, and that "men of such experience in editorial
work as on the Herald, Times, and Missoulian should have learned ere this
1

that 'people who live in glass houses should not throw stones.'"

l^Helena Daily Herald, September 2I4,
^^Bozeman Times, September 22, 1877.
^%vant Courier, November 1, 1877.
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Ghauncey Barbour, who was in Helena after visiting Deer Lodge,
sent the following dispatch concerning the reputation of Mills who,
just prior to the Fort Fizzle affair, has been a close associate and
friend;
The impression has gained ground, even in his own baliwick,
that the Deer Lodge apostle of gush is a mortal man and vul
nerable. The impression has gained ground that the querulous
disposition and inflated vanity of this man has ever stood in
the way of progress of the place where he has located. ..
To summarize the editorial positions taken after the Fort Fizzle
affair, on the one side was the New North-West and the Butte Miner.
Strongly opposed to them were the Missoulian and the Bozeman Times.
Somewhat favoring the latter camp were the Helena Herald and the Avant
Courier. Unquestionably the individual to suffer the greatest personal
criticism in the press war was Mills.

The Volunteers
The authorization of Montana militia has been reviewed in depth
alreacfy.

As noted, the two proclamations issued devolved on Captain

Rawn's request just prior to the negotiations with the Nez Perce at
Fort Fizzle on July 28, 1877. Again the question of whether a peace
treaty was formulated at that time comes up. When the governor issued
the second proclamation on July 31, he sent a dispatch from Deer Lodge
to Helena stating that the militia should proceed quickly to the Bitterroot Valley,

Shortly afterward, he sent a second dispatch to the com

mander of the Helena militia. Captain Fuller, requesting him to "suspend
further movements until further orders.Potts explained that he

l^Weekly Missoulian, October 5, 1877*
Helena Daily Herald, July 31, 1877.
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•wished to consult the War Department before taking what -was earlier
termed "offensive" action against the Indians. Fisk, who had the lo'west
regard for the governor of any editor in the Territory, put the blame
for the confusion on the War Department, stating that the government
"fears volunteers more than Indians."^®

The Mssoulian, two days later,

praised the willingness of volunteers—particularly those from Philipsburg—to respond in a time of need.

Barbour explained further, however,

that at no time were there more than 2l6 defenders at Fort Fizzle.
Barbour failed to mention anything about the Deer Lodge company
of militia, and Mills became angered. Mills wrote:

"We fail to find

one word of thanks for the men of this county who went to their
[Missoula's] assistance and paid every penny of expenses of ordinary
travelers and purchasers. That is not what they or their friends had
20
a right to expect."

As it had done earlier, the Butte Miner supported

Mills on this issue and assaulted the Missoulian and the people of
21
Missoula for their lack of hospitality toward the militia,

Barbour

replied that same week:
The Butte Miner reiterates its slander on Missoula people
that th^ were after Butte pockets instead of help, and mentions
two instances where men were charged hotel and stable bills. .
.. The Miner regards the irruption [sic] of Nez Perces into
the Territory as exclusively a Missoula county fight. If
Missoula had taken that narrow view, it would have fortified
in its stone blocks.22

^%elena Daily Herald, August 1, 1877»
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877.
^%ew North-West, August 10, 1877.
^^Butte Miner, August llj., 1877.
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877.
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That Barbour did not refute the charges regarding the payment
of hotel and stable bills suggests that volunteers were obliged to
meet their own financial expenditures in resisting the Indians,
According to a bond drawn up by Capt. G» P» Iflggins of Missoula,
and discovered recently in a file of letters to Governor Potts, the
people of Missoula were issued Springfield muzzle-loading rifles
(of Civil War vintage), a bayonet, 20 rounds of fixed (paper wrapped)
ammunition, and a screw driver—all for $30, The signator was re
quired to return his weapon and unused ammunition when the crisis had
passed.Thus, it was an expensive proposition for a volunteer to
volunteer.
Moreover, the Springfield muskets—which required 20 to 30
seconds to reload—were inferior in fire power to the repeating
D&nchester rifles which many N e z Perce c a r r i e d , W i n c h e s t e r
lever-action repeaters (Models 1866, 1873) were capable of being
loaded with ll| rounds and fired with rapidity.
There is little doubt that a number of white ranchers also
had Winchesters. But the majority of townspeople did not. Mills
sent three telegrams from Deer Lodge on July 28 in a frantic attempt
to secure breech loaders. The first was as follows:

^^Bond by Co P. Higgins, July 12, I877, Personal Correspond
ence to Gov. B, F, Potts (Manuscript Case 978.6, N k9 P, Historical
Society of Montana).

^^Howard and McGrath, og. cit., p. Ih6,
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Deer Lodge
July 28, 1877
8:37 a.m.
To Ben R. Dittes
Helena, M,T<.
No news—ascertain iimiediately how inary breech loaders can
be purchased and price. One hundred more men than guns reacfy
to move. If hostiles evade Missoula will cut them off.
25
Jaso H, Mills, Sec.
The reply by Dittes, who was acting commander in Helena while
the governor was in Missoula, was penciled at the bottom of this tele
gram and states:

"No breechloaders for sale here—Power tho will have

twelve Winchesters Tuesday (July 31), can't give price yet."
The second telegram to Dittes from Mills, filed two hours later,
changed the request from breech loaders to needle guns, which were a
forerunner of the Winchester repeating rifles. The telegram statess
"Call in every needle gun in or about Helena and forward them and all
the guns you can—Call on people to give up private guns."
Apparently Dittes sent back another negative reply, for Mills
sent a third telegram the next hour, 11:10 a.m., stating, "Have prin-

27

cipal citizens organize committee to secure guns be prompt."

These telegrams are important for two reasons. First, they
indicate the military weakness of Montana militia, which may have had
influence on the decision not to fight at Fort Fizzle,

Secondly, they

indicate the unusual role a newspaper editor played during the Nez

^^Telegram from James H. Mills to Ben R. Dittes, July 28, 1877°
Microfilm, "Indian Excitement," Montana State University Library. The
telegrams cited have not been published previously.
Z^Ibid.
27lbid.
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Perce campaign»
In addition to being poorly equipped^ there is évidence suggest
ing that the volunteers were ineffectual fighters. Sutherland wrote in
the New York Heralds
To add to the bitterness of seeing the people and department
commanders almost indifferent to our success, bands of armed
men, styling themselves volunteers, have every now and then
come in a cloud of dust to our assistance, and when assigned
some position in the line not to their liking or promised that
within two days we should overtake the Indians and they should
have a chance to fight, they would play us the Arab trick of
folding their tents and silently stealing away» Undoubtedly
there were some intell^ent and courageous men among these
gangs—gangs which we [Howard's command] sampled from three
Territories--but taken as a boc^, the frontiersmen volunteer
of to-day is an undoubted fraud, having almost as little pluck
or principle and as meagre in conception of discipline as a
backwoods school master»^
Bravery was a frequent topic in the newspaper war, for there were
suggestions of cowardice in news accounts several timeso

Even in the

Big Hole battle, which was regarded as a heroic onslaught by soldiers
and volunteers, the Helena Daily Herald reported that "several of the
men commenced to run, when the old veteran (Jolonel Gibbon} cried out,
'Don't run, men, or I will stay right here alone.' The men halted at
once, lessened their pace, and fell back in an orderly manner.
The Missoulian used the matter of bravery to assail the New North
west and the Butte Miner, both of which were critical about the conduct
at Fort Fizzle. Barbour wrote: "The volunteers in the Big Hole fight
are now styled the brave Montana volunteers [all 3k who participated
were from Missoula and Bitterroot ValleyJ.

9R

What would they have been

New York Herald, September 10, 1877.

^%elena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877»
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if they had ran?"^^
The Batte Miner replied:

but we refer to the oolumng of

the Miner to prove that we have given credit ty speaking of the men who
participated so gallantly in the Big Hole battle as the brave Bitter
Rooters
The Bozeinan Times, meanwhile, commented editorially that there
was friction between Montana militia and General Howard before the Big
Hole battle*

The editorial stated:

An order of Gen. Howard's disgusted the Deer Lodge volunteers^
as it is reportedp and they returned home. They were ordered to
march in the rear or retire altogether» For this order the Deer
Lodge volunteers and the people of Beaverhead county denounce
Gen. Howard.32
Two days later^ however^ a letter to the editor of the Helena Daily
Heralds signed by 13 Deer Lodge volunteersrefuted the charges made
about General Howard's orders.

It was stated that the volunteers became

separated from Howard's command tgr mistake. The letter praised the
generalg noting: "In our intercourse with Gen. Howard, we found him
kind, courteous and gentlemanly.

We regret that any reports should have

been circulated to the contrary and trust that this statement may have
the effect of preventing any such in the future.
Editorial brickbats continued to be hurled over the issue of the
volunteers during September, 1877°
again and stated?

Mills reviewed the Fort Fizzle affair

"Then the Missoullan cried lustily for 'help!' No

3'Weekly Missoulian, August 21)., 1877.
^^Butte Miner, August 28, 1877.
^^Bozeman Times, August 28, 1877°
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 25, I877.
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voice so loud as the Missoulian; no reliance so steadfast in the 'brave
miners* of Deer Lodge county»
with a vengeance.
a glutton,""'

Barbour's policy had come home to him

He bellowed and blubbered and gnawed the file like

To make matters worsej, this editorial appeared while

General Sherman was visiting Missoula on his tour of Montana, Fisk,
editor of the Helena Daily Herald^ rallied to the defense of Missoula
and heaped insults on Millss
The offending of the General is contained
, o in these
words; "The Territory is so large and the ranches so scattered
that I am not astonished that the people did not assemble as
volunteers to fight the Nez Perces»"
Mills dashes back at Sherman, and sayss
"The General assumes what is not a facto The people did
assemble as volunteers to fight the Nez Perces. . , » If
General Sherman has expressed astonishment that the War Depart
ment refused to authorize or subsist these volunteers who had
assembled from the sparsely settled Territory he describes# he
would have given utterance to the sentiment the situation
demanded."
Now that's a squelcher on Shermano It finishes up the whole
batch of military incompetents and upstarts—from Captain to
General-in-Chiefo Hurrah for Millsl Harrah for Montana's
Adjutant General of MilitiaS
Actually Mills was correct in his assessment^ as has been noted
about the volunteers responding to the governor's proclamations^

What

is important about this editorial^ other than the fact it was a fight
between the most powerful editors in the Teridtoiyj was that the mili
tary was now involved in the volunteer question.
In October, the d^ that the Nez Perce surrendered, the Mlssoulian
ran two poems on the front pages as followss

-^^New North-West., September 7? 187?„
^^Helena Daily Herald, September 10^ 1877.
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BIG HOLE
Col. Gibbon to Gov. Potts.
We've had a hard fight
and I'm soriy to say
They've whipped us out quite
And the devil's to pay.
I wait at Big Hole
For an answer from you,
And confess, on iqy soul,
I don't know what to do.
Gov. Potts to Col. Gibbon.
Licked again? Tour command
Nearly turned inside out?
Did Chief Joseph take a hand,
Or was Howard about?
Tour dispatch,
I answer the
If you're near
Tou'd better

trusty soul,
minute:
a big hole, ,
crawl in it.^

As is evident, the command which surprised the Nez Perce the
fateful morning of August 9 were no longer regarded as brave victors.
Despite the fact that the Indians were seriously crippled. Colonel
Gibbon and his men had failed to strike a mortal blow to the slumbering
enençr.

One of the final discussions of the volunteer question was by

the Missoulian, which summarized the situation:

"There has been much

talk about cowardice and inefficiency in this whole Nez Perce business,
both as to the military and citizen volunteers. We have always been
prepared to admit that no great number of men could be got together
without finding some who would show the white feather. . . .

The

editorial concludes that the critics did not take a rational view toward

^Weekly Missoulian, October 5, 1877.
37lbid.
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Howard or the citizens and that the merit due them was not given.
As adjutant general. Mills bore much of the brunt of the general
criticism. But so did Governor Potts, who was comander in chief of
the militia.

Potts'Reputation
Proceedings to impeach Governor Potts in May,

I877, failed,

as

noted, but Fisk seemingly refused to acknowledge the decision made by
President Hayes.

He assailed the Indianapolis Journal in July for voic

ing approval of the President's plans to make a political tour.^®

Beyond

aqy question, Fisk was the most outspoken Montana editor against both
the federal and territorial administrations.

Owing t o the fact that t h e

governor was in a delicate position after the impeachment proceedings,
the Nez Perce war that followed a month later was more than just a
difficult task for him. His reputation was at stake.
The Missoulian, giving a first-hand account of the Fort Fizzle
affair, explained that the governor was "heart sick" on arrival in
Missoula because the War Department had refused authorization to raise
a volunteer force. It was stated further that the governor "did not
feel that we were in duty bound to punish the enemies of the government
further than to see that life and property in our midst was protected.
In another editorial the same day, August 3» it was stated that
Governor Potts had counseled moderation.

Praise was given to both the

governor and Captain Rawn for not allowing a fight that would have left

38Helena Daily Herald, July 12,

1877.

39weekly Missoulian, August 3, 1877.
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"the fairest portions of this county .

pillaged »

The first editorial response about this came from the Herald on
August 7» claiming that the governor's conduct was deplorable. Fisk
stateds
The General-in-Chief
We endorse without stint the Missoulian"s estimate of our
Governor during the impending danger, vizs "He could be of more
service in the rear . *
The exhaustive services he had per
formed "in the rear," the panic which had pervaded his ponderous
person; his proclamations, defiant alike of the progress of
events and the rules of grammar, issued when needless and re
voked when required, his pitiful, tremulous appeal for Gibbonj
his indignation at Rawn for not achieving impossibilities; his
assumptions and disclaimers of authority; his weakness of his
hopes and his fears; his fitfulness of purpose; his ignorance
of his own mind; his forwarding of unnamed supplies to the
front; his conduct of the omitted "flank attack," and his
departure—"after dinner"; all these, if chronicled in a style
befitting so stately a theme, will become a classic in military
criticism.
The same day this editorial was published, the Butte Miner noted
that the general response to the governor's call for militia had been
poor and that in "Bozeman the people are organized . „ „ but they do
not favor the plan for a campaign at the expense of the Territory."^2
Reaction was strong to Fisk's charges against the governor. In
Deer Lodge a public session was conducted and a resolution passed,
endorsing the actions taken by Governor Potts during the Fort Fizzle
affair. The Missoulian stated that the Herald "cannot be satisfied
with anything that Gov, Potts does."^^ Four days later, August 21,

^Qlbid.
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 7, 1877°
^^Butte Miner, August 7, 1877.
^^Weekly Missoulian, August 17, 1877.
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the Butte Miner joined in support of the governor and, in the unusually
lengtty editorial, criticized Fisk roundly:
We have been led to these reflections by a newspaper war that
has for some time been going on in the Herald, or rather a news
paper attack, for it cannot be dignified with the name of war,
since it is limited to virulent and repeated attacks on the part
of the assailant, while the Governor's position prevents him
from making any reply. . <, <, When the Indians were coming over
Lo Iio trail the Governor called out the militia of two counties,
knowing very well that his hands were tied by the lack of all
authority to bind either the United States or Montana for the
subsistence of troops in the field. But how else could he have
proceeded? , . . for it [the Herald ]not only blames him {Governor
PottsJ for not sending volunteers to the Big Hole, what he wished
to do and might have done but for the rabid opposition of the
Herald, but it charges him with all the calamities that have
befallen our soldiers and citizens in consequence of the Big Hole
fight, calamities that arose from a defence [sicj so brave and
heroic on the part of the Indians that as warriors and men they
have won our respect and admiration, however anxious we may be
to see them exterminated as murderers and savages,
¥e are quite willing to admit that the efforts of the Governor
to oppose the march of the Nez Perce Indians through Montana did
not lead to any satisfactory result, but their failure was due
to a combination of perplexing circumstances that might well
have puzzled a cooler and more experienced Indian fighter«bb
Then came one of the most unusual events of the newspaper war.
General Sherman had just arrived in Helena and the Herald welcomed him
with two full columns of editorial praise.

But also run on the editor

ial page was a charge by Fisk that the governor had censored the Herald.
How this was done, if it was done, is uncertain, but the editorial was
satirically written:
GIVE THâNKS
The cordial thanks of the Capital City of Montana are due
and are hereby tendered to His Excellency the Governor of Montana,
for the strategy which seems to signalize his mastery and man
agement of his personal and official "organ" on the occasion of
the visit here of the General of the Amy, A more malicious and
vindictive Bourbon print has not in times past and recent eaked

^^Butte Miner, August 21, 1877,

181
out of existence from the crums and "cold vittals" shook from
the public table. The files of the paper are sure witnesses
of a depravity never before eqiialled in the number and frequency
of aggravated assaults upon the constituted civil and military
authorities of the nation. Its columns have only at intervals
ceased to teem with alternate denunciations and ridicule of
Sheridan, Teriy, Crook, Gibbon, Howard, and other grand soldiers,
and if the General-in-chief has himself more recently escaped
its venomous assaults, it is owing probably to the restraining
hand now uplifted in warning gesture for the time being to
desist. We therefore thank, and thank again^ the head of civil
government in Montana for the gratifying service done this
community and the Territory in muzzling, for a temporary period
at least, the rabid demonstrations of his personal and official
organ.42
Other Montana newspapers tended to ignore this issue altogether,
except in one instance where the Butte Miner reprinted the editorial and
reiterated its stand favoring Governor PottsThe Miner summarized
its stand in a very short editorial on August 28, stating that "the
Helena Herald never loses an opportunity of carping at Governor Potts nh7
The Herald fired back, regarding the issue of censorship:
DECLINED, WITH THANKS
The Butte Miner—"one of ny (Mills\ papers, both weekly"—
courts our notice. Excuse us, if you please, on the subject of
your master. ¥e cannot stop to bandy words with a weakling which
adopts second-hand the stereotyped platitudes of the other twin
New North-West]. We have seen the same old duds passed around
rom one Cheap uohn print to another, which compulsory printing
subsidies pays for liberally at so mich a line. Our Butte
contemporary had better settle its controversy with the Missoulian
(regarding Fort Fizzl^, about which we have no opinion, and
address the balance of its time and occupy the rest of its space
to lecturing Howard.^"

E

The matter of Potts' reputation received some national attention

^^Helena Daily Herald, August 22, 1877»
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877»
^^Butte Miner, August 28, 1877°
^^Helena Daily Herald, August 23, 1877«
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when the Chicago Tribune published comments made by leading military
officers who were angered about the militia in Montana»

But for the

most part, the war against the governor's conduct and reputation was
waged by one editor, Fisk,

He was denounced by his contemporaries,

as indicated, and the governor became one of the most popular terri
torial administrators in Montana, He held office for 13 years»
Howard*5 Reputation
Several controversies concerning General Howard received atten
tion from newspapers outside of Montana Territory»

Scholars have

mentioned frequently the confusing dispute that was caused by an
article which appeared in the Chicago Tribune regarding the surrender
of Chief Joseph, It will be remembered that the chief handed his
rifle to Howard, but Howard indicated to him that the surrender should
be made to Colonel Mlles»

"When newspaper accounts failed to mention

anything at all about General Howard's part in the surrender, his
li9

officers felt cheated and a bitter controversy arose»

The criticism of the general during the early phase of the war
by Idaho and Oregon papers was, for the most part, disregarded by
editors. Before the campaign moved from Idaho, the New York Tribune
commented that "Gen» Howard seems to be doing good execution in the
Indian country*
Editorial opinion in Montana was to become sharply divided. The
first to hurl insults was Mills, who reviewed the Idaho fighting and

^%eal, 0£« cito, pp. 232-233•
^%ew York Tribune, July 9, 1877.
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stated that Howard let "the handful of Indians walk around him and drive
his 'trap' into rifle pits.Howard's ambulatory pace became another
issuBj, as did the report from Lewiston^ IdahOj, on July 10 by the general
claiming that "he would pursue the Indians and kill them if it was
possibleJ and that he would take no prisoners»"
On July 16g the following report appeared in the Heralds
Washington^ July iL—There is a report that Howard's inefficiency
has led the administration to consider the advisability of
superseding him by the appointment of Crook in command of the
Department of the Columbiao A cabinet officer, this evening,
said his lips were sealed upon the subject» It is possible that
Howard may be superseded tomorrowo^3
When Howard's command arrived in Montana Territory^ the Mlssoulian
carried an account explaining the reasons for the apparent slownesso
Sutherland paid tribute to the general for getting his command across
Lolo pass in the time they did»^^

When Howard's command began moving

down the Bitterroot Valley toward the Big Hole^ he sent a letter regard
ing newspaper criticism to Governor Potts which was widely published.
He wrotep in parts
Bitter Root Valley g Montana
Augo
l877'='"9 Pom®
To Gov. Pottss
o o c. I notice "bj the local papers that I am set down as
entrenching on Snake river; that the battle in which the Indians
were beaten „ » » is discredited, and the columns of the papers
are billed with personal abuseo The effect of this treatment
is to create distrust on the part of your people, with whom I
want the heartiest cooperation . , „ The anxieties of loved ones

^iNew North-West, July 13, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, July Ih, 1877.
^^Helena Daily Herald, July 16, 1877.
^^Weekly Mlssoulian, August 10, 1877.
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at home are great enough alreacfy without having them aggravated
by stories of inefficiency and slowness that are known to us
so palpably false as hardly to need contradiction.
0. 0. Howard
Brig. Gen. Commanding^
The majority of Montana editors agreed with the general's comments.
But the two papers under Mills, the New North-West and the Butte Miner;»
stood firm in their protests. Mills^ who had been critical the previous
month, stated in his editorial of August 2it;
We have been loath to criticize and have refrained from
criticism of his campaign. .. . Yet with all these things the
expression is forced unwillingly but deliberately from us that
his caiîçjaign has been a miserable failure^, gives no promise of
success, and that in our belief there will be no efficient
service by his command until he is superseded by an officer
qualified for Indian service.
The Hew North-West quoted a story from the Chicago Tribune of August 2$
which stated "there is no intention of retiring Gen. Howard from coamand,
as the Secretary of War thinks he is doing the utmost possible with the
few troops he has."

^7

A curious incident occurred shortly after this article appeared.
The Bozeman Times, which had probably been in contact with General
Sherman who was just returning from Yellowstone Park, released the
following news in an editorials "We learn^ from good authority^ that
Gen. Howard has been superseded in the command of the troops . . . now
somewhere in the National Park, by the appointment of Lieut. Col. Gilbert,
who has gone to take command.

^^Avant Courier, August l6, 1877.
^^ew North-West, August 2kg 1877°
tn
New North-West, August 31, 1877»
^^ozeman Times, September 6, 1877.
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How s'ach an erroneous aeeount got into print is difficult to
imagine, but it should be noted that just previously General Sherman
had exchanged four dispatches with General Howard suggesting that he

step dowi from command."'
But the editorial critics

in Montana

about their attitude toward Howardo

and elsewhere were censured

The Hew York

Times

ran an editorial,

reprinted in the Missoulian^ which satirically stateds
General Howard hag commanded the troops that are operating
against the Nez Perces Indians. His failure to outmarch, with
his hea^vy Infantry, the savage horsemen, has finally opened
the eyes of the public. "With his handful of men he has not
yet exterminated the Indians, although he has been in the field
almost as long . . . as the gallant Custer had been when his
force was annihilated by the Sioux. People in this part of the
country can form a much better judgment as to how an Indian
campaign should be conducted than can old arïiy officers in the
field. All General Howard had to do is to surround the Nez
Perces, and to kill or capture the whole ef them. That he did
not do so within the first twenty minutes after he began his
campaign is a convincing proof that he is utterly unfit to
hold any command. . . .5o
When General Howard later returned to his home in Portland, Oegon,
a large crowd turned out to welcome him and the city fathers made speeches
which reviewed both the events of the war and the criticisms

of

the press.

A number of resolutions were adopted which characterized the newspaper

criticism as %njust and 'wicked." The last
regret the contemptuous attacks

of

of

these stated that "we

his maligners as deserçdng only

of

public rebuke to be followed by an eternal silence.
General Howard--whc had fought in six major battles of the Civil

S^See p. 132.
^^eekly Mlssoulian, October 5, I877.
^IPortland [Oregon] Daily Bee, November 11, 1877.
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War, had lost his right arm when wounded twice at the Battle of Fair
Oaks, and who had for a short time on July 1, 1863, commanded the
entirety of the Union forces at Gettysburg—was never relieved of
command. In I878, he fought a decisive war against the Bannack Indians«
Scholars in general view Howard's campaign against the Nez Perce as
mediocre.

But because of the 1,300 miles of difficult terrain his

command traversed and because the Nez Perce had proved themselves as
ranking among the finest warriors on the continent, it is doubtful
that any commander who might have replaced Howard would have done
better.

Colonel Sturgis, it -will be remembered, failed completely

despite the fact he had fresh men and horses.

Above all else, General

Howard was very much liked and greatly respected by the troops under
him.

Swing of Opinion
It would be an oversimplification to regard the opinions of
whites—generally reflected in newspaper editorials—toward the Nez
Perce as swinging from bad to good.
is what happened.

But in the most broad terms, that

The turning point in what has been described as a

tide of opinion came just after the Fort Fizzle affair, August 2-3»
1877, when the newspaper war in Montana was beginning over the conduct
during that event. Most striking in this survey of Montana newspapers
is the lack of criticism against the Nez Perce during the editorial
battles about the volunteers. Governor Potts and General Howard. The
flood of opinion against the Nez Perce before the Fort Fizzle affair
has been reviewed at length already, as has the turning point of that
tide. As noted, the Missoulian of August 3 was among the first to show
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outward respect for the Nez Perce. This was followed

a remarkable

editorial in the Butte Miner on August 7 which, in reviewing the Fort
Fizzle events, said that "the Gallatin people will most likely think

fs9
with the Bitter Rooters—that it is best to let them go in peace."
The Bozeman Times followed by noting that the Indians had "marched
leisurely right through the settlements of Missoula, boastful and inso
lent, but had killed no one so far as learned.
The change of opinion did not come easily.

One of the few editors

in Montana to express continued contempt for those Indians was Fisk who
had been the first to denounce the Nez Perce when the war erupted. He
wrote, on August l8, "that the Indians were by no means as prudent in
any respect as th^ were credited" during the Big Hole battle because
th^ had failed to post scouts and they had left their horses far enough
aw^ from camp to be easily captured.
This assessment was correct, assuming that no peace pact had been
made at Fort Fizzle,

Oddly enough, Fisk had been the only editor who

made mention of the fact that such a peace pact might have taken place.
On August 20, Fisk remarked editorially that "if it were possible
(for the Nez PerceJ to find a train loaded with whiskey it might serve a
good purpose in detaining the raiders and putting them hors du combat.
Two days later, Mills took a much different viewpoint.

^%utte Miner, August 7g I877,
^^Bozeman Times, August 9, 1877»
^%elena Daily Herald, August 18, 1877.
65Helena Daily Herald, August 20, I877.
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These Nez Perces have achieved renown for interpid [sicj courage
and indomitable purpose^, that goes as far as aught in the world
can do to atone their butcheries^ and ranks them among the first
warriors in the world, while he who leads them should be called
Moses instead of Joseph, Their warfare since th^ entered
Montana has been almost universally marked so far by the highest
characteristics recognized by civilized nations, the only devia
tion being killing the wounded or isolated parties. Th^ perpe
trated no imrders in Missoula county, and their slight pillaging
was less than that of the stragglers of a civilized army in the
eneuçr's country; while succeeding the battle of Big Hole, they
committed no outrages upon those they killed, but crossed their
hands and wrapped them decently in their garments or blankets.
. . . Let us give the Nez Perces their dues. Their valor hides
maqy a fault, and wrong in the outset may not have been wholly
theirs. ..
The Missoulian then quoted a lengthy statement by Ex-Senator
Nesmith, superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1857-=59, which was pub
lished in the New York Sun and explained the causes of the outbreak.
In part, he stated:
I can not better acquaint you with the history of their
wrongs than to refer you to a report which I, as a member of
a joint Congressional committee to investigate the condition
of Indian tribes, made to the U. S. Senate in 1865. In regard
to the charge made in that report against "Governor Caleb Lyons
of Lyonsdale," it is but proper to state that he was promptly
removed from office upon the strength of nçr charges. But
instead of depositing the public funds [annuities for the
Indians] in the U. S. depository in San Francisco, as the law
and regularity directed him, he started East with the money,
some forty odd thousand dollars, in a belt around his person.
On the morning of his arrival in Washington his empty belt was
cut open and found lying upon the floor of the sleeping car,
and ffl.s Excellency raised the hue and cry that he had been
robbed.
The robbery device was a thin and transparent one which
no sensible man believed, but the Nez Perce were robbed of
forty odd thousand dollars of their annuities in a Washington
sleeping car, and "Gov. Caleb Lyons of Lyonsdale" had a bill
pending before the last Congress for relief.
The Bozeman Times, on hearing of the surrender at Bear Paw,

^%ew North-West, August 21;, 1877.
^^Weekly Missoulian, September ll;, 1877»
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stated that although the killings ty the Nez Perce could not be condoned,
. . . it must be admitted that they have been forced into
rebellion by the action of the government and its thieving
agents and favorites who were permitted to plunder and encroach
upon them a long series of years| all of which will be investi
gated ty Congress and published to the world.
The New York Times summed up this matter by stating that the Nez
Perce war *'on our part, was in its origin and motive nothing short of a
gigantic blunder and a crime.Shortly afterward, the Nation paid
tribute to Joseph's generalship and "the manly and unflinching bravery
70
of his warriors."

But no words had more profound effect than those spoken ty the
President in a summation of the recent Indian wars. The tesct of the
address was reprinted in full in the Avant Courier^ and contained the
following remarks:
Many if not most of our Indian wars have had their origin
in broken promises and acts of injustice upon our part, and
the advance of the Indians in civilization has been slow
because the treatment thqy received did not permit it to
foster and be more general. ...
The faithful performance of our promises is the first
condition of a good understanding with the Indians.7^

^^Bozeman Times, October 11, 1877.
^%ew York Times, October 15, 1877.
7°The Nation, October 18, 1877.
^^Avant Courier, December 20, 1877.

CHAPTER VIII
CCNCLUSIQMS

To evaluate the rights and wrongs of such a complex series of
events in a few word?? is extremely difficult.
A wealth of information has yet to be uncovered about the Nez
Perce, the newspapers and the war of 1877• One area in particular lacks
sufficient documentation—Idaho newspaper coverage regarding the treaties,
councils and early fighting of the war»
Another area of importance which deserves attention is the series
of interviews conducted by Duncan McDonald with the Nez Perce after the
war. His reports were published in full in the New North-West of Deer
Xodge, Montana, in

I878.

Three general questions formed the basis for the majority of
research done in this study:
1. Who was responsible for the war?
2. What influence did the newspapers have on this and the events
that followed?
3. What events did follow^ and what was the general reaction to
them?
Surprisingly^ the first question was largely answered during the
war. An assumption at the outset was that little rational thought would
have been done concerning the Indians because of high emotions and the
lack of information about the causes of the war. It is to the credit of
editors, statesmen and soldiers (in that order) that the blame was fixed
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and accepted once the facts were made known»

Those facts were exposed

by newsmen in Washington who interviewed Indian commissioners, on the
one hand, and by pioneer editors in Montana who, having met face to face
with the Nez Perce at Fort Fizzle, admitted openly that these were not
"savage" Indians.
Those who are not fully acquainted with the treaties, broken
promises and corruption that resulted from government policy during the
22 years before the outbreak, invariably point to the massacre in cen
tral Idaho as the cause and justification for the war. While these acts
by Nez Perce braves were deplorable, it must be realized that theirs was
a reaction, a rebellion, a revolt against tyranny. How many Nez Perce
were murdered after the mining invasion of i860 by miners and settlers
has not been determined exactly, but scholars have estimated the figure
at 22, as noted. So far as is known, not once during those 22 years
before hostilities did the Indians break aty commitments or seek revenge
for the wrongs done to them. They did ask for justice concerning mur
ders by whites, but this was denied.
The second question regarding newspaper influence on the outbreak
has not been fully answered in this stucfy.

Without a thorough investi

gation of the Idaho press, it could not be. But the studies done by
Merrill Seal and Nancy Donner, as noted, suggest strongly that the papers
of that Territory in general, and the Lewiston Teller in particular,
contributed to the decision made by the military to force the non-treaty
Nez Perce to move to the Lapwai Reservation in June, 1877.
One of the assumptions made when the initial research was being
conducted for this study was that Montana newspapers contributed to that
decision, also. This was incorrect. Unlike the settlers of Idaho, the
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Montana populace had become fond of those Indians who passed through
their settlements on the annual treks to buffalo country. And, simi
larly, the Nez Perce liked the Montanans.

Trade relations were

excellent, for the Nez Perce had highly bred horses that were in demand^
and the whites had maty things the Indians wanted.

As a rule, the Nez

Perce were an unusually handsome people., evidenced by photographs of
them, and the people in the Bitterroot Valley were not above inviting
individuals into their homes or giving them medical attention»
When the news of the Idaho massacre reached Montana, the alarm
displayed by pioneer editors was not a great deal different, for the
most part, from that in New York or San Francisco.

But when it was

learned that the Indians were headed for the Montana border, alarm
turned to fear, which is understandable.
It was at this point that the Montana press markedly influenced
events. It has been noted in editorials that settlers in the Territory
generally were apathetic toward the entire matter.
were not.

Editors^ however

With the appointment of James H, Mills as adjutant general

of Kilitia, the volunteer movement became passionate. It has been sug
gested that he was involved in an intrigue concerning the call for
volunteers ly the governor.
very well substantiated.

The evidence is neither conclusive nor

But Mills did: (l) organize the entire

militia of the Territory (in one instance before he received authori
zation) while the governor was in Missoula; (2) make arrangements to
arm and equip those men; (3) send a dispatch to Colonel Gibbon at Fort
Shaw asking for help.
The Fort Fizzle affair is generally regarded ty scholars' as
relatively unimportant, probably because no battle was fought there.
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It has been contended for a long while that Joseph's maneuver around
the breastworks in Lolo canyon was a skillful and daring and most
unexpected move that threw the soldiers into confusion. This seems
unlikely, however, for there is considerable evidence that the whites
were prepared both for a direct attack and evasive action by the Nez
Perce.
Chief Joseph and Yellow Wolf both claimed that a verbal agreement
or "peace treaty" was made during the negotiations on July 28, I877.
Apparently this guarantee would allow the Indians free passage if th^
honored their word not to fight in Montana»

Considerable circumstantial

evidence, gleaned from newspaper accounts, supports the Nez Perce peace
claim. First, the governor, who was the chief negotiator, repeatedly
expressed his desire to avoid a fight that undoubtedly would be lost to
an Indian force that was superior in numbers, equipment and fighting
experience. The governor expressed his reasons for avoiding hostilities
to editors afterward.

He also publicly praised Captain Rawn for with

holding fire. Second, the Nez Perce were anxious to avoid a fight^ if
possible. Third, in their maneuver around the breastworks, th^ exposed
women and children to the rifles of the whites. Fourth, hats were waved
in friendly gestures by the Indians as they passed the entrenchments.
Fifth, the governor and the majority of volunteers alrea<^ had retired
from Fort Fizzle during the time of the passage. Sixth, no attempt was
made to follow up the Indians who moved slowly and camped nearby. A
small detachment that did, after two hours, take their trail, was greeted
in a friendly manner ty the chiefs. Seventh, the governor ordered the
Helena-Butte-Deer Lodge militia heading toward Missoula to halt.

Eighth,

the Nez Perce moved some 1^0 miles through Montana at a leisurely pace
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when it would have been entirely possible for the governor to have
raised a force of 1,000, or perhaps 2,000 men from Helena, Butte, Deer
lodge, Missoula, Bozeman and other communities to take the field.

He

was not authorized by the military to do this, however, and it is
apparent that the Nez Perce presented no threat that would compel him
to do so.

Ninth, the relations of the Nez Perce with the Bitterroot

settlers were cordial.

Tenth, when Colonel Gibbon made his surprise

attack at the Big Hole, he was able to approach a camp that was erected
in a place easily subject to attack from the mountainside.

There is no

evidence to suggest that the Nez Perce thought th%r were at war with
Montanans, for scouts were not even posted.

Eleventh, the governor

released no volunteers to participate in the fighting until Colonel
Gibbon had taken the initiative and recruited 3h volunteers in Missoula
and elsewhere.
This is the circumstantial evidence already documented which
supports the claims by two chiefs that a peace pact had been made at
Fort Fizzle. It may be asked why the governor did not announce the pact.
The reasons here are speculative, but important.

First, it was apparent

that the Bitterroot volunteers were satisfied that the Nez Perce were
friendly, and following their retirement from the breastworks, there
was little reason to announce that there would be no fighting.

Second,

this was the governor's first major role of leadership in Montana since
the impeachment proceedings the previous month.

In the principal cities

of the Territory emotions were highly pitched for war, especially in
view of the belligerent attitude toward the Nez Perce that seemed to
dominate the columns of Montana newspapers at the time.
editors had denounced the lack of support

Third, the

the military concerning
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volunteers and were adamant against allowing the Nez Perce to wander
through their Territory. It can be easily imagined what would have
happened if the governor, as commander in chief of the militia, announced
he had made a peace agreement with the Nez Perce. In Missoula, where
the situation was understood, it would have been accepted, but in Helena,
Butte, Deer Lodge and other large towns there would have arisen a cry,
^'Lynch him.^
Chauncey Barbour, editor of the Missoulian, was the first news
paperman in Montana to show regard for the Nez Perce. This took consi
derable courage, and he was damned for it at first. But the swing of
editorial opinion became general and, much to his credit, the first
editor to issue an unqualified statement that the Nez Perce were just
and correct in principle and honorable and brave in conduct was,
surprisingly, James H. Mills. Regardless of his position as adjutant
general, he acted on principle, too, when the facts were presented to
him.
The final major question, regarding the events that followed and
the general reaction to them, has been documented as well as possible
already.
Of particular note, however, was the complex and heated series
of controversies which erupted between several Montana editors over the
conduct of the military and militia. Termed "the newspaper war" in this
stu(^, one of the most interesting aspects about it was that the Nez
Perce—still being pursued by General Howard—were not especially involved
in the criticism. In fact, it was dui-ing the newspaper war that editors
issued statements of praise about the Indians.
Although it is a generalization, it might be noted as a guide for
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further research that the majority of newspaper controversies which
arose were based on misunderstandings.
taken by Governor Potts at Fort Fizzle.

This was true of the action
His most vocal editorial

assailant, R. E. Fisk, editor of the Helena Daily Herald, capitalized
on the affair because of former animosities.

Other editors rebuked

Fisk for his denouncements of the governor, but none of them clarified
exactly what had happened at Fort Fizzle.
Much of the criticism of General Howard was also the result of
misunderstanding.

He was denounced for "ordering" the Deer Lodge

volunteers to "retire" from the field just before the Big Hole battle.
The facts were finally brought to light when several of the Deer Lodge
volunteers wrote a letter which appeared in the New North-West explain
ing the situation. General Howard did not order the volunteers from
the field. They had mistaken his line of march and became separated.
Moreover, the volunteers expressed great respect for the general in
their letter and asked that all denunciations of him cease.

But on

several occasions, false and defamatory reports appeared as confirmed
news that General Howard was about to be or was replaced as commander
in the field.
Possibly the only editor who carried the newspaper war to extremes,
however, was Fisk. Although he stayed silent about General Howard for
the most part, his editorials concerning the governor. Mills, Fort Fizzle,
the volunteers, the President and the Nez Perce were unusually critical.
So far as could be gathered, his opinions changed little once his mind
was made up. Fisk led the impeachment fight against the governor and
lost. It was entirely evident from his editorials during the Nez Perce
war that resentment grew between the editor and Governor Potts.
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Apparently it was no great shock to other Montana editors that the
governor censored Fisk when General Sherman visited Helena,
The majority of editors, however, seemed very flexible in forming
and then changing their opinions as facts became known. It has been
noted, for instance, that the Nez Perce killed innocent persons while
in Montana. But none of these killings occurred until after the Big
Hole battle, during which Nez Perce women and children had been slaught
ered in large numbers. It was the one time, so far as is known, that
the Nez Perce as a group showed hatred for the whites. But when editors
learned of the killings in Yellowstone Park, they asked with sadness,
who is responsible for all the suffering?

And th^ answered the ques

tion, as it has been answered here, that the suffering arose from an
oppressive government policy that refused to respect the human rights
of an otherwise friendly people.

APPENDn

APPENDK

"RESPQMSIBILITY FCR THE IDAHO MR"

An article titled "Responsibility for the Idaho War"^
appeared in The Nation, a weekly periodical, on August 2,

I877,

and is quoted in full for three reasons:
First, it was published one week before the Big Hole
battle—a time of high emotion and considerable confusion
about the Nez Perce war;
Second, the information given and the opinions offered
prove conclusively that a great deal was understood about the
causes of the war during the early half of the campaign. This
article marks one phase of the turning point of editorial
opinion. After August, 1877, the Nez Perce no longer were
generally regarded as brutal savages;
Third, the penetrating insight of this article--which
has not since been published in scholarly works—affirms the
findings of this study.

It was reprinted widely by the Montana

press in late August, 1877.
The article carried no by-line and the author is unknown.

^The Nation, Vol. XXV (August 2,

1877),

pp. 69-70.

200
How far the Indian insurrection on the Pacific slope is for
the present suppressed is not decided, but it were well, while
its lesson is fresh, to realize that the Nez-Perces are not to
blame for the expensive and sanguinaiy campaign, unless being
goaded into a brief madness by the direct and endless oppression
of our Federal authorities be blameworthy, mat is remarkable
about their case is that the tribe had been faithful and peace
able since it was met by Lewis and Clark in l805; that official
frauds in its management—so often a just ground for complaint
—have not been alleged; but that the neglect and bad faith of
the general Government, continued for a quarter of a century,
not in petty matters and by individuals, requiring detection
and proof, but on a grand scale ty the United States itself,
and set forth in its own printed publications.
It is too late now to revise the policy of regarding Indians
as political communities having a right to the lands within the
boundaries of which th^ were found. The rule has been uniform
from the earliest discovery of North America, under the royal
Government, the colonies, the States, the confederacy, and the
present Union, to make treaties with their several tribes and
nations. Our Supreme Court has recognized their title by
occupancy, and when by treaty they have yielded to the United
States for certain considerations the main body of their lands,
there has been a solemn guaranty to them of the residue. In
many parts of the country the Indian title has been extinguished
before the whites have been legally permitted to settle upon or
obtain any rights in the land. This precaution, absolutely
necessary to prevent collision, was wholly neglected in refer
ence to the district now partly in Oregon but chiefly in Idaho
occupied formerly and still by the Nez-Perces, though there was
an express provision in the acts of Congress establishing the
Territories of Oregon and Idaho, that the land occupied Tgr
Indian tribes should not without their consent be included in
the limits or jurisdiction of those Territories, but should be
expected out of their boundaries. Section 1839 of the Revised
Statutes recognizes similar rights of person and property in
tribes embraced within the limits of a State, as well as a
Territory, unless the tribe shall consent to be so embraced.
The first treaty with the Nez-Perces was made June 11, 1855,
after a considerable number of whites had settled on the lands
acknowledged to be within their bounds. It provided that no
white man should be permitted, either before or after its
ratification, to reside upon the tract reserved, but in the
meantime it should be lawful for the Indians to reside on any
lands, either within or outside of that tract, not in the
actual claim and occupation of citizens. The whole of the
Wallowa Valley, the contest for which was the immediate cause
of the present insurrection, was distinctly included in the
reservation, and, unless it had been so, the elder chief Joseph
and his band, who claimed and occupied it, would haver have
been induced to agree to the treaty. Even with this stipula
tion, their signatures were procured with great difficulty and
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over-persuasion. These facts are not matters of inference, but
were formally reported by the Commission which in 1873 investi
gated all the subjects in controversy. The bands of the tribe
owned separate tracts of territory, with the full right of
treating severally respecting them, there being no organized
nation, and the loose confederacy not recognizing ar^ head
chief. An English-speaking chief of a mere band, A-sha-lote,
generally called La-wyer, was appointed head chief by the U. S.
Commissioners as a convenient part of their programme, but had
no original or accept authority as such.
This treaty was not ratified until April, 1859, without anyapparent reason for the delay but the mere neglect of the
Senate, and during these four years there had raged throughout
the region an extensive Indian war, in which the Nez Perces had
proved the only stay and bulwark of the Government. They es
corted the Governor of Oregon through hostile hordes, rescued
Col. Steptoe and his whole command after his defeat on May 17,
1858, and in the campaign of that year joined Col, Wright with
a mounted company raised by themselves, which rendered invalu
able aid, for which and for many horses furnished they were
not paid. They resisted all attempts of the Mormons, who
established a station on the Salmon River expressly to alienate
them from the Government, and by their fidelity and courage
saved the infant settlements. When, after ungrateful delay,
the ratification was at last proclaimed, and Congress added
to neglect absolute dishonesty, "by withholding appropriations
to carry out the contract made, the tribe yet remained faithful
and patient. Numerous emissaries from the Confederate States
in rebellion vainly came to them with arras and money, repres
enting with strong argument that the United States Government
was broken up, and urged as proof of the statement the non
payment of the annuities and other sums guaranteed. While th^
received no help in establishing themselves on the reservation,
to which most of them obediently repaired, they continued to
assist the Federal authorities in their hour of trial, though
the latter markedly, and in eveiy possible mode, violated their
agreements. Gold was discovered in i860, and fifteen thousand
white men poured into the very land set apart exclusively for
the Indian home, not only committing numberless individual
outrages but also violating the treaty with such system that
a town of 1,200 white inhabitants was laid out in the centre
of the reservation without the consent of the tribe and against
the protest of its agent.
In 1862 the proposition was made by Congress to settle these
evils by a new treaty, the debates showing it to be fully under
stood that the Indians had faithfully observed all the obligations
on their part, while the Government had wholly disregarded its
own. The idea of beginning to fulfill these honorably was not,
however, entertained. Accordingly, in June, 1863, Joseph and
his band, Eagle-from-the-Light, Big Thunder, and other chiefs
who did not recognize the supposititious head-chief Lawyer came,
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in obedience to summons, to a council, and encamped on the west
bank of the Lapwai, while the Lawyer faction remained on the
east bank. The main point of the treaty proposed by the Com
missioners was to reduce the reservation to about one-tenth of
its actual limits, leaving out of the new boundaries the whole
of the Wallowa Valley. To this Joseph and his party utterly
and expressly refused agreement, defying any authority in any
other part of the tribe to dispose of the land not only poss
essed by him before the treaty of 1855, but also guaranteed by
it, and retired from the council. The tribe thus become formally
divided about equally into "treaties" and "non-treaties," the
latter never recognizing any treaty later than that of 1855,
and never accepting any consideration.
About the year I87I Joseph died, bequeathing his beloved
valley to his band and his son. Young Joseph, as his successor
in the chieftaincy. The above facts are all admitted by the
Commission of 1873» The legal position, then, was that the
bands occupying the territoiy proposed to be ceded in I863 had
a right to consider, and did consider, the old treaty to be
inoperative because of the acknowledged failure of the United
States to comply with its terms, but whether or not it ceased
to be valid they retained the land before owned by them and
reserved in it. Also, having a perfect right to refuse agree
ment to the new treaty, they did so refuse. The title to the
Wallowa Valley, therefore, remained vested in Joseph's band.
The Commissioners, however, proceeded to conclude the new
treaty with the ramp of the council, which, though requiring
persuasion to deal at all with the Government that had before
shown itself so grossly deceitful, was induced to consent by
the simple arrangement of including the existing possessions
of its members in the new reservation. The birthplace of
Lawyer and the homes of his adherents being preserved to them,
they were willing to accept even the doubtful security of the
United States for nearly half a million of dollars as a consi
deration for the sale of a tract of land in which they had
little interest and no title. The transaction may be likened
to a supposed purchase in our colonial times by the parent
government from the Pennsylvanians of the charter and lands
of the New York colony, against its earnest protest, with the
provision that the latter should migrate from its home on the
Hudson for some grudged refuge among treacherous enemies—to
be driven by force in case of refusal, and the purchase-money
all paid to the undisturbed Quakers. The Lawyer party could
afford to be "friendly" on these terms, but in fact made little
by their unworthy bargain, for the Government has been consis
tently perfidious even to them. This new treaty, which, being
unjust and incomplete, should never have received the approbation
of the Senate, was not ratified for four years more, so that
while annuities and other payments under the old were not paid,
those just promised did not begin, and when there was a pretence
of fulfilling pledges, it was done with such delay and irregu
larity as to be nearly useless. The Territory of Idaho having
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been established, laws were enacted in direct disregard of the
Intercourse Act, and approved by the Governor, who was sc
officio the local superintendent of Indian affairs, therebyconfusing the aboriginal mind and inducing fear that the "great
father" had a "forked tongue." The allotments of land, with
certificate of title, pledged by the treaty have never yet
been given, and cannot be, because the surveys were made,
against the protest of the agent, in such a perfunctory style
as to leave no inner metes and bounds with monuments and records
so as to adjust the lines of farms. Intermixed with the con
fused and uncertain lines of the tribal fields are the farms
and improvements of white settlers. As, notwithstanding the
treaty, the Land Office had decided these claims to be legally
held
the whites, they naturally refuse to go off until paid
for them, and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs thereupon has
repeatedly asked Congress in vain for an appropriation to
remove this intolerable nuisance. There was small inducement
for Joseph to listen to ohe voice of the charmer and abandon
his vested rights for the new reservation.
As if there were not enough misunderstanding already
occasioned ly treaties and their violation, two contradictory
executive orders were issued. The first was dated June l6,
1873, setting aside a tract, including the disputed Wallowa
Valley, exclusively for the "roaming" or "non-treaty" Nez-Perces,
thereby acknowledging the justice of their claim to it, if not
the validity of their title, and they were formally told by the
local agent, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior,
that they should remain undisturbed in possession of this tract,
and that the white settlers, then about one hundred men, should
be removed. This order and promise were induced by the report
of the Commission of the preceding month, which came to the
following conclusion; "If any respect is to be paid to the laws
and customs of the Indians, then the treaty of I863 is not bind
ing upon this band. If so, then Wallowa Valley is still part
of the Nez-Perce reservation. If this is the case, the Government
is in equity bound to pay white settlers for their improvements
and for the trouble, inconvenience and expense of removing from
there." The Secretary of the Interior directed appraisements
to be made of these improvements, which amounted to the large
sum of $67,860, and probably frightened Congress so that no motion
was introduced to make the appropriations. It was not realized
that persistent national wrong is a debt at compound interest,
and that the payment of this equitable obligation in I87I1—though
it would have have been incurred if right and reason had earlier
prevailed—would have saved a much larger sum, as well as many
lives, in 1877» As no provision was made for the settlers, the
executive order above mentioned was, perhaps necessarily, revoked
another dated June 10, 1875» which restored the land to public
domain for sale, and it has since been surv^ed, forming a part
of Baker County, Oregon, Perfidy and tergiversation could no
further go, Joseph and his band became hopeless of earthly
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justice and ready victims to the new prophet who preached of
divine interposition. The settlers of course remained, and
also of course there has been for years a hostility sometimes
resulting in collision between them and the Indians (each party
regarding the other as trespassers), one of whom was last year
murdered, and his brother this summer exploded the mine of
insurrection by killing the murderer. This desperate rising
of a free, warlike, and uncivilized people against insupport
able wrong done by its professed guardian has been the natural
and necessary result of Congressional neglect in the ratifica
tion of a treaty until circumstances had wholly changed, and
in refusing appropriations and legislation necessary to fulfill
the solemn obligations of Government. It has been prophesied
with reiterated warning in successive printed reports of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and his agents, upon the atten
tion of Congress and its appropriate committees| so that the
responsibility is more definitely fixed in this instance than
can often be the case in Indian disputes, when the question
may be complicated by the errors or misconduct of officers
and of the tribes themselves.
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